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Abstract
Water quality is a major environmental issue.  Pollution from nonpoint sources is the
single largest remaining source of water quality impairments in the United States.
Agriculture is a major source of several nonpoint-source pollutants, including nutrients,
sediment, pesticides, and salts.  Agricultural nonpoint pollution reduction policies can be
designed to induce producers to change their production practices in ways that improve
the environmental and related economic consequences of production.  The information
necessary to design economically efficient pollution control policies is almost always
lacking.  Instead, policies can be designed to achieve specific environmental or other
similarly-related goals at least cost, given transaction costs and any other political, legal,
or informational constraints that may exist.  This report outlines the economic character-
istics of five instruments that can be used to reduce agricultural nonpoint source pollu-
tion (economic incentives, standards, education, liability, and research) and discusses
empirical research related to the use of these instruments.
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What Is the Problem?
The quality of the Nation’s surface water has improved since 1972’s Clean Water Act,
primarily through reductions in pollution from industrial and municipal sources.
However, water quality problems remain, especially those associated with nonindustrial
sources.  The latest EPA Water Quality Inventory reports that, of the water resources
assessed by the States, more than one-third of the river miles, lake acres, and estuary
square miles suffer some degree of impairment. 
Water pollution may be categorized into two types.  Point-source pollution enters water
resources directly through a pipe, ditch, or other conveyance.  Industrial and municipal
discharges fall into this category.  Nonpoint-source pollution enters water diffusely in
the runoff or leachate from rain or melting snow and is often a function of land use.
Nonpoint-source pollution has been identified as a major reason for remaining U.S.
water quality problems. Despite some progress in reducing agricultural production prac-
tices believed harmful to water quality, agriculture is generally recognized as the largest
contributor to nonpoint-source water pollution in the United States.  
Primary agricultural pollutants are sediment, nutrients, pesticides, salts, and pathogens.
A U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) study of agricultural land in watersheds with poor
water quality estimated that 71 percent of U.S. cropland (nearly 300 million acres) is
located in watersheds where the concentration of at least one of four common surface-
water contaminants (nitrate, phosphorus, fecal coliform bacteria, and suspended sedi-
ment) exceeded criteria for supporting water-based recreation activities.  Well-water
sampling by EPA and USGS has found evidence of agricultural pesticides and nitrogen
in groundwater resources, possibly threatening water supplies in some areas.
Comprehensive estimates of the damages from agricultural pollution are lacking, but
soil erosion alone is estimated to cost water users $2 billion to $8 billion annually.
Why Are Nonpoint Pollution Control Policies Needed 
and What Are the Issues Involved?
Nonpoint-source water pollution is an externality to the production process.
Externalities exist when some of the consequences of production (pollution’s imposing
costs on others) are not considered when production decisions are made.  The result is a
misallocation of resources from society’s perspective.  
A fundamental goal of environmental policy is to induce polluters to explicitly consider
the costs they impose on society through their production-related activities.  An ideal
goal of policy is to maximize the expected net economic benefits to society from pollu-
tion control, also known as the economically efficient or first-best outcome.  Designing
policies to achieve efficiency, however, is often impossible because the relationship
between economic damages and nonpoint pollution is seldom known.  Instead, policies
can be designed to achieve specific environmental goals (such as reducing ambient pol-
lution levels or reducing fertilizer applications in a region) at least cost, given the policy
instruments available to a resource management agency, relevant policy transactions
costs, and any other political, legal, or informational constraints that may exist.  Such
outcomes are often referred to as cost-effective or second-best.
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therefore consists of defining appropriate policy goals, choosing appropriate instru-
ments, and setting these instruments at levels that will achieve the goals at least cost.
There are difficulties associated with each of these aspects due to the complex physical
nature of the nonpoint pollution process.
Nonpoint emissions (runoff) cannot be measured at reasonable cost with current moni-
toring technologies because they are diffuse (i.e., they move off the fields in a great
number of places) and are impacted by random events such as weather.  In addition, the
process by which runoff is transported to a water body where it creates economic dam-
ages is also impacted by random events.  The random nature of these physical processes
creates some significant limitations in the way that policy goals with good economic
properties are defined, and in the types of policy tools that can be used to attain a cost-
effective outcome.  
Finally, runoff depends on many site-specific factors.  The better that policies and goals
can address these site-specific factors, the more efficient nonpoint policies will be.
However, obtaining the appropriate information to adequately design and implement
policies that address site-specific factors may be quite costly.  These costs may limit the
types of policies (e.g., to those that are more uniformly applied and informationally less
intensive) that can be used to control nonpoint pollution.
What Types of Policy Instruments Can Be Applied 
to Nonpoint-Source Pollution?
Five classes of policy instrument have either been applied to nonpoint-source pollution,
or are feasible tools.  These are economic incentives, standards, education, liability, and
research.  In evaluating a tool’s potential, a number of important economic, distribution-
al, and political characteristics are considered.  These include economic performance
(ability to achieve a goal at least cost), administration and enforcement costs, flexibility
(able to provide effective control in the face of changing economic and environmental
conditions), incentives for innovation, and political feasibility.  
Economic incentive-based instruments include performance incentives (taxes on runoff
or ambient water quality), design incentives (taxes or subsidies on inputs and technolo-
gy), and market-based approaches such as point/nonpoint trading (allowing different
sources to trade abatement allowances).  Ideally, incentives are directed at an aspect of
the pollution process (the instrument base) that is closest to the water quality problem,
such as ambient water quality or runoff into a stream (e.g., a runoff tax or subsidy).
However, because nonpoint-source discharges cannot be observed, runoff-based instru-
ments are currently infeasible.  In this report, we show that the most practical incentive-
based instruments are design incentives (including expected runoff incentives that use
runoff models), and market-based approaches (also based on design elements).
Incentive policies have generally not been applied to agricultural nonpoint-source pollu-
tion.  Cost-shares and other financial incentives offered by USDA are not subsidies in
the traditional sense, in that they are only offered over the short term.
Standards use the regulatory system to mandate that producers meet a particular envi-
ronmental goal, or that they adopt more socially efficient management practices.  In the-
ory, standards can be applied to performance measures, such as runoff or ambient quali-
ty, or to inputs and technology.  As with incentives, performance-based standards are
generally infeasible.  Design-based standards, which are feasible,  include standards
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ogy choice through the use of simulation models) and standards based more directly on
input use and technology choices. 
Design-based standards are being widely applied to agricultural nonpoint-source pollu-
tion problems.  Some examples include the required use of best management practices
on cropland, mandatory establishment of riparian buffer strips, and restrictions on where
and at what rates agricultural chemicals can be applied.
Liability rules can be used to guide compensation decisions when polluters are sued for
damages in a court of law.  Such rules, although they are employed only after damages
occur and if victims are successful in their suit, can theoretically provide ex ante incen-
tives for polluters to account for the environmental consequences of their actions.
Liability rules can be developed under two different frameworks: strict liability and neg-
ligence.  Polluters are held absolutely liable for payment of any damages that occur
under strict liability.  Alternatively, polluters are liable under a negligence rule only if
they failed to act with the “due standard of care.”  
In theory, an efficient level of pollution control can be achieved for each type of rule.  In
practice, however, the characteristics of nonpoint-source pollution limit the feasibility of
liability tools for achieving efficient control.  Liability depends on being able to identify
the individual sources of pollution when damages occur.  The inability to trace nonpoint
pollution back to its source greatly weakens the effectiveness of liability.  In addition,
liability rules that are based on performance measures require polluters to understand
how their choices impact the performance measures.  If these impacts are difficult to
predict or require an extensive amount of information, liability rules will be less than
effective in promoting more efficient production.  Liability rules are probably best suit-
ed for the control of pollution related to the use of hazardous materials, or for nonfre-
quent occurrences such as accidental chemical spills.  Liability is currently being used in
some States to protect groundwater supplies from agricultural chemicals.  
Education provides producers with information on how to farm more efficiently with
current technologies (minimizing excess use of chemicals, for example), or about new
technologies that generate less pollution and are more profitable (conservation tillage).
While such “win-win” solutions to water quality problems are attractive, education can-
not be considered a strong tool for water quality protection.  Its success depends on
alternative practices being more profitable than conventional practices, or that producers
value cleaner water enough to accept potentially lower profits.  Evidence from USDA
education programs suggests that net returns are the predominant concern of producers
when adopting alternative management practices.  Producers have not exhibited interest,
in general, in adopting practices that do not benefit them personally. In other words,
they do not voluntarily account for any externalities they create.  A more appropriate
role for education is as a support tool for other policies.  Education can shorten the time
it takes producers to successfully adopt alternative practices promoted through other
policies.  Education is widely used by USDA to promote the adoption of alternative
management practices.
Research and development can be an important component of a policy for reducing agri-
cultural nonpoint-source pollution because it provides producers and society with more
efficient ways of meeting environmental goals.  However, producers and private firms
will necessarily underinvest in research and development for water quality-improving
innovations.  Not all the benefits from research result in economic returns to investors.
vi •   USDA/Economic Research Service AER-782   •   Economics of Water Quality ProtectionPublic sector involvement is necessary either to carry out this research or to provide
producers and the private sector with incentives that result in more efficient research
investments.  Finally, research cannot independently provide a solution to water quality
problems.  Research cannot make producers account for the externalities resulting from
their production practices.  Instead, it serves as a valuable component of other approach-
es by expanding the set of alternative production practices.
What Is the Guidance for Nonpoint-Source Policy?
The characteristics of nonpoint-source pollution currently render performance-based
policies infeasible.  Education and research can be valuable in a support role, but cannot
stand alone.  This leaves design-based policies such as design standards and design
incentives (including market-based approaches) as the most viable options.  The charac-
teristics of nonpoint-source pollution and the diversity of resource conditions important
to agriculture rule against a single tool being applied to all problems.  For example, a
nitrates-in-groundwater problem might require a combination of fertilizer bans in well
recharge areas, reduced application rates elsewhere, the use of cover crops to soak up
nitrogen remaining in the soil after harvest, and the use of long-term easements to retire
marginal cropland.  The tool or combination of tools best suited for a particular problem
is an empirical issue based on policy goals, local conditions, and the costs of acquiring
information.  Policies designed to control the quality of expected or predicted runoff
have some of the desirable characteristics of performance-based policies, but depend on
models for estimating runoff.  Development of models that can estimate agricultural pol-
lutant flows in a variety of geographic and agronomic settings would greatly improve
effectiveness of nonpoint-source control policies. 
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water quality include soil erosion; runoff into rivers
and streams of fertilizers, animal waste, and pesticides;
and leaching into groundwater of nutrients and pesti-
cides.  However, agricultural pollution is only one
source of water quality problems; others include dis-
charges from industry and municipal sewage treatment
plants, urban runoff, and atmospheric deposition
(delivery by wind and rain).  Still, agriculture is identi-
fied as a major contributor to pollution of the Nation’s
surface waters (EPA, 1998a).
Public concern over the degradation of water
resources has led to a number of Federal, State, and
local policies and programs for protecting and
improving water quality.  The response has been
multifaceted.  Both regulatory and voluntary pro-
grams have been administered by a variety of
Federal, State, and local agencies.  On February 19,
1998, the White House released the Clean Water
Action Plan.  The plan states that:
After 25 years of progress, the nation’s clean water pro-
gram is at a crossroads.  Implementation of the existing
programs will not stop serious new threats to public
health, living resources, and the nation’s waterways, par-
ticularly from polluted runoff.  These programs lack the
strength, resources, and framework to finish the job of
restoring rivers, lakes, and coastal areas.  To fulfill the
original goal of the Clean Water Act—fishable and swim-
mable water for every American—the nation must chart a
new course to address the pollution problems of the next
generation. (EPA, USDA, 1998, pg. i).
Controlling water pollution can follow many courses.
Economics has an important, if not vital, role to play in
identifying policy strategies that can enhance water
quality at least cost.  An economic framework can coor-
dinate policy formulation among different levels of gov-
ernment and help to unify policies across regions. 
Reducing pollution requires changing the behavior of
polluters.  Since polluters are already operating within
an economic framework (the profit-maximizing one),
water quality protection policies can be seen as alter-
ing some of the economic variables a polluter consid-
ers when making everyday production decisions. 
On the other hand, economics also determines the opti-
mal level of water quality protection.  Society does not
benefit from overly stringent or costly water quality
goals. Measuring the benefits of water quality protec-
tion to water users in economic terms is often difficult,
since many benefits occur outside of easily observable
market conditions. Even where water quality impacts on
markets are observed, it can be difficult to ascertain just
how water pollution affects the ability of a resource to
provide economic goods.  Nevertheless, information on
benefits is essential to developing socially optimal water
quality protection policies.
In this report, we review alternative policy tools for
addressing nonpoint-source pollution.  Much progress
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Introductionhas been made in controlling pollution from point
sources, such as factories and municipal sewage treat-
ment plants.  However, nonpoint-source pollution is
much more complicated and elusive than point-source
pollution, and the tools developed for controlling one
do not necessarily apply to the other.  We first present
what is currently known about the quality of the
Nation’s water resources and agriculture’s contribu-
tions to existing problems.  The second chapter pres-
ents some guidelines for efficient policy design.  We
then review some issues surrounding policy develop-
ment and implementation, including the characteristics
of nonpoint-source pollution and the level of govern-
ment—Federal or local—best suited to addressing
those problems.  The next five chapters cover five
classes of  policy tools:  economic incentives, stan-
dards, liability, education, and research and develop-
ment.  Finally, we suggest the roles of different policy
instruments in a national strategy to control nonpoint-
source pollution, and identify additional research need-
ed to improve such a strategy.
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The Nation’s surface-water quality has improved since
1972’s Clean Water Act, primarily through reductions
in pollution from industrial and municipal sources.  No
longer are there news stories of the Cuyohoga River
catching fire, or Lake Erie being biologically dead.
Indeed, we read stories about increasing recreational
use of major rivers such as the Potomac, Delaware,
and Hudson, even close to major urban areas.
However, water quality problems remain, especially
those associated with nonindustrial sources.  We now
read of microbe-related fish kills in nutrient-enriched
waters, the presence of pesticides in drinking water,
and the degradation by nutrients of important national
resources such as the Gulf of Mexico, Chesapeake
Bay, and the Everglades.  In 1998, the White House
called for a shift in national water quality policy to
address more effectively the problems caused by non-
point-source pollution (EPA, USDA, 1998).
Water pollution may be categorized by two types of
sources.  Point sources discharge effluent directly into
water resources through an identifiable pipe, ditch, or
other conveyance.  Industrial and municipal discharges
fall into this category.  Nonpoint-source pollution
(NPS) enters water diffusely in the runoff or leachate
from rain or melting snow, and is often a function of
land use.  Agriculture is generally recognized as the
largest contributor to NPS water pollution in the
United States (EPA, 1998a).  Animal waste and certain
farm practices (soil tillage, use of chemicals, use of
irrigation) are the major sources of pollutants such as
sediment, nutrients, pesticides, salts, and pathogens.
The first part of this chapter presents what is known
about the current condition of the Nation’s water
resources.  The second section summarizes agricul-
ture’s contribution to specific water quality problems.
The costs of water pollution are then presented, along
with Federal and State programs to address water pol-
lution.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of
how deficiencies in current water quality data affect
water quality policies.
Surface Water
Since the passage of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.
§§ 1288, 1329) in 1972, water quality has improved
largely through reductions in toxic and organic chemi-
cal loadings from point sources.  Discharges of toxic
pollutants have been reduced by an estimated billion
pounds per year (Adler, 1994).  Rivers affected by
sewage treatment plants show a consistent reduction in
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Chapter 1
Current Water Quality Conditions and 
Government Programs To Protect Water Quality 
The quality of the Nation’s water is an important environmental issue.  While
water quality laws passed since 1972 have resulted in some improvements, many
water quality problems remain.  The latest EPA Water Quality Inventory reports
that, of the water resources assessed by the States, more than one-third of the river
miles, lake acres, and estuary square miles are impaired to some degree.
Nonpoint-source pollution has been identified as a major reason for these prob-
lems, with agriculture a major contributor.  Agricultural pollutants include sedi-
ment, nutrients, pesticides, salinity, and pathogens.  Comprehensive estimates of
the damages from agricultural pollution are lacking, but soil erosion alone is esti-
mated to cost water users $2 billion to $8 billion annually.  Federal and State pro-
grams rely heavily on economic and educational tools to deal with water quality
problems.  Inadequate water quality monitoring hinders use of a full range of poli-
cy instruments to deal with nonpoint-source water pollution.ammonia between 1970 and 1992 (Mueller and Helsel,
1996).  The percentage of the U.S. population served
by wastewater treatment plants increased from 42 per-
cent in 1970 to 74 percent in 1985 (Adler, 1994).  A
widely scattered surface-water monitoring network has
shown national reductions in fecal bacterial and phos-
phorus concentrations (Knopman and Smith, 1993;
Smith, Alexander, and Lanfear, 1993; Lettenmaier,
Hooper, Wagoner, and Faris, 1991; Mueller and
Helsel, 1996).  Case studies, opinion surveys, and
anecdotal information suggest that these reductions in
pollutants have improved the health of aquatic ecosys-
tems in many basins, particularly near urban areas
(Knopman and Smith, 1993).  However, challenges to
water quality remain, including continuing discharges
of pollutants from a growing population and economy,
inadequate discharge permit requirements in some
States, violations of permits issued, and pollution from
nonpoint sources.
The most recent EPA Water Quality Inventory reports
indicate the nature of water quality impairments (table
1-1) (EPA, 1998a).  The Water Quality Inventory is
prepared with information contained in biennial
reports from the States, required by the Clean Water
Act, on the status of their surface-water resources
(known as Section 305(b) reports).  In 1996, 36 per-
cent of river miles, 39 percent of lake acres (excluding
the Great Lakes), and 38 percent of estuary square
miles were found to not fully support the uses for
which they were designated by States under the Clean
Water Act (see box 1.1).  States reported that agricul-
ture is the leading source of impairment in the
Nation’s rivers and lakes, and a major source of
impairment in estuaries. 
While many agencies and organizations assess water
quality, only the 305(b) reports  provide a snapshot of
how well waters across the Nation meet designated
uses (see box 1.2).  However, 305(b) data are not gath-
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Table 1-1—Status of the Nation’s surface-water quality, 1990-96
Rivers                                         Lakes1 Estuaries            
Item                             1990     1992      1994     1996      1990     1992      1994      1996      1990      1992      1994      1996
Percent of total water*
Water systems  36 18 17 19 47 46 42 40 75 74 78 72
assessed
Percent of assessed waters
Meeting designated 
uses2:
Supporting 69 62 64 64 60 56 63 61 67 68 63 62





38 Not supporting 10 13 14 21 9 9 8 9 9
Clean Water Act 
goals: Fishable
Meeting 80 66 69 68 70 69 69 69 77 78 70 69
Not meeting 19 34 31 31 30 31 31 31 23 22 30 30
Not attainable 1 - - - 0 - - - - 0 0 0
Clean Water Act 
goals: Swimmable
Meeting 75 71 77 79 82 77 81 75 88 83 85 84
Not meeting 15 20 23 20 18 22 19 25 12 17 15 16
Not attainable 10 9 - - - - - - -  0 - -
- = less than 1 percent of assessed waters.
1 Excluding Great Lakes.
2 Supporting - water quality meets designated use criteria; partially supporting - water quality fails to meet designated use criteria at times; not
supporting - water quality frequently fails to meet designated use criteria.
3 In 1996, the categories “Partially supporting” and “Not supporting” were combined.
* Miles of rivers, acres of lakes, square miles of estuaries.
Source: Environmental Protection Agency, National Water Quality Inventories (1992b, 1994b, 1995, 1998a).ered in a consistent manner from one State to another,
and often are not based on actual monitoring.  Only a
portion of water bodies are actually monitored in any
given year (ranging from 19 percent of rivers and
streams to 94 percent of Great Lakes shoreline in
1996), so variations in estimates between years could
be due to changes in actual water quality, changes in
the water bodies sampled, or changes in assessment
protocols.  These data cannot therefore be used to
identify trends.  
Nationwide, about one-third of surface waters are
deemed impaired, but large, regional problems exist.
These include:
• The Great Lakes show only 3 percent of the
assessed shoreline miles (with 94 percent assessed)
fully supporting designated uses (EPA, 1998a).
Fish consumption is the designated use most fre-
quently impaired.  Most of the shoreline is polluted
with toxic chemicals, primarily polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCB’s), mercury, pesticides, and dioxins
that are often found in fish samples.  Atmospheric
deposition of toxics (delivery by wind or rain),
point sources, and contaminated sediment are the
leading sources of impairment.
• The Chesapeake Bay, the largest estuary in the
world, has seen water quality degrade due primari-
ly to elevated levels of nitrogen and phosphorus
(EPA, 1998a).  An aggressive pollution control pro-
gram has reduced phosphorus, but nitrogen concen-
trations have largely remained unchanged, leaving
the bay overenriched.  Excess nitrogen and phos-
phorus promote algae growth that clouds the water
and reduces oxygen levels.  Excessive nutrient lev-
els in tributaries of the Bay are believed responsi-
ble for the outbreak of the micro-organism
Pfiesteria, which led to large fish kills in 1997
(Mlot, 1997).  Shellfish harvests have declined dra-
matically in recent years, and poor water quality is
believed to be an important contributing factor
(State of Maryland, 1984).
• The Gulf of Mexico has seen since 1993 a doubling
in the size of an oxygen-deficient “dead” zone to
7,000 square miles (Rabalais, Turner, and
Wiseman, 1997).  The primary cause is believed to
be increased levels of nitrates carried to the gulf by
the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers.  The
amount of nitrate discharged into the gulf has
increased threefold since 1954 (Goolsby and
Battaglin, 1997).  A major source of nitrates is fer-
tilizers from the Upper Mississippi Basin
(Antweiler, Goolsby, and Taylor, 1995).
Ground Water
Groundwater quality in the United States is not well
known. Unlike surface water, no comprehensive
groundwater monitoring system exists.  However,
many States report on the general quality of their
groundwater resources in their section 305(b) reports.
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Box 1.1—How Is Water Quality
Defined?
The Clean Water Act (passed in 1972 as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act) defines water quality in
terms of designated beneficial uses with numeric and
narrative criteria that support each use.  Designated ben-
eficial uses are the desirable uses that water quality sup-
ports.  Examples are drinking water supply, primary-
contact recreations, and aquatic life support.  Numeric
water quality criteria establish the minimum physical,
chemical, and biological parameters required for water
to support a beneficial use.  Physical and chemical crite-
ria may set maximum concentrations of pollutants,
acceptable ranges of physical parameters, and minimum
concentrations of desirable parameters, such as dis-
solved oxygen.  Biological criteria describe the expect-
ed attainable community attributes and establish values
based on measures such as species richness, presence or
absence of indicator species, and distribution of classes
of organisms (EPA, 1994b).  Narrative water quality cri-
teria define conditions and attainable goals that must be
maintained to support a designated use.  Narrative bio-
logical criteria describe aquatic community characteris-
tics expected to occur within a water body.  
The Clean Water Act allows jurisdictions to set their
own standards but requires that all beneficial uses and
their criteria comply with the goals of the Act.  At a
minimum, beneficial uses must provide for the “protec-
tion and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife” and
provide for “recreation in and on the water” (fishable
and swimmable) (U.S. Congress, PL 92-500, 1972, p.
31).  The Act prohibits waste assimilation as a benefi-
cial use.
Source: U.S. Congress, PL 92-500, 1972.Of 38 States that reported overall groundwater quality
in 1992, 29 judged their groundwater quality to be
good or excellent (EPA, 1994b).  Generally, States
report that contamination of ground water is localized.
In 1994, over 45 States reported that pesticide and fer-
tilizer applications were sources of groundwater con-
tamination (EPA, 1995).  Other indications of ground-
water quality come from the EPA’s National Survey of
Pesticides in Drinking Water Wells, conducted in
1988-90.  The survey provided the first national esti-
mates of the frequency and concentration of nitrates
and pesticides in community water system wells and
rural domestic drinking water wells. 
Agricultural Pollutants 
Both natural and human-caused sources of pollutants
affect the Nation’s water resources.  Anthropogenic
sources include point sources, such as industrial and
municipal discharges, and nonpoint sources such as
agriculture, forestry, construction, and urban runoff.  
Agricultural pollutants include sediment, nutrients
(nitrogen and phosphorus), pesticides, salts, and
pathogens.  While farmers do not intend for these
materials to move from the field or enterprise, they
often do.  For example, as much as 15 percent of the
nitrogen fertilizer and up to 3 percent of pesticides
applied to cropland in the Mississippi River Basin
make their way to the Gulf of Mexico (Goolsby and
Battaglin, 1993).  A U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
study of agricultural land in watersheds with poor
water quality estimated that 71 percent of U.S. crop-
land (nearly 300 million acres) is located in water-
sheds where the concentration of at least one of four
common surface-water contaminants (dissolved
nitrate, total phosphorus, fecal coliform bacteria, and
suspended sediment) exceeds criteria for supporting
water-based recreation (Smith, Schwarz, and
Alexander, 1994). 
Sediment
Disturbing the soil through tillage and cultivation and
leaving it without vegetative cover increases the rate
of soil erosion.  Dislocated soil particles can be carried
in runoff water and eventually reach surface-water
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Box 1.2—Assessing Water Quality
Many Federal, State, and local agencies and private groups monitor water quality (EPA, 1997c).  The U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS) monitors surface and ground water extensively.  For example, under its National Stream Quality
Accounting Network, 618 watersheds of major U.S. rivers and streams are monitored for physical characteristics (e.g.,
stream flow, temperature) and quality characteristics (e.g., nutrient levels).  The USGS National Water Quality Assessment
Program uses a regional focus to study status and trends in water, sediment, and biota in selected major watersheds.  The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides grants for water quality monitoring, or, in some cases, conducts moni-
toring itself.  Under its National Monitoring Program, EPA attempts to obtain long-term data on the effectiveness of non-
point-source pollution control measures.  The Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Program is designed to provide
information on status and trends of selected waters for a variety of ecosystems.  Other Federal agencies involved in water
quality monitoring include the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  In some cases, other agencies and groups may receive Federal support for monitoring,
or they may conduct such activities for their own uses.  
However, using monitoring data to assess water quality at a national level is not a simple exercise.  Water quality varies by
time, location, and depth (e.g., shallow or deep portion of an aquifer or reservoir).  Further, water quality is composed of a
variety of characteristics, the importance of which will vary with the desired use of the water (e.g., dissolved oxygen con-
centration to support aquatic life; nitrate or pesticide concentrations that may violate drinking water standards; the pres-
ence of pathogens that would inhibit recreational uses).  In many cases, monitoring is often done to study only one or a
few components of water quality, or a specific problem, and might not address other quality questions.  USGS reports sta-
tus and trends of specific characteristics of water in which one may be interested, but does not weight the characteristics to
develop an aggregate measure.  EPA, in its biennial report to Congress on the Nation’s water quality, draws from the
States’ assessments of how well waters meet their designated uses to report an aggregate measure of water quality in dif-
ferent water sources (e.g., rivers, lakes, estuaries), though there is no standardization across the States. resources, including streams, rivers, lakes, reservoirs,
and wetlands. 
Sediment causes various damage to water resources
and to water users.  Accelerated reservoir siltation
reduces the useful life of reservoirs.  Sediment can
clog roadside ditches and irrigation canals, block navi-
gation channels, and increase dredging costs.  By rais-
ing stream beds and burying streamside wetlands, sed-
iment increases the probability and severity of floods.
Suspended sediment can increase the cost of water
treatment for municipal and industrial water uses.
Sediment can also destroy or degrade aquatic wildlife
habitat, reducing diversity and damaging commercial
and recreational fisheries.  Siltation is the leading pol-
lution problem in U.S. rivers and streams (EPA,
1998a).  Sediment damages from agricultural erosion
have been estimated to be between $2 billion and $8
billion per year (Ribaudo, 1989).  These estimates
include damages or costs to navigation, reservoirs,
recreational fishing, water treatment, water con-
veyance systems, and industrial and municipal water
use.
Trends in erosion losses and instream sediment con-
centration seem to show improvements in recent years.
The National Resources Inventory reports that the
average rate of sheet and rill erosion on cropland
declined by about one-third between 1982 and 1992.
In most regions, the USGS found that suspended sedi-
ment concentrations trended slightly downward over
the 1980’s, particularly in the Ohio-Tennessee, and
Upper and Lower Mississippi regions (table 1-2)
(Smith, Alexander, and Lanfear, 1993).  Areas charac-
terized by corn and soybean production and mixed
crops had the greatest downward trends.  Soil conser-
vation efforts over the past 10 years, particularly the
Conservation Reserve Program and Conservation
Compliance, likely played a role (USDA, ERS, 1997).
Table 1-3 shows estimated benefits of soil conserva-
tion programs to be on the order of several hundred
million dollars to billions of dollars over the life of the
conservation practices adopted.
Nutrients
Nutrients, chiefly nitrogen, potassium, and phospho-
rus, promote plant growth.  About 11 million tons of
nitrogen, 5 million tons of potash (the primary chemi-
cal form of potassium fertilizer), and 4 million tons of
phosphate (the primary chemical form of phosphorus
fertilizer) are applied each year to U.S. cropland
(USDA, ERS, 1997).  Nutrients can enter water
resources three ways.  Runoff transports pollutants
over the soil surface by rainwater, melting snow, or
irrigation water that does not soak into the soil.
Nutrients move from fields to surface water while dis-
solved in runoff water or adsorbed to eroded soil parti-
cles.  Run-in transports chemicals directly to ground
water through sinkholes, porous or fractured bedrock,
or poorly constructed wells.  Leaching is the move-
ment of pollutants through the soil by percolating rain,
melting snow, or irrigation water.
Of the three nutrients, nitrogen and phosphorus can
cause quality problems when they enter water systems.
Nitrogen, primarily found in the soil as nitrate, is easi-
ly soluble and is transported in runoff, in tile drainage,
and with leachate.  Phosphate is only moderately solu-
ble, and relative to nitrate, is not very mobile in soils.
However, erosion can transport considerable amounts
of sediment-adsorbed phosphate to surface waters.  If
soils have been overfertilized, rates of dissolved phos-
phorus losses in runoff will increase due to the buildup
of phosphates in the soil. 
Nitrogen and phosphorus from agriculture accelerate
algal production in receiving surface water, resulting
in a variety of problems, including clogged pipelines,
fish kills, and reduced recreational opportunities (EPA,
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Table 1-2—Trends in concentrations of agricultural
water pollutants in U.S. surface waters, 1980-90
Water 
resources                    Nitrate         Total          Suspended
region                                        phosphorus     sediment
Average percentage change per year
North Atlantic * -1.4 -0.4
South Atlantic-Gulf * 0.1 0.2
Great Lakes * -3.3 0.5
Ohio-Tennessee * -1.0 -1.3
Upper Mississippi -0.4 -1.2 -1.3
Lower Mississippi -1.6 -3.8 -1.2
Souris-Red-Rainy * -0.8 1.2
Missouri * -1.7 -0.2
Arkansas-White-Red * -3.1 -0.7
Texas-Gulf-Rio Grande * -0.9 -0.6
Colorado * -2.4 -0.8
Great Basin * -2.7 -0.2
Pacific Northwest * -1.7 -0.1
California * -1.4 -0.6
* Between -0.1 and 0.1.
Source: Smith, Alexander, and Lanfear, 1993.1998a).  Nitrogen is primarily a problem in brackish or
salt water, where it is the limiting nutrient, while phos-
phorus is primarily a problem in freshwater.  EPA
reports that nutrient pollution is the leading cause of
water quality impairment in lakes and estuaries, and is
the second leading cause in rivers (EPA, 1998a).
Increases in the occurrence of harmful algal blooms in
coastal waters have been attributed to nutrients from
human-caused sources, including fertilizers (Boesch
and others, 1997).  
Besides harming aquatic ecosystems, nitrate is also a
potential human health threat.  The EPA has estab-
lished a maximum contaminant level (MCL, a legal
maximum long-term exposure) in drinking water of 10
mg/liter.   Nitrate can be converted to nitrite in the
gastrointestinal tract.  In infants, nitrite may cause
methemoglobinemia, otherwise known as “blue-baby
syndrome,” which prevents the transport of sufficient
oxygen in the bloodstream.  Public water systems that
violate the MCL must use additional treatment to bring
the water they provide into compliance, though
exemptions are specified (42 U.S.C. §300g).  
Data (from USGS monitoring stations) on nutrients in
surface waters over the 1980’s show different trends for
nitrate and phosphorus (table 1-2) (Smith, Alexander,
and Lanfear, 1993).  Nitrate, in general, showed no sta-
tistically significant trend, which differs from the rise
noted during 1974-81 (Smith, Alexander, and Wolman,
1987).  This follows the pattern of agricultural nitrogen
use, which rose sharply during the 1970’s,  peaked in
1981, and then stabilized.  Phosphorus in water during
the 1980’s continued a decline noted in the 1970’s,
likely due to improved wastewater treatment, decreased
phosphorus content of detergents, reduced phosphorus
fertilizer use, and reduced soil erosion.  Indeed, the rate
of phosphorus decline in water in cropland areas was
more than twice that in urban areas (Smith, Alexander,
and Lanfear, 1993).
Exposure to nitrate in drinking water is chiefly a con-
cern to those whose source water is ground water,
which generally has higher nitrate concentrations than
surface water (Mueller and others, 1995).  From its
1988-90 national survey of drinking water wells, the
EPA found nitrate in more than half of the 94,600
community water system wells (CWS) and almost 60
percent of the 10.5 million rural domestic drinking
water wells, making nitrate the most frequently detect-
ed chemical in well water (EPA, 1992a).  However,
only 1.2 percent of the CWS’s and 2.4 percent of the
rural domestic wells were estimated to contain levels
above the MCL.  About 3 million people (including
43,500 infants) using water from CWS’s and about 1.5
million people (including 22,500 infants) using rural
wells are exposed to nitrate at levels above the MCL
(EPA, 1992a).
A 1991 USGS study of nitrate in near-surface aquifers
in the midcontinental United States detected nitrate in
59 percent of the samples taken (Kolpin, Burkart, and
Thurman, 1994).  Concentrations greater than the
MCL were found in 6 percent of the samples.
Statistical analyses indicated that the frequency of
samples having concentrations greater than 3 mg/l
(believed to be the maximum level from natural
sources) was positively related to the proximity of
agricultural land, to the use of irrigation, and to fertil-
izer application rates.
More recently, in a study of well water samples in 18
USGS National Water Quality Assessment Program
study units, USGS found that the MCL was exceeded
in about 1 percent of CWS’s and 9 percent of rural
domestic wells (Mueller and others, 1995).  About 16
percent of domestic wells under agricultural land
exceeded the MCL in selected watersheds, with partic-
ularly high proportions exceeding the MCL in the
Northern Plains (35 percent) and the Pacific (27 per-
cent) regions.
Data developed by the Economic Research Service of
the USDA were used to identify regions most vulnera-
ble to nitrate problems (see box 1.3).  (Data are not yet
available to conduct a similar analysis for phospho-
rus).  Residual nitrogen on cropland (nitrogen from
commercial fertilizer, manure, and natural sources in
excess of plant needs) is an indicator of potential
nitrate availability for runoff to surface water or leach-
ing to ground water.  Regions with relatively high
residual nitrogen include the Corn Belt, parts of the
Southeast, and the intensively irrigated areas of the
West (fig. 1.1).  Whether residual nitrogen actually
contaminates water depends on the leaching character-
istics of the soil and on precipitation.  For example,
regions with the greatest potential for nitrate contami-
nation of groundwater mainly include parts of the
Lower Mississippi River and the Southeast, based on
an index of groundwater vulnerability that considers
factors such as soil type and depth to ground water
(Kellogg, Maizell, and Goss, 1992) (fig. 1.2).  A simi-




















No datalar index is not yet available for surface water.
However, areas with high residual nitrogen and low
soil permeability would tend to have a high surface-
water vulnerability.
Nitrogen from animal waste is an important source of
total nitrogen loads in some parts of the country.  A
USGS study of nitrogen loadings in 16 watersheds found
that manure was the largest source in 6, primarily in the
Southeast and Mid-Atlantic States (Puckett, 1994). 
Nitrogen (and other contaminants) from manure is an
increasing concern given the recent trend toward larg-
er, more specialized beef, swine, and poultry opera-
tions.  Approximately 450,000 operations nationwide
confine or concentrate animals (EPA, 1998a).  Of
these, about 6,600 have more than 1,000 animal units,
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Box 1.3—Using GIS To Create the Maps
Residual Nitrogen Including Manure (fig. 1.1).  Residual nitrogen is that portion of nitrogen available from natural and
manmade sources that is not taken up by crops.  Residual nitrogen on cropland (nitrogen from both commercial and manure
sources in excess of plant needs) is an indicator of potential nitrate availability for runoff to surface water or leaching to
ground water.  Data for this figure include commercial fertilizer applications and manure use by farmers recorded in
ERS/NASS Cropping Practices, Area Studies, Fruit, and Vegetable Surveys during 1990-1993 (USDA-ERS/NASS).
Manure application rates were calculated from 1992 Census of Agriculture data on livestock numbers and average livestock
densities by animal type.  Nitrogen fixation by legumes in the rotation and nitrogen uptake by crops were estimated using
standard agronomic coefficients (Meisinger, 1984; Meisinger and Randall, 1991). 
Groundwater Vulnerability Index for Nitrogen, Including Manure (fig. 1.2).  Nitrate leaching depends on the quantity
of residual nitrogen above crop needs and the leachability of the soils to which it is applied. Residual nitrogen, calculated
as above, is combined with the leaching characteristics of the soil and the rainfall characteristics in an index of vulnerabili-
ty to leaching (Kellogg and others, 1992).
Manure Nitrogen per Acre of Onsite Cropland, 1992 (fig. 1.3).  The amount of nitrogen from manure per acre of land
available to the operation for land disposal is an indicator of potential problems with excessive manure nitrogen.
Economically recoverable nitrogen in manure from confined cattle, swine, and poultry per acre of cropland and managed
pasture on the operation is a more sensitive measure than the ratio of nitrogen from manure to total cropland because live-
stock operators may not have access to much of the land in a county.  This measure was developed by Letson and
Gollehon from census farm micro data at the U.S. Bureau of the Census, accounting for disclosure restrictions (Letson and
Gollehon, 1996).  
Nitrogen From Point Sources (fig. 1.4).  National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit data on
nitrogen discharged by point sources is reported by EPA in the Permit Compliance System (PCS).  Both municipal sewage
treatment plants and industrial point sources are required to have NPDES permits (Moreau, 1994).  However, because
ambient pollutant levels may not be nitrogen-limited, or because nitrogen reductions may not otherwise be called for,
many point sources that could be expected to have nitrogen discharges report none.  
Groundwater Vulnerability Index for Pesticides, Weighted by Persistence and Toxicity (fig. 1.5).  The amount of
active pesticide ingredient applied is an inadequate measure of ground water vulnerability because it does not account for
the time the pesticide remains in contact with the environment, the relative seriousness of exposure, and the likelihood that
the pesticide will be leached.  Data for this figure include pounds of active ingredients in pesticide applications by farmers
recorded in ERS/NASS Cropping Practices, Area Studies, Fruit and Vegetable Surveys during 1990-1993 (USDA-
ERS/NASS).  Persistence of the material in the environment is proportional to the half-life of the material (Kellogg,
Maizel, and Goss, 1992).  The seriousness of exposure is inversely proportional to the toxicity of the material, measured
by the lethal dose (LD50) in rats.  Pesticide leaching depends on the characteristics of the active ingredient with regard to
solubility and transport, and the leachability of the soils to which it is applied.  Pesticide characteristics are combined with
the leaching characteristics of the soil and the rainfall characteristics in an index of vulnerability to leaching (Kellogg and
others, 1992).and are defined under the Clean Water Act as
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, or CAFO’s.
Such operations must handle large amounts of animal
waste, and can cause two sources of water quality
problems.  First, CAFO’s require large and sophisticat-
ed manure handling and storage systems, which have
at times failed with serious local consequences (see
box 1.4, “Animal Waste Storage Failures”).  Second,
CAFO’s tend to lack sufficient cropland on which
manure can be spread without exceeding the plants’
nutrient needs (Letson and Gollehon, 1996).  The
highest ratios of manure nitrogen to land are mostly
found in parts of the Southeast, Delta, and Southwest
(fig. 1.3).  
Agricultural activities are not the only source of nutri-
ent pollution.  Other loadings stem from point sources
such as wastewater treatment plants, industrial plants,
and septic tanks.  Atmospheric deposition of pollutants
is another nonpoint source of nitrogen.  Indeed, more
than half the nitrogen emitted into the atmosphere
from fossil fuel-burning plants, vehicles, and other
sources is deposited on U.S. watersheds (Puckett,
1994).  The shares of total nitrogen load to selected
eastern U.S. estuaries from atmospheric deposition
have been estimated to range between 4 and 80 per-
cent (Valigura, Luke, Artz, and Hicks, 1996). 
The shares of point and nonpoint sources vary by
region, with commercial agricultural fertilizers the
dominant source in some areas of the West, and in the
central and southeastern United States (Puckett, 1994).
Nitrogen discharges from point sources such as
sewage treatment plants and fertilizer plants, based on
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System per-
mits, are concentrated in the Northeast and Lake
States, often areas with major population centers and
large concentrations of industry (fig. 1.4).  By compar-
ing figures 1.1 and 1.4, one can identify regions where
water resources are likely stressed by both point and
nonpoint sources of nitrogen.  These include the east-
ern Corn Belt, Florida, Mid-Atlantic, and the agricul-
tural valleys of California.  
The cost of nutrients in water resources has not been
fully estimated.  EPA (1997a) estimated costs of $200
million for additional drinking water treatment facili-
ties to meet Federal nitrate standards.  Also, consumers
are estimated to be willing to pay significant sums to
reduce nitrate in the water.  Crutchfield, Feather, and
Hellerstein (1995) estimated total consumer willing-
ness to pay for reduced nitrate in drinking water in
four areas of the United States to be about $350 mil-
lion per year. 
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Box 1.4—Animal Waste Storage Failures
The growing concerns over concentrated animal operations were highlighted in June 1996 when a dike surrounding a large
hog-waste lagoon in North Carolina failed, releasing an estimated 25 million gallons of hog waste (twice the volume of the
oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez) into nearby fields, streams, and the New River (Satchell, 1996).  The 8-acre earthen
lagoon was built to allow microbes to digest the waste, and is a common form of management for confined operations.
The spill killed virtually all aquatic life in the 17-mile stretch between Richlands and Jacksonville, NC (Satchell, 1996).
There are approximately 6,000 confined animal operations with at least 1,000 animal units in the United States (Letson and
Gollehon,1996).  (One animal unit equals 1 beef head, 0.7 dairy head, 2.5 hogs, 18 turkeys, or 100 chickens.)  Under the
Clean Water Act, these facilities cannot discharge to waters except in the event of a 25-year/24-hour storm.  This require-
ment necessitates the construction of onsite storage facilities for holding manure and runoff.  In addition to these large oper-
ations, facilities with more than 300 animal units that discharge directly to waters are required to take the same measures.
Regions with large numbers of animal operations containing more than 1,000 animal units include the Northern Plains (for
beef), Pacific (dairy), Corn Belt (swine), Appalachian (swine), and Southeast (broilers) (Letson and Gollehon, 1996).
Most States are responsible for carrying out Clean Water Act regulations.  A survey of livestock waste control programs in
10 Midwest and Western States indicated that few States actively inspect facilities for problems, including the integrity of
storage structures (Iowa Dept. Nat. Res., 1990).  National estimates of broken or leaking storage facilities do not exist.
However, a North Carolina State University study estimated that wastes were leaking from half of North Carolina’s
lagoons built before 1993 (Satchell, 1996), so the problem may be widespread.12 •   USDA/Economic Research Service AER-782   •   Economics of Water Quality Protection
Source: USDA, ERS
Figure 1.3
Manure nitrogen per acre of onsite cropland, 1992
Pounds per acre (county rank)
< 3.6 (lowest 10%)
3.61 - 19.5 (10 - 50%)
19.51 - 113.8 (50 - 90%)
> 113.8 (highest 10%)
Figure 1.4Pesticides
A wide variety of pesticides are applied to agricultural
crops to control insect pests, fungus, and disease.  Well
over 500 million pounds (active ingredient) of pesti-
cides are applied annually on farmland, and certain
chemicals can travel far from where they are applied
(Smith, Alexander, and Lanfear, 1993; Goolsby and
others, 1993).  Pesticides move to water resources
much as nutrients do, in runoff, run-in, and leachate.
In addition, pesticides can be carried into the air
attached to soil particles or as an aerosol, and deposit-
ed into water bodies with rainfall.  Which route a pes-
ticide takes depends on its physical properties and the
properties of the soil.  
Pesticide residues reaching surface-water systems may
harm freshwater and marine organisms, damaging
recreational and commercial fisheries (Pait, DeSouza,
and Farrow, 1992).  Pimentel and others (1991) esti-
mate that direct annual losses from fish kills due to
pesticides are less than $1 million, though the authors
considered their result an underestimate.   
Pesticides in drinking water supplies may also pose
risks to human health.  Some commonly used pesti-
cides are probable or possible human carcinogens
(Engler, 1993).  Regulation requires additional treat-
ment by public water systems when certain pesticides
exceed health-safety levels in drinking water supplies,
though exemptions are specified (42 U.S.C. §300).
Enforceable drinking water standards have been estab-
lished for 15 currently used pesticides, and more are
pending (see box 1.5, “Maximum Contaminant
Levels”).  EPA (1997a) estimates that costs for addi-
tional treatment facilities needed to meet current regu-
lations for pesticides and other specific chemicals
would be about $400 million, with about another $100
million required over the next 20 years.
Pesticides are commonly detected in water quality
studies, though usually at low levels.  USGS (1997)
detected at least one pesticide in every sampled stream
and in about half of sampled ground water in 20 major
U.S. watersheds.  Pesticides in water supplies have
been scrutinized in the Midwest, where large amounts
of pesticides are used.  Goolsby and others (1993)
found that herbicides are detected throughout the year
in the rivers of the Midwest, including the Mississippi
River.  Concentrations are highest during the spring
when most pesticides are applied and when spring
rains occur.  The amounts transported by streams and
rivers in the Midwest are generally less than 3 percent
of the amount applied, but can still result in concentra-
tions above the MCL (Goolsby and others, 1993).
Atrazine (and its metabolites), alachlor, cyanazine, and
metolachlor, used principally for weed control in corn
and soybeans, were the principal contaminants detect-
ed, and are also the most widely used pesticides in the
region.  Such chemicals, once in drinking water sup-
plies, are not controlled by conventional treatment
technologies (Miltner and others, 1989).  
Pesticides may pose a special problem for reservoirs.
Results from a study of herbicides in 76 midwestern
reservoirs showed that some herbicides are detected
more frequently throughout the year in reservoirs than
in streams, and except for the spring, at higher concen-
trations (Goolsby and others, 1993).  Many of these
reservoirs receive much of their storage during the
spring and early summer rains, when runoff from
cropland contains high concentrations of herbicides.
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Box 1.5—Maximum Contaminant Levels
Public water systems are required to ensure that chemi-
cals in the water are below specified thresholds, the max-
imum contaminant level (MCL) for each chemical.
These are enforceable standards, set by EPA, that are
considered feasible and safe.  MCL’s have been set for
15 agricultural chemicals.
















Source: EPA, 1994a.Because the half-lives of many herbicides are longer in
the water than in the soil, relatively high concentra-
tions can persist in reservoirs long after the materials
have been applied. 
Some pesticides leach into underlying aquifers.
Pesticides or their transformation products have been
detected in the ground water of 43 States (Barbash and
Resek, 1995).  EPA’s survey of drinking water wells
found that 10 percent of the CWS’s and 4 percent of
rural domestic wells contained at least one pesticide
(1992a).  However, the EPA estimated that less than 1
percent of the CWS’s and rural domestic wells had
concentrations above MCL’s or Lifetime Health
Advisory Levels (the maximum concentration of a
water contaminant that may be consumed safely over
an average lifetime).  In a 1991 study of herbicides
and some of their metabolites in near-surface aquifers
in the midcontinental United States, USGS detected at
least one herbicide in 28.7 percent of the wells sam-
pled (Kolpin, Burkart, and Thurman, 1994).  However,
no herbicides were found at concentrations greater
than the MCL or Lifetime Health Advisory Level.
Atrazine and its metabolite desethylatrazine were the
most frequently detected compounds.
Groundwater vulnerability to pesticides varies geo-
graphically, depending on soil characteristics, pesticide
application rates, and the persistence and toxicity of
the pesticides used (fig. 1.5) (see box 1.3 for a descrip-
tion of how the map was created).  Areas with sandy,
highly leachable soils and high application rates of
toxic or persistent pesticides, such as central Nebraska,
generally have high vulnerability ratings.  Irrigated
areas in Idaho, California, Texas, Washington, and the
Southeast also have high vulnerability ratings.  Despite
widespread use of pesticides, the Corn Belt ranks
lower than some of the above-mentioned areas because
the predominant soils are not prone to leaching, are
not irrigated, or because the chemicals used (mostly
herbicides) are less persistent or toxic.  
Salts
When irrigation water is applied to cropland, a portion
of it runs off the field into ditches and flows back to a
receiving body of water.  These irrigation return flows
may carry dissolved salts, as well as nutrients and pesti-
cides, into surface or ground water.  Increased concen-
trations of naturally occurring toxic minerals, such as
selenium and boron, can harm aquatic wildlife and
14 •   USDA/Economic Research Service AER-782   •   Economics of Water Quality Protection
Source: USDA, ERS
Figure 1.5







No datadegrade recreational opportunities.   Increased levels of
dissolved solids in public drinking water can increase
water treatment costs, force the development of alterna-
tive water supplies,  and reduce the lifespans of water-
using household appliances.  Increased salinity levels in
irrigation water can reduce crop yields or damage soils
so that some crops can no longer be grown.  
Dissolved salts and other minerals are an important
cause of pollution in the Southern Plains, arid
Southwest, and southern California.  Total damages
from salinity in the Colorado River range from $310
million to $831 million annually, based on the 1976-85
average levels of river salinity.  These include damages
to agriculture ($113-$122 million), households ($156-
$638 million), utilities ($32 million), and industry ($6-
$15 million) (Lohman, Milliken, and Dorn, 1988). 
The USGS reports mixed trends of salinity in surface
water over the 1980’s (Smith, Alexander, and Lanfear,
1993).  Measures of dissolved solids (mostly ions of
calcium, magnesium, sodium, potassium, bicarbonate,
sulfate, and chloride) indicate that water quality
improved at more stations than it worsened.  Salinity
trends in water for domestic and industrial purposes
generally improved during the 1980’s, though salinity
worsened for irrigation purposes.  Among USGS cata-
loguing units (watersheds) with significant irrigation
surface-water withdrawals, the share with annual aver-
age dissolved solids concentrations greater than 500
mg/L increased from 30 percent in 1980 to 33 percent
in 1989 (Smith, Alexander, and Lanfear, 1993).
Pathogens
The possibility of pathogen-contaminated water sup-
plies is attracting increased attention (NRAES, 1996;
Olson, 1995).  Bacteria are the third leading source of
impairment of rivers and the second leading cause in
estuaries (EPA, 1998a).  Potential sources include
inadequately treated human waste, wildlife, and ani-
mal operations.  Animal waste contains pathogens that
pose threats to human health (CAST, 1996).
Microorganisms in livestock waste can cause several
diseases through direct contact with contaminated
water, consumption of contaminated drinking water, or
consumption of contaminated shellfish.  Bacterial,
rickettsial, viral, fungal, and parasitic diseases are
potentially transmissible from livestock to humans
(CAST, 1996).  Fortunately, proper animal manage-
ment practices and water treatment minimize the risk
to human health posed by most of these pathogens.
However, protozoan parasites, especially
Cryptosporidium and Giardia, are important etiologic
agents of water-borne disease outbreaks (CDC, 1996).
Cryptosporidium and Giardia may cause gastrointesti-
nal illness, and Cryptosporidium may lead to death in
immunocompromised persons.  These parasites have
been commonly found in beef herds, and
Cryptosporidium is estimated to be prevalent on dairy
operations (USDA, APHIS, 1994; Juranek, 1995).  
Outbreaks of waterborne diseases are a growing con-
cern.  EPA (1997a) estimates the cost of facilities for
improved microbial treatment to be about $20 billion
over the next 20 years, with about half of that needed
immediately.  The health cost of Giardia alone is esti-
mated to be $1.2-$1.5 billion per year (EPA, 1997b).
Cryptosporidia is a more recently identified threat,
with oocysts present in 65-97 percent of surface water
sampled in the United States (CDC, 1995).  The organ-
ism has been implicated in gastroenteritis outbreaks in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin (400,000 cases and 100 deaths
in 1993) and in Carrollton, Georgia (13,000 cases in
1987).  The cost of the Milwaukee outbreak is estimat-
ed to exceed $54 million (Health and Environment
Digest, 1994).  While the source of the organism in
these outbreaks was never determined, its occurrence
in livestock herds has brought some attention to this
sector, especially given the proximity of cattle and
slaughterhouses to Milwaukee (MacKenzie and others,
1994).  
Costs of Pollution
The total costs of water pollution from point and non-
point sources are largely unknown.  Research has
examined the costs of some specific pollutants (e.g.,
sediment) or the costs of poor water on some desired
uses (e.g., recreation).  Other indicators of damages
include the estimated benefits from pollution control
efforts, which give a lower bound to damages (table 1-
3).  Water quality damages due to sediment from soil
erosion are substantial, and appear greater than esti-
mated damages from other pollutants (nutrients, pesti-
cides, and pathogens). 
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Table 1-3—National estimates of the damages from water pollution or benefits of water pollution control
Estimate of— Study/year  Description
Selected estimates of annual damages 
Water quality damages  Clark and others (1985) Damages to all uses: $3.2-$13 billion, “best guess” of 
from soil erosion   $6.1 billion (1980 dollars).  Cropland’s share of 
damages: $2.2 billion. 
Water quality damages from Ribaudo (1989) Damages to all uses: $5.1-$17.6 billion, “best guess” of  
soil erosion   $8.8 billion.  Agriculture’s share of damages: $2-$8 
billion. 
Adjustments to net farm income Hrubovcak, LeBlanc,  Reduction in net farm income account of about
considering effects  of soil and Eakin (1995) $4 billion due to soil erosion effects.
erosion    
Environmental costs  Pimentel and others (1991)  Direct costs from fish kills: less than $1 million. 
of pesticides
Infrastructure needs to protect EPA (1997a) $20 billion in current and future (20-year) need under 
drinking water from poor Safe Drinking Water Act requirements for microbial
source-water quality   treatment; $0.2 billion for nitrates; and $0.5 billion for 
other synthetic chemicals, including pesticides. 
Health costs from waterborne EPA (1997b) Damages from Giardia outbreaks:  $1.2-$1.5 billion in 
disease outbreaks   health costs.  
Recreational damages of Freeman (1982)  Total recreational damages from all forms of water
water pollution   pollution: $1.8-$8.7 billion; “best guess” of $4.6 billion
(1978 dollars/year). 
Selected estimates of annual benefits from water pollution control 
Water quality benefits of Ribaudo (1986) Erosion reduction from practices adopted under the 
reduced soil erosion from 1983 soil conservation programs were estimated to 
conservation practices     produce $340 million in offsite benefits over the lives 
of the practices.   
Water quality benefits of Ribaudo (1989) Reducing erosion via retirement of 40-45 million acres
reduced soil erosion from of highly erodible cropland would generate $3.5-$4.5
Conservation Reserve Prog.     billion in surface-water quality benefits over the life of 
the program. 
Recreational fishing benefits Russell and Vaughan (1982) Total benefits of $300-$966 million, depending on the 
from controlling water pollution  quality of fishery achieved. 
Recreational benefits of surface- Carson and Mitchell (1993) Annual household willingness to pay for improved
water pollution control    recreational uses of $205-$279 per household per year, 
or about $29 billion. 
Recreational benefits of Feather and Hellerstein (1997) Total of $611 million in benefits from erosion 
soil erosion reductions  reductions on agricultural lands since 1982, based on 
recreation survey data.  Programs for Controlling
Agricultural Pollution
Agricultural nonpoint-source pollution (NPS) is
addressed at both Federal and State levels.  A host of
programs using several types of policy instruments
have been implemented.
Federal Programs
At the Federal level, EPA is chiefly responsible for poli-
cies and programs that deal with water quality, mainly
under provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972 (the Clean Water Act).  The Act deals with
point-source pollution through technology-based con-
trols (uniform, EPA-established standards of treatment
that apply to certain industries and municipal sewage
treatment facilities), and water quality-based controls
that invoke State water quality standards (Moreau,
1994).  The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) sets limits on individual point-source
effluents.  Large, confined animal operations (over
1,000 animal units) fall under the NPDES, though
enforcement has been a problem, and many facilities
lack permits (Westenbarger and Letson, 1995).  
When technology-based controls are inadequate for
waters to meet State water quality standards, Section
303(d) of the Clean Water Act requires States to identi-
fy those waters and to develop total maximum daily
loads (TMDL) (EPA, 1993).  A TMDL is the sum of
individual wasteload allocations for point sources, load
allocations for nonpoint sources and natural back-
ground, and a margin of safety (Graham, 1997).  A
TMDL approach forces the accounting of all sources
of pollution.  This helps identify how additional basin
reductions, if needed, might be obtained.   EPA has
responsibility for developing TMDL’s if a State fails to
act (EPA, 1993).  Over 500 TMDL plans have been
initiated since 1992, and 225 have been completed and
approved by EPA (EPA, 1997).  
NPS pollution is dealt with directly in several pro-
grams authorized by the Clean Water Act.  Section 319
established EPA’s Nonpoint Source Program, which
grants States funds to develop and promote nonpoint-
source management plans and other programs.  EPA
also provides program guidance and technical support
under the program.  States had a deadline of 1995 for
developing and implementing nonpoint-source man-
agement plans.  Under the Clean Lakes Program (sec.
314), EPA provides grants to States for various activi-
ties, including projects to restore and protect lakes.
The National Estuary Program (sec. 320) helps States
develop and implement basinwide comprehensive pro-
grams to conserve and manage their estuary resources.  
The Coastal Zone Management Act Reauthorization
Amendments (CZARA) is the first federally mandated
program requiring specific measures to deal with agri-
cultural nonpoint sources (16 U.S.C. §§ 1455(d)(16),
1455b).  CZARA requires each State with an approved
coastal zone management program to submit a program
to “implement management measures for NPS pollution
to restore and protect coastal waters” (cited in USDA,
ERS, 1997).  States can first try voluntary incentive
mechanisms, but must be able to enforce management
measures if voluntary approaches fail.  Implementation
of plans is not required to begin until 2004.
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) requires the
EPA to set standards for drinking water quality and
requirements for water treatment by public water sys-
tems (Morandi, 1989).  The SDWA authorized the
Wellhead Protection Program in 1986 to protect sup-
plies of ground water used as public drinking water
from contamination by chemicals and other hazards,
including pesticides, nutrients, and other agricultural
chemicals (EPA, 1993).  The program is based on the
concept that land-use controls and other preventive
measures can protect ground water.  As of December
1998, 45 States had an EPA-approved wellhead protec-
tion program (EPA, Office of Ground Water and
Drinking Water, 1998).  The 1996 amendments to the
SDWA require EPA to establish a list of contaminants
for consideration in future regulation (EPA, 1998b).
The Drinking Water Contaminant Candidate List,
released in March 1998, lists chemicals by priority for
(a) regulatory determination, (b) research, and (c)
occurrence determination.  Several agricultural chemi-
cals, including metolachlor, metribuzin, and the tri-
azines, are among those to be considered for potential
regulatory action (EPA, 1998b).  EPA will select five
contaminants from the “regulatory determination pri-
orities” list and determine by August 2001 whether to
regulate them to protect drinking water supplies.
Also under the 1996 amendments, water suppliers are
required to inform their customers about the level of
certain contaminants and associated EPA standards, and
the likely source(s) of the contaminants, among other
items (EPA, 1997e).  If the supplier lacks specific
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be used for the contaminants, such as “runoff from her-
bicide used on row crops” (e.g. for atrazine). “The
information contained in the consumer confidence
reports can raise consumers’awareness of where their
water comes from,...and educate them about the impor-
tance of preventative measures, such as source water
protection...” (Federal Register, August 19. 1998, p.
44512).  Increased consumer awareness concerning
water supplies could lead to public pressure on farmers
to reduce pesticide use (Smith and Ribaudo, 1998).
USDA administers a variety of water quality programs
that directly involve agricultural producers (table 1-4).
These programs use financial, educational, and
research and development tools to help improve water
quality and achieve other environmental objectives.
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program
(EQIP), authorized by the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, provides tech-
nical, educational, and financial assistance to eligible
farmers and ranchers to address soil, water, and related
natural resource concerns on their lands in an environ-
mentally beneficial and cost-effective manner (USDA,
NRCS, 1998).  This program consolidated the func-
tions of a number of USDA programs, including the
Agricultural Conservation Program, Water Quality
Incentives Program, Great Plains Conservation
Program, and Colorado River Basin Salinity Program.
EQIP assistance is targeted to priority conservation
areas and identified problems outside of those areas.
Five- to 10-year contracts may include incentive pay-
ments as well as cost-sharing of up to 75 percent of
the costs of installing approved practices.  Fifty per-
cent of the program funding is to be targeted at natural
resource concerns related to livestock production
(USDA, NRCS, 1998).   Owners of large, concentrated
livestock operations are not eligible for cost-share
assistance for installing animal waste storage or treat-
ment facilities.  However, technical, educational, and
financial assistance may be provided for other conser-
vation practices on these large operations.  EQIP is
designed to maximize environmental benefits per dol-
lar expended (USDA, NRCS, 1998).
The Water Quality Program (WQP), established in
1990 and essentially completed, has attempted to
determine the precise nature of the relationship
between agricultural activities and water quality.  It
has also attempted to develop and induce adoption of
technically and economically effective agrichemical
management and production strategies that protect 
surface- and groundwater quality (USDA, 1993).
WQP includes three main components: (1) research
and development; (2) education, technical, and finan-
cial assistance; and (3) database development and
evaluation.  The first two components were carried out
in targeted project areas.  Seven projects were devoted
to research and development (Management System
Evaluation Areas) and 242 to assisting farmers imple-
ment practices to enhance water quality (Hydrologic
Unit Area projects, Water Quality Incentive projects,
Water Quality Special projects, and Demonstration
Projects).  The database development activity consists
of annual surveys of chemical use on major field, veg-
etable, and fruit crops. 
Since 1936, USDA has provided technical assistance
to farmers for planning and implementing soil and
water conservation and water quality practices through
Conservation Technical Assistance (CTA) (USDA,
ERS, 1997).  Farmers adopting practices under USDA
conservation programs and other producers who
request aid in adopting approved USDA practices are
eligible for technical assistance.  Some programs have
required technical assistance as a condition for receiv-
ing financial assistance.
Conservation Compliance provisions were enacted in
the Food Security Act of 1985 to reduce soil erosion
(USDA, ERS, 1997).  Producers who farm highly
erodible land (HEL) were required to implement a soil
conservation plan to remain eligible for other specified
USDA programs that provide financial payments to
producers. 
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Table 1-4—USDA programs associated with water
quality and the incentives they employ
Program                  Economic    Educational    Research & 
Development
Environmental Quality 
Incentives   X  X  
Water Quality   X  X  X 
Conservation Tech-
nical Assistance  X  
Conservation
Compliance X X   
Conservation Reserve X   
Wetlands Reserve X   
See USDA, ERS (1997) for a description of these programs.Water quality would also be expected to improve from
two USDA land retirement programs.  The
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was established
in 1985 as a voluntary long-term cropland retirement
program (USDA, ERS, 1997).  USDA provides CRP
participants with an annual per-acre rent and half the
cost of establishing a permanent land cover in
exchange for retiring highly erodible or other environ-
mentally sensitive cropland for 10-15 years.  U.S.
cropland erosion has been reduced by about 20 percent
under the program (USDA, ERS, 1994).  The
Wetlands Reserve Program, authorized as part of the
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of
1990, is primarily a habitat protection program, but
retiring cropland and converting back to wetlands also
has water quality benefits (USDA, ERS, 1997).  These
benefits include not only reduced chemical use and
erosion on former cropland, but also the ability of the
wetland to filter sediment and agricultural chemicals
from runoff and to stabilize stream banks.  
In addition to the above programs that provide direct
assistance to producers, USDA also provides assis-
tance to State agencies and local governments through
the Small Watershed Program (otherwise known as
Public Law 566) (USDA, ERS, 1994).  To help pre-
vent floods, protect watersheds, and manage water
resources, this program includes establishment of
measures to reduce erosion, sedimentation, and runoff.
State Programs
Most, if not all, States provide incentives to farmers to
adopt management practices that reduce agricultural
NPS pollution.  Common strategies include watershed
and land-use planning, development of voluntary best
management practices, technical assistance programs,
and cost-sharing for prevention and control measures. 
Recently, more States have been moving beyond a vol-
untary approach to address NPS pollution.  Mechanisms
to enforce certain behavior include regulation and liabil-
ity provisions (ELI, 1997).  State laws using such provi-
sions for NPS pollution vary widely in definitions,
enforcement mechanisms, scope, and procedures, large-
ly because of the absence of Federal direction (ELI,
1997).  Catalysts moving States toward stronger meas-
ures include immediate and urgent problems (such as
nitrate contamination of ground water in Nebraska, ani-
mal waste problems in North Carolina, and pesticide
contamination of ground water in California and
Wisconsin), the use of total maximum daily load provi-
sions for identifying sources of water contaminants, the
requirements of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization
Amendments, and the improving technical ability of
States to assess their waters (ELI, 1997).  
States are using five different mechanisms to make
adoption of best management practices (BMP’s) more
enforceable (ELI, 1997).  These include making
BMP’s directly enforceable in connection with
required plans and permits; making BMP’s enforce-
able if the producer is designated a “bad actor”; mak-
ing compliance with BMP’s a defense to a regulatory
violation; making BMP’s the basis for an exemption
from a regulatory program; and making compliance
with BMP’s a defense to nuisance or liability actions.  
While many States have provisions that deal with
water quality as it relates to agricultural NPS pollu-
tion, they often target only a subset of water quality
problems.  Few States deal with agricultural NPS pol-
lution in a comprehensive manner (table 1-5).  Most
target individual pollutants (sediment), resources
(ground water), regions (coastal zone), or type of oper-
ations (swine).  Most of these laws have been enacted
within the past 5 years, so the impacts of these policies
on producers have yet to be seen.  
Summary and 
Policy Implications
Nonpoint sources of pollution are the largest remain-
ing sources of water quality impairment in the United
States.  While most of the sampled waters are reported
to be supporting designated uses, runoff from agricul-
ture, forests, urban areas, and other land uses are caus-
ing impairments in some important water resources.
Nutrients, bacteria, and siltation are reported to be the
largest causes of impairment to surface waters; agri-
culture is the primary source of impairments in rivers
and lakes, and a major source in estuaries (EPA,
1998a). Both Federal and State governments have
responded with primarily voluntary programs for
addressing nonpoint-source pollution, though some
States are moving toward stronger policy measures.  
Deficiencies in water quality data hinder the develop-
ment of a full range of water quality policies at Federal
and State levels, and complicate measuring the progress
of initiatives already undertaken.  Data are often unable
to identify the relative contributions of pollutant load-
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1993).  In many cases, current monitoring efforts of
nonpoint-source pollution are incapable of attributing 
changes in water quality to the actions of a specific pol-
luter.  How these deficiencies affect policy development
is addressed more fully in the next chapter.  
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Table 1-5—Summary of State water quality mechanisms for controlling agricultural pollution1
Nutrient plan          Pesticide           Sediment         Animal waste
State                                    requirement           restriction          restriction         disposal plan       Comprehensive         
Alabama
Alaska























Montana X X X





















West Virginia X X
Wisconsin X X X X
Wyoming X
1 Mechanisms may apply only under certain conditions or in certain localities.
Sources: ELI, 1998; NRDC,1998; Animal Confinement Policy National Task Force, 1998.Introduction and Overview
In chapter 1, we showed the economic costs associated
with nonpoint-source pollution to be significant.  In
this chapter, we formalize the nonpoint problem by first
discussing the characteristics of nonpoint-source pollu-
tion and then examining why government intervention
is necessary.  Next, we focus on how the unique char-
acteristics of nonpoint-source pollution influence poli-
cy design and limit the options for cost-effective con-
trol.  Finally, issues related to the appropriate level of
government (Federal, State, local) for carrying out non-
point-source pollution policies are discussed.   
Characteristics of 
Nonpoint-Source Pollution
Agricultural water pollution is described as “nonpoint
source” (NPS) pollution because emissions (runoff)
from each farm are diffuse.  Runoff does not emanate
from a single point, but leaves each field in so many
places that accurate monitoring would be prohibitively
expensive (Braden and Segerson, 1993; Shortle and
Abler, 1997).  The amount and quality of runoff leav-
ing a field depend not only on factors that can be
measured, such as the technology used and the use of
variable inputs, but also on factors such as rainfall that
vary daily and are difficult to predict (Braden and
Segerson, 1993; Shortle and Abler, 1997).1
The relationship between agricultural production and
damages from water pollution is complex, involving
physical, biological, and economic links (fig. 2.1).
How well a policy performs often depends on how
well these links are understood.  The first link (runoff)
is between production practices and movement of pol-
lutants off a field.  Important variables include rainfall,
soil characteristics, slope, crop management, chemical
management, water management, and conservation
practices.  These factors combine to determine the
amount of soil particles, nutrients, and pesticides that
actually leave a field.
The second link consists of pollutants moving from the
field to water resources, or the pollution transport
process.  Pollutants can travel in overland runoff and be
discharged directly into the water resource, or enter
small streams and waterways and be transported to larg-
er rivers, lakes, and estuaries.  The amount of pollutants
that eventually reach a water resource depends on factors
such as distance, rainfall, slope, vegetation, properties of
agrichemicals, and intervening conservation practices
such as riparian buffers and constructed wetlands.
The third link is between the agricultural pollutants
discharged into water resources and water quality.
Water quality is expressed in terms of physical and
biological measures, including dissolved oxygen, tem-
perature, turbidity, pH, ambient pollution concentra-
tions, fish populations, algae levels, and zooplankton
and bacterial concentrations.  Changes in ambient pol-
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Chapter 2
Comparing Options for Addressing 
Nonpoint-Source Pollution
Water pollution is an externality to production that prevents an efficient allocation
of resources. One role of public policy is to correct such externalities.  To do so, an
agency must take into account a number of considerations in selecting a policy
instrument.  Weighing on these considerations are the unique characteristics of
agricultural nonpoint source pollution.  Nonpoint source pollution cannot be easily
traced back to individual sources, and its movement is a stochastic process related
to weather, topography, and land use.  However, limitations in information do not
prevent the design of economically sound pollution control policies.
methods used (e.g., conservation tillage, crop rotation, aerial pesti-
cide applications, etc.).
1 Inputs are defined as those items used in production that can be
applied in varying amounts (e.g., chemical fertilizers, pesticides,
water for irrigation, etc.).  Alternatively, technologies (or manage-
ment practices) are defined as specific production techniques orlution concentrations may affect other measures of
water quality (fish populations) as well.
The fourth link is how changes in ambient pollution
levels (and hence water quality) affect the ability of
the water resource to provide economic services.  For
example, the recreation potential for a water body can
be affected by changes in its biological characteristics
and physical appearance.  Fewer fish, foul odors, algae
blooms, and turbidity can all reduce the attractiveness
of a potential recreation site.  Suspended sediment,
algae, and dissolved chemicals can increase the cost of
providing water for municipal use. 
The fifth link is between the services provided by the
water resource and the economic (use and nonuse)
value actually placed on those services.  This is a func-
tion of demand by individuals, municipalities, or
industry.  The greater the demand for services such as
recreation or industrial use, the greater their value and
the greater the economic damages if impaired by pol-
lution.  Factors influencing the value of services
include population, regional income, and treatment
costs.  The reduction in economic values due to ambi-
ent pollution levels is referred to as economic damages.
Nonpoint-Source Pollution 
Is an Externality
Nonpoint-source pollution (NPS) occurs at inefficient-
ly high levels because farmers, when making their pro-
duction decisions, have no incentive to consider the
costs pollution imposes on others (Baumol and Oates,
1979).  Economists refer to such costs as externalities
because they are external to the production manager’s
decision framework.  A decentralized, competitive
economy will not maximize social welfare in the face
of agricultural NPS pollution; farmers have no incen-
tives to consider the social costs of pollution when
making production decisions.  Economic theory sug-
gests several ways to design policies that provide the
appropriate incentives for farmers to account for the
costs of their pollution.
An efficient solution is one that maximizes expected
net economic benefits—the private net benefits of pro-
duction (aggregate farm profits) minus the expected
economic cost of pollution.2 Decisions must be made
based on the expectation of what damages will be
since it is impossible to accurately predict damages
due to the varying nature of pollutant runoff and trans-
port.  Consequently, the efficient solution is often
referred to as the ex ante efficient solution, meaning
that it is the expected outcome as opposed to the actual
or realized outcome. 
Efficiency Conditions
The economically efficient solution is defined by three
conditions (formally developed in Appendix 2A):
(1) For each input and each site, the marginal net
private benefits from the use of the input on the
site equal the expected marginal external dam-
ages from the use of the input. In other words,
the last unit of the input used in production should
provide an equal increase in net private benefits
and expected damages.  This condition is violated
and the Pareto-efficient outcome forgone if farmers
ignore external damages. Instead, the use of pollu-
tion-causing inputs will be too high, the use of pol-
lution-mitigating inputs will be too low,  and the
resulting runoff levels will be too high.
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2 Private net benefits from production may also include benefits to
consumers and owners of factors of production.  We discuss pri-
vate net benefits in terms of aggregate profits for simplicity, but
note that nonpoint policies may also impact consumers and factor
owners by altering input and output prices.(2) A site should be brought into production as
long as profits on this site are larger than the
resulting expected increase in external damage.
In other words, the benefits from allowing a site
into production should exceed the expected social
costs of doing so.  This condition defines the opti-
mal amount of land in production.  Marginal
acreage is defined as sites with profits equal to
their expected contribution to damages in the effi-
cient solution (or the sites with the smallest posi-
tive difference between profits and expected dam-
age contribution).  Sites with a positive (negative)
difference between profits and its expected damage
contribution are defined as inframarginal (extra-
marginal).  It is only efficient for the marginal and
inframarginal sites to be in production.  If external
damages are ignored, the amount of land expected
to produce profitably is greater than optimal, as is
runoff and ambient pollution.
(3) Technologies should be adopted on each site
such that the incremental impact of each tech-
nology (relative to the next best alternative) on
expected social net benefits is greater than or
equal to the incremental impact on expected
damages. 
The three efficiency conditions represent economic
tradeoffs involving farm profitability (net returns) and
water quality (fig. 2-2).  Movement along the curve
represents changes in inputs and technologies familiar
to the farmer that achieve increasing levels of water
quality.  For instance, higher levels of water quality
protection may necessitate a move away from conven-
tional practices to ones using fewer chemical inputs,
adding filter strips, and even retiring cropland.  It is
assumed here that higher levels of water quality can be
achieved only with a loss of net returns, reflecting the
fact that pollution control is typically costly.  
We assume here and throughout that a farmer’s eco-
nomic goal is to maximize net revenues, taking into
consideration personal and family health.  Suppose
tradeoffs exist as in figure 2.2 and that the socially
desirable level of water quality is Q2.  With no exter-
nal incentives to control pollution and no apparent per-
sonal health impacts from the pollution, a farmer’s
economic calculations would lead to production at
point a.  Point a maximizes net returns without consid-
eration of water quality.  Any movement away from a
results in a profit loss.  A farmer may have an incen-
tive to pollute less if directly affected by onfarm prac-
tices, such as polluting a drinking water well.  Such
consideration, without any further incentives, may lead
to the adoption of practices at point b, which corre-
sponds to a water quality level of Q1.  Essentially, the
policy tools discussed in the following chapters aim to
move farmers along the frontier toward Q2.
Nonpoint-Source Policy Goals: 
Cost-Effectiveness3
Environmental policies are cost-effective if they
achieve some measurable objectives or goals at least
cost.  An overall strategy for water quality protection,
therefore, depends on the choice of both policy goals
and the instruments to achieve them.  These choices
are generally interdependent.  Depending on the goals,
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3While we do not discuss this explicitly, existing market distor-
tions that are outside of the regulatory agency’s control must be
taken into account when designing optimal incentives.  Otherwise,
the performance of incentives will be limited.  A variety of agri-
cultural policies, such as price floors, target prices, and deficiency
payments, that are designed to support farm income also stimulate
production.  The resulting use of more chemical inputs and more
intensive land use may lead to increases in nonpoint-source pollu-
tion (Miranowski, 1978; Reichelderfer, 1990; Ribaudo and
Shoemaker, 1995).  The 1996 Farm Act has phased out many of
these policies, explicitly to reduce market distortions.  Other pro-
grams, such as acreage retirement programs and paid land diver-
sion, are supply control programs that may help to offset the
effects of some support policies.  Recently, some supply control
programs and other agricultural conservation programs (e.g.,
Sodbuster, Swampbuster) have been targeted to environmentally
sensitive land and linked to agricultural support policies. it may not be possible to attain the least-cost solution
with some types of policy instruments.
Water quality protection is costly to those who must
pay for pollution reduction.  Consequently, nonpoint
policies can produce net social economic gains only if
their impact is to reduce the expected damages from
pollution.  Reducing expected damages may not
always constitute a measurable policy goal, however,
because damages from NPS pollution often remain
largely unquantified.  In addition, the relationships
among runoff, ambient pollution levels, and economic
damages to society are often unknown or poorly
understood  (Shortle, Horan, and Abler, 1998; Baumol
and Oates, 1988).  Instead, it is necessary to adopt
alternative goals that are measurable and that are
believed to reduce expected damages—even when
damages remain unknown.  Potential alternatives
include goals based on measurable physical (i.e.,
ambient water quality, expected runoff) or production-
related (i.e., input use, technology) performance indi-
cators.4 For example, U.S. point-source policy goals
are often defined in terms of ambient water quality
(EPA, 1993).  With nonpoint sources, ambient water
quality or runoff goals must be defined in terms of a
probability of occurrence (e.g., to attain a mean ambi-
ent water quality at least cost) because a particular pol-
icy could produce a variety of results due to the natu-
ral variability associated with the nonpoint process
(Braden and Segerson, 1993; Shortle and Abler, 1997;
Shortle, 1990).
There may be instances where achieving certain types
of policy goals cost-effectively may increase expected
damages.  For example, suppose a policy goal is to
meet a mean ambient pollution target and that Method
A meets this goal at least cost (Method A is the cost-
effective approach).  Even if mean ambient levels are
decreased, Method A may unintentionally increase the
variability of pollution levels, increasing expected
damages and making society worse off (Shortle,
1990).  However, without the ability to measure dam-
ages, it may not be possible to recognize when such
situations arise.
There are situations where a policy goal is expected to
reduce damages, even though damages remain
unknown.  For example, Method A will reduce mean
damages if ambient pollution levels are reduced for
each potential state of nature (for each possible real-
ization of random events).  Similar results do not
apply to runoff-based goals, however, and appropriate-
ly specified goals based on ambient pollution levels
will generally be preferred (Horan, 1998).
Another problem with physically based policy goals is
comparing different methods of achieving the same
goal.  The economically preferred method of pollution
control achieves a goal with greatest expected social
net benefits (defined as the sum of private pollution
control costs plus the expected benefits of pollution
reduction).  The economically preferred method is
economically superior to all other methods that
achieve the same goal because it takes damages into
consideration.  The other methods, including cost-
effective ones, do not.  Since damages often remain
unquantified, it would be convenient if economically
preferred and cost-effective methods always coincided.
However, the economically preferred method of
achieving a physically based goal will generally differ
from the cost-effective method that achieves the same
goal (Horan, 1998).  The differences are due to risk
effects that arise because the cost-effective method
does not account for the impact of each production
choice on expected damages.  For example, suppose
Policy A corresponds to $50 in control costs and yields
a $100 expected reduction in damages, for a net
expected social gain of $50.  Suppose Policy B
achieves the same physical goal at a cost of $60, but
the policy yields a $120 expected reduction in dam-
ages (a greater reduction in damages may result under
Policy B if Policy B reduces the variability of pollu-
tion relative to Policy A), for an expected net social
gain of $60.  Policy A is the cost-effective policy
because it achieved the policy goal at a lower cost.
Policy B is the economically preferred policy because
it generates a greater net social gain, and is the one
that policymakers would choose if they had informa-
tion about damages.  However, Policy A will generally
be chosen because economic measures of damages are
seldom known.5
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4 Expected runoff levels could be measured with a simulation
model.
5With a deterministic pollution process (as is often assumed for
point sources of pollution), ambient water quality goals or runoff
goals can always be used to ensure a reduction in damages even
when damages remain unknown, and to ensure that the least-cost
method of achieving particular goals is economically preferred over
all other methods.  This is because ambient pollution or runoff lev-
els can be controlled with certainty, and a deterministic reduction in
these measures would correspond to a reduction in damages.
Similar results do not apply to nonpoint pollution control, however,  The final class of goals is based on input use and tech-
nology choices.  For example, instead of designing
policies to reduce mean nitrogen loadings, the goal
may be a specified reduction in nitrogen fertilizer
application rates (e.g., a 20-percent reduction in nitro-
gen use in a watershed).  Such goals provide policy-
makers with more direct control (than water quality
goals) over the specific production factors that influ-
ence the distribution of outcomes.  Consequently, these
goals can be chosen to ensure both a reduction in
expected damages and an expected improvement in
water quality, and to ensure that the outcome is eco-
nomically superior to all other possible outcomes.
Obviously, complete control over the distribution of
outcomes is possible only when goals are specified for
each input and technology choice that influences
runoff.  However, adequate control (in terms of the cri-
teria described above) is possible if goals are chosen
for those producer choices that are most correlated
with runoff, and if any pollution-increasing substitu-
tion effects (i.e., when producers switch to alternative
technologies or inputs that may generate more pollu-
tion) are limited or of little consequence.  Moreover,
these goals are advantageous because they can be set
deterministically, making it easier to verify whether or
not the goals are met.  In contrast, it may take years to
obtain a large enough sample to determine if a mean
ambient water quality goal is achieved (Horan, 1998).
For simplicity, we focus on three types of goals in this
report: mean ambient-based goals, mean runoff-based
goals, and input- and technology-based goals.6 The
cost-effective outcomes based on mean ambient goals
are denoted CE(a), cost-effective outcomes based on
expected runoff goals are denoted CE(r), and cost-
effective outcomes based on input use and technology
are denoted CE(x).  All cost-effective plans are charac-
terized by conditions similar to the efficiency condi-
tions discussed earlier, with the expected social bene-
fits of pollution reduction measured in terms of the
policy goals.7 Thus, nonpoint policies must encourage
three types of responses for least-cost control: (1)
reduction (increase) in the use of variable inputs that
increase (mitigate) runoff, (2) adoption of appropriate
technologies, and (3) appropriate land-use decisions at
the extensive margin (decisions about whether or not
to bring land into or out of production, and what to do
with land that is taken out of production—for exam-
ple, plant trees, grass, etc.).  The mathematical condi-
tions describing the cost-effective solutions are provid-
ed in Appendix 2B.
Second-Best Policies and Outcomes
Cost-effective and efficient outcomes provide bench-
marks from which to gauge the economic performance
of alternative policies.  That is, these outcomes define
actions that would optimally be taken to satisfy NPS
pollution policy goals in an ideal world where the set
of policy instruments is not restricted and when there
are no transactions costs (e.g., costs associated with
implementing, administering, and enforcing policies,
as well as the costs of obtaining information to design
policies) associated with implementing optimally
designed policies.  Obviously, transactions costs and
policy limitations are important and should not be
ignored when designing policies.  In practice with
these limitations and costs, the best possible outcome
would achieve policy goals at the lowest cost, given
the types of instruments that are used and the costs
associated with using them.  Such an outcome is gen-
erally referred to as second-best.8 While second-best
policies are optimal in practice, their economic per-
formance in the sense of being able to achieve a goal
at least cost is still measured relative to the ideal of a
cost-effective or efficient baseline.  This provides a
useful method of comparison between alternative
types of policies, especially when data on transactions
costs are unavailable (as they often are).
Characteristics of Nonpoint-Source
Pollution Influence Policy Design
The characteristics of nonpoint-source pollution
(unobservable runoff, natural (weather-related) vari-
ability, site-specific nature, etc.) influence how various
policy options for controlling NPS pollution might
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8We use the term “second-best” somewhat loosely.  Technically,
efficient policies are first-best.  Cost-effective policies are also sec-
ond-best because they are not efficient.  For simplicity and consis-
tency, we make a distinction between cost-effective and alternative
second-best policies.
because designing policies to control aspects of the probability dis-
tributions of ambient water quality or runoff is not the same as
designing policies to control expected damages.   The probability
distributions associated with damages, ambient pollution, and
runoff are not the same, and control of one distribution does not
necessarily imply control of the other.
6 Many other types of physical goals exist.  Even though expected
runoff goals are not preferred relative to other goals, we include
these goals in our discussion because runoff reduction is often an
important goal in practice (e.g., EPA-USDA, 1998).
7 In addition, analogous definitions for marginal, inframarginal,
and extramarginal acreage exist for cost-effective solutions, where
social costs of pollution are defined in terms of policy goals.perform.  The impacts of these characteristics on poli-
cy performance will be dealt with more fully in the
following chapters, but it is useful to provide an intro-
ductory discussion here.
Observability of runoff and loadings
Agricultural nonpoint-source pollution is difficult to
measure or to observe.  Most problematic from a poli-
cy standpoint is the inability of policymakers (as well
as farmers) to observe runoff from a field and loadings
into water systems.  In addition, monitoring the move-
ment of nonpoint-source pollutants is impractical or
prohibitively expensive.  Impacts on ambient water
quality can be observed.  However, because NPS pol-
lution is generated over the land surface and enters
water systems over a broad front, and because of the
natural variability of the pollution process, these meas-
ures of ambient quality do not indicate where pollu-
tants enter the water resource or from which cropland
they originate.
The inability to observe loadings would be mitigated if
there were a strong correlation between ambient quali-
ty and some observable aspect of production.  For
example, the quality of a shallow aquifer that is entire-
ly overlain by cropland is directly related to how the
fields are managed.  A policy could then be directed at
the production process with a reasonable expectation
of the water quality impacts.  However, such correla-
tions are extremely unlikely, and where relationships
can be established, they are unlikely to hold up across
a range of conditions.  Because a regulator cannot
infer producers’ actions by observing the state of water
quality, the policymaker is uncertain as to whether
poor water quality is due to the failure to take appro-
priate actions or to undesirable states of nature, like
excessive rainfall (Malik, Larson, and Ribaudo, 1994).
Finally, production inputs critical for forecasting NPS
pollution may also be unobservable or prohibitively
expensive to monitor.  For example, there is a close
correlation between chemical contamination of
groundwater and the amount of a chemical applied and
soil type.  Chemical characteristics of the pesticide,
soil characteristics, and depth to groundwater can all
be easily determined.  However, application rates and
timing are generally not observable to a regulating
agency without costly and intrusive monitoring.
Producers have a special knowledge about their opera-
tions that they may not be willing to share with poten-
tial regulators.
Natural variability and pollution flows
Nonpoint-source pollution is influenced by natural
variability due to weather-related events (e.g., wind,
rainfall, and temperature).  As a result, a particular
policy will produce a distribution of water quality out-
comes (Braden and Segerson, 1993).  This by itself
does not preclude ex ante efficiency through the use of
standard policies.  However, it greatly complicates
policy design.  For example, nearly all soil erosion
occurs during extremely heavy rain events.  Practices
that control erosion from “average” rainfalls but fail
under heavy rain events will likely be ineffective in
protecting water resources from sediment.  In addition,
natural variability may limit the effectiveness of mod-
els in predicting water quality from production deci-
sions since runoff and loadings are not observable. 
The natural variability of the NPS pollution process
limits policies from being able to achieve ambient or
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Table 2-1—Example policy objectives
Objective   Definition 
Efficiency   Maximize aggregate farm profits less expected damages 
Cost-effectiveness:
Mean ambient target   At least cost, reduce expected ambient pollution levels to a specified level.  Such an outcome is 
denoted CE(a).  
Mean runoff targets   At least cost, reduce expected runoff to specified levels.  Such an outcome is denoted CE(r).  
Input and tech- At least cost, achieve input use and technology adoption goals.  Such an outcome is denoted CE(x).
nology targets        
Second-best    When restricted to policy instruments that are not capable of achieving policy goals at least cost, 
instruments can be set at levels that achieve the goals at the lowest cost possible for those instru-
ments.  The set of policy instruments may be restricted to reduce administrative and enforcement 
costs, and to be informationally less intensive and applied more uniformly across producers.  runoff targets at least cost.  By nature, policies produce
a distribution of results.  Therefore, policy must specify
both the runoff or ambient targets and the frequency at
which those goals are achieved (Shortle 1987, 1990).
For example, a nitrogen control policy may require that
an ambient goal of 10 mg/liter be met for 75 percent of
the samples taken over the course of a year.
Heterogeneous geographic impacts
The characteristics of nonpoint-source pollution vary
by location due to the great variety of farming prac-
tices, land forms, climate, and hydrologic characteris-
tics found across even relatively small areas.  This
site-specific nature of NPS pollution has important
policy implications.  For example, even if models
could be developed to measure runoff and loadings,
they would have to be calibrated for the site-specific
qualities of each individual field.  The information
required for such calibration would be significant, and
possibly unavailable.  Therefore, spatial characteristics
of cropland and transport/dispersion of pollutants
introduce additional uncertainties into the estimation
of loadings into water resources (Miltz, Braden, and
Johnson, 1988).   Policy tools flexible enough to pro-
vide cost-effective pollution control under a variety of
conditions would outperform tools that are not self-
adjusting (Braden and Segerson, 1993). 
Transboundary effects
The effects of agricultural nonpoint-source pollution can
often be felt far from their source.  Chemicals with long
half-lives and sediment (pollutants that tend to maintain
their properties in a water environment) can affect water
users far from where they originate. For example, much
of the atrazine and nitrates that enter the Gulf of Mexico
each year via the Mississippi River are applied to crop-
land in the Upper Corn Belt States of Minnesota, Iowa,
and Illinois (Goolsby and other, 1993).
Uncertain water quality damages
As with most types of pollution, the economic damages
associated with water quality impairment are often dif-
ficult to observe or to ascertain.  Knowledge of the
relationship between economic damages and water pol-
lution is essential for establishing water quality goals or
incentive levels that maximize societal welfare. The
impacts of pollution on water quality are often nonmar-
ket in nature.  For example, nitrates in the Chesapeake
Bay are believed to reduce submerged aquatic vegeta-
tion (SAV) levels.  There is no market for SAV; howev-
er, SAV has economic value because it provides habitat
for economically valuable fish populations, among
other things.  Without organized markets, information
on the value of water quality may be difficult to obtain.
Even if these impacts are observed and can be attrib-
uted to specific sources, valuation requires the use of a
nonmarket valuation technique such as travel cost or
contingent valuation (Ribaudo and Hellerstein, 1992).
Such exercises are both time consuming and costly, and
the reliability of such techniques is in question.
Therefore, a cost-effective policy that achieves a more
easily measured physical goal might be more practical
than one based on estimated damages.
Time lags
The movement of a pollutant off a field to the point in
a water system where it imposes costs on water users
may take a considerable amount of time.  Time lags of
this sort have two policy implications.  First, observed
ambient water quality conditions may be the result of
past management practices, or of polluters no longer in
operation.  Second, the results of a policy may not be
immediately apparent, making it difficult to assess its
effectiveness. 
Selecting Policy Tools for Reducing
Nonpoint-Source Pollution
Policy instruments at the Federal, State, or local level
for controlling water pollution fall into five general
classes: (1) economic incentives, (2) regulation, (3)
education, (4) liability, and (5) research and develop-
ment.9 Policymakers must consider a number of
important economic, distributional, environmental, and
political characteristics when selecting an instrument.
Economic performance
The instruments differ in their ability to maximize net
social benefits by correcting an externality.  Some may
be able to achieve only a second-best solution because
external pollution costs are not fully accounted for
when production decisions are made.  The policy
instruments also distribute costs of pollution control
differently between polluters and the rest of society.
For example, subsidies place the burden of pollution
control on taxpayers, while taxes place the burden on
polluters. 
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9These instruments will be covered in detail in the following
chapters.The basis of a policy instrument is the point in the pol-
lution stream to which the instrument is applied, and
has a bearing on the performance of the instrument.
Instruments can be applied either to farmers’ actions or
to the results of their actions.  For point sources, the
preferred basis is discharge because it is directly related
to water quality and because it is easy to observe
(Baumol and Oates, 1988).  However, the choice is not
so clear for nonpoint sources.  Proposed bases include
ambient pollution levels, expected runoff levels, input
use, technology, and output.  Bases most closely corre-
lated to water quality (runoff and ambient pollution)
are preferred to those that are more indirectly related,
such as agricultural output (Braden and Segerson,
1993).  Directing policy instruments at bases that are
only indirectly correlated with water quality may lead
to unrelated effects and inefficient management. 
Administration and enforcement costs
The costs of administering a water quality protection
policy and enforcing it are related to a variety of fac-
tors, including the nature of the pollution problem, the
legal system, and the information required to imple-
ment an instrument efficiently.  These costs have par-
ticular importance for policies aimed at controlling
nonpoint-source pollution.  Nonpoint runoff is difficult
to monitor due to its stochastic and diffuse nature.
Likewise, measurements of ambient concentration and
chemical loss may be subject to error.  In addition,
while it is straightforward to monitor the use of pur-
chased inputs, not so the use of all polluting inputs
such as manure applications.  If the cost of detecting
noncompliance is too high, polluters will be able to
skirt the policy (Braden and Segerson, 1993).
Administration and enforcement costs need to be
weighed against the potential environmental benefits
of the policy.
Flexibility
Policy instruments may be flexible both for producers
and for the managing agency.  A policy instrument is
flexible for producers if they are able to reduce pollu-
tion control costs by adjusting their production and
pollution control decisions in the face of changing eco-
nomic conditions (such as changes in input and output
prices or the availability or new technologies), chang-
ing environmental conditions (such as rainfall), and
site-specific physical conditions (such as slope and
soil quality) and, in at least some situations, still meet
policy goals.  
A policy instrument is flexible for a resource manage-
ment agency if it continues to provide the proper sig-
nal or incentive to producers in the face of changing
economic and environmental relationships that under-
lie its construction.  An inflexible instrument would
require an adjustment to continue meeting a policy
goal if conditions changed.  Adjusting a policy instru-
ment may be costly.  The resource management
agency is left with a choice of either efficiency loss if
the instrument is not adjusted, or potentially high
transactions costs if the rate is adjusted.  Flexibility is
an empirical issue that has not been addressed in the
nonpoint literature and that will likely depend on spe-
cific circumstances.  However, in the face of changing
economic and environmental relationships, flexibility
may be increased if the agency has fewer instruments
to adjust.  For example, if a single runoff tax can be
used to provide the same results as two input taxes,
then the runoff tax would be more flexible for the
agency because fewer adjustments would be required
if relationships changed.  In this report, we focus pri-
marily on flexibility with respect to producers, and
also on flexibility for an agency in terms of how many
instruments are required.
Innovation
A policy instrument should encourage and reward
farmers for using their unique knowledge of the
resource base to meet policy goals (Shortle and Abler,
1994; Bohm and Russell, 1985; Braden and Segerson,
1993).   Instruments that provide these incentives are
more likely to achieve cost-effective control than those
that do not.
Political and legal feasibility
Even though several policy instruments are equally
capable of an economically efficient outcome, they
may not be perceived as equal for legal or political
reasons.  The difficulty in observing nonpoint runoff
may be a source of legal problems for instruments
using runoff or ambient quality as a base.  For exam-
ple, it may be difficult to hold individual farmers
legally responsible for observed water quality damages
when the sources of NPS pollution cannot be
observed.  The stochastic nature of nonpoint pollution
also makes it difficult to accurately infer damages or
runoff based on farm practices  (Shortle, 1984;
Tomasi, Segerson, and Braden, 1994).   In addition,
ambient pollution levels may be the result of past man-
agement decisions due to time lags in pollution trans-
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tion level may cause current farming operations to be
unfairly punished.  
An instrument’s political feasibility may be related to
ethical and philosophical arguments.  For example, in
the absence of any water quality laws, the right to
clean rivers and streams is not assigned to any group.
As a result, an activity such as farming, which pro-
duces runoff that can pollute rivers and streams, is not
obliged to consider the impacts of its activities.  This
can be considered an implicit “right” to pollute.  Taxes
and permits may then be politically unpopular among
farmers  because these instruments implicitly shift pol-
lution “rights” from farmers to the users of water
resources.  Alternatively, a subsidy to reduce pollution
implicitly affirms the producer’s “right” to pollute.
Those who seek cleaner water must pay for it.  This
position may be protested by the victims of pollution,
who believe they have a right to clean water, and by
other industries that are legally required to reduce pol-
lution.  In an era of widespread anti-tax sentiment, a
tax-based environmental policy may be impossible to
implement, despite efficiency considerations.
Choosing an Appropriate
Institutional Structure
Are water quality programs best implemented at the
local, State, regional, or national levels, and with what
type of coordination across levels?  Major government
activities for any environmental policy include setting
standards, selecting appropriate policy tools, imple-
mentation, and enforcement.  Policy can be central-
ized, where all activities are handled by the Federal
Government (possibly with local input), or localized
with State or local governments having all or most of
the responsibilities.  Braden and Matsueda (1997)
present a set of environmental problem characteristics
that can be used to determine the level of governance
best able to provide efficient control.  Some of these
characteristics involve the nature of the pollution prob-
lem, while others concern the abilities of different lev-
els of government to operate programs efficiently.
Regional differences
Nonpoint-source pollution varies by place due to the
great variety of farming practices, land forms, climate,
and hydrologic characteristics found across even small
areas.  Since benefits and costs of policies are likely to
vary along with these factors, a policy should take
them into account (Shortle, 1995; Sunding, 1996)
Both centralized and local governments can tailor poli-
cy to local conditions.  A centralized policy would
require that decisionmakers obtain much local infor-
mation, resulting in potentially high transaction costs
(Fort, 1991).  These costs could be reduced by using
more uniform standards and policies, but at the
expense of greater inefficiency.  Local governments
are better able to set standards that reflect local
demands for water quality and to take into account
local economic and physical characteristics in setting
policy (assuming they have the resources to acquire
information).   Many Federal environmental laws rec-
ognize local variation and pass some of the responsi-
bilities for standard setting and policy implementation
to the States. 
Influence of interest groups
Through bargaining and other influences, special inter-
est groups can often influence both the quantity and
price of public goods such as environmental quality,
resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources
(Braden and Matsueda, 1997).  Decentralized policies
give local special interests more influence because
they are proportionately larger and face less competi-
tion in the local economy than in, say, the national
economy (Fort, 1991; Esty, 1996; Braden and
Matsueda, 1997; Lester, 1994).  For instance, threats
to move an important local industry could influence
local leaders to underprovide environmental protec-
tion.  Agricultural interests often have an important
voice in agricultural areas where nonpoint-source pol-
lution would be generated.  Centralized policies would
have an advantage over local policies in counteracting
local special interests.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty can take two forms:  uncertainty about the
causes and consequences of an environmental prob-
lem, and uncertainty about the consequences of public
policies (Braden and Matsueda, 1997).  Nonpoint-
source pollution is characterized by uncertainty in pro-
duction, movement, and impacts on water quality.
Uncertainty about the causes and consequences of an
environmental problem can be reduced through
research.  Environmental research generates informa-
tion that is a pure public good, and so its cost is appro-
priately spread across the entire population (Braden
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as better suited to provide this research because the
research results would be available to all (Braden and
Matsueda, 1997; Esty, 1996). 
An advantage posited for decentralized policies is that
States will try different policy approaches, and through
these “experiments” the most effective policies will
emerge (Esty, 1996; Braden and Matsueda, 1997);
however, no single researcher controls experiments,
tabulates results, or draws conclusions.  A centralized
system, with State cooperation, could be in a better
position to conduct policy experiments.  Centralized
leadership could set the limits or scope of policy
experiments; spread the costs of research, data gather-
ing, and interpretation; and subsidize sharing of infor-
mation with States (Braden and Matsueda, 1997).  
Transboundary issues
Local jurisdictions have an advantage over more cen-
tralized authorities in developing policies tailored to
local conditions.  However, some agricultural pollu-
tants travel long distances (Goolsby and others, 1993).
Under these circumstances, the smaller the jurisdic-
tions providing environmental protection, the greater
the chance for the costs of pollution and benefits of
policies to fall outside (Esty, 1996).  Locally based
policies tend to account only for local benefits and
costs (Braden and Matsueda, 1997; U.S. Congress,
1997).  The result is an inefficient allocation of
resources.  A basic principle of federalism is that eco-
nomic efficiency in the provision of public goods is
best served by delegating responsibility for the provi-
sion of the good to the lowest level of government that
encompasses most of the associated benefits and costs
(Shortle, 1995).  With pollutants that travel long dis-
tances, this prinicple could enlist very large regions.
Widespread, routine transboundary problems require
policies that apply widely; a centralized authority
might achieve economies of scale in setting standards
and implementing policy (Braden and Matsueda,
1997).  Efficient policy requires that all beneficiaries
be considered, even if they reside outside a govern-
ment’s area of control (Esty, 1996; Fort, 1991).  This
includes those who suffer from pollutants transported
outside the area of jurisdiction (transboundary supply)
as well as consumers who reside outside the jurisdic-
tion area but value water quality within (transboundary
demand).  Following the rule of fiscal federalism,
defining jurisdiction on the basis of all beneficiaries
leads to more centralized policies.
Of course, local jurisdictions could handle transbound-
ary problems through interstate agreements and com-
pacts.  However, very seldom have States come togeth-
er without Federal prodding to address regional water
quality issues, despite common goals and the fact that
an individual State may be unable to meet water quality
goals without better control of interstate pollution.  For
example, the Northeastern States for years tried to get
Midwestern States to better control sulfur emissions
that were causing acidification of Northeastern lakes,
without success (Price, 1982).  Only four compacts or
inter-regional commissions are devoted to water quality
and the management of major rivers that cross State
boundaries: Delaware River Commission (New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania), Interstate
Sanitation Commission (New Jersey, New York, and
Connecticut), Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation
Commission (Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, New York, Virginia, and West Virginia), and
the Susquehanna River Basin Commission (New York,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland) (EPA, 1995).
Watersheds cross political jurisdictions, and by all
accounts, are the most appropriate geographic units for
implementing specific water quality protection plans
(EPA-USDA, 1998).  A watershed is the geographic
area in which water, sediments, and dissolved materi-
als drain to a common outlet—a point on a larger
stream, a lake, an underlying aquifer, an estuary, or an
ocean.  A watershed is also known as a drainage basin.
If watersheds are defined as the USGS 8-digit hydro-
logic unit, of which there are 2,111 in the contiguous
48 States, 35 percent of the land area in these States is
within watersheds that span more than 1 State (table 
2-2).  Thus, States must cooperate to manage land (for
nonpoint-source pollution) and point sources in order
to provide efficient water quality protection in many
watersheds.  Without cooperation, a single State may
be unable to address a water quality problem in such
watersheds, or may have to implement unnecessarily
stringent measures to achieve water quality goals.    
If larger rivers are of most concern and the targets for
water quality improvement, then individual State
actions will require widespread cooperation.  For
example, defining watersheds at the 6-digit hydrologic
unit code (600 watersheds), 71 percent of the land area
is within watersheds that cross State boundaries.  At
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percent of land area is in watersheds that cross State
boundaries.  However, there are few examples of such
cooperation.  The transaction costs of all the agree-
ments necessary to handle all transboundary problems
would be enormous.  Centralization, depending on the
skill of the policymakers and implementers, may
reduce transaction costs and maintain efficiency.
Water quality spillovers can occur not only over space,
but also over time.  Some dimensions of environmental
quality are not easily restored once degraded.  Ground
water is an example.  Concern for future generations is
more difficult to incorporate in local policy decisions
than at the national level (Oates and Schwab, 1988).
An individual’s children and their offspring will proba-
bly live elsewhere, creating a myopic view of environ-
mental quality that could lead to a suboptimal provi-
sion of environmental goods (Oates and Schwab,
1988).  Centralized decision-making, in principle, is
better suited to internalize the “demand” for current
environmental standards from future generations.
Economies of scale
A single product standard set at the national level
imparts efficiency benefits on manufacturers who then
do not have to meet 50 different State standards.  For
nonpoint-source pollution, economies exist in the tech-
nical expertise to set, monitor, and enforce standards
(Braden and Matsueda, 1997; Fort, 1991; Esty, 1996;
Smith and other, 1993).  For example, there is no need
to conduct research on the health and environmental
effects of a pesticide in all 50 States.  These effects
would be the same everywhere.  Data collection, test-
ing quality assurance/quality control, fate and transport
studies, epidemiological and ecological analyses, and
risk assessments all represent highly technical activi-
ties in which expertise is important and scale
economies are significant (Esty, 1996).  In fact, the
Federal Government provides much information in the
areas of water quality monitoring, land use surveys,
health studies, and fate and transport studies that
States can use to implement their own programs.
States may implement their own research programs to
get finer detail, but many States lack the technical
capacity to do this (Lester, 1994; Esty, 1996).  
Interjurisdictional competition
One of the classic arguments for centralized control is
the so-called “race to the bottom” (Esty, 1996; Oates
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Table 2-2—Land area in watersheds that cross
State borders, 48 contiguous States
State                          8-digit1            6-digit          4-digit
Percent
Alabama 42 85 100
Arizona 21 53 60
Arkansas 44 71 100
California 17 40 53
Colorado` 43 92 92
Connecticut 90 100 100
Delaware 68 100 100
Florida 20 36 36
Georgia 32 66 100
Idaho 40 100 100
Illinois 43 58 68
Indiana 51 66 100
Iowa 39 100 100
Kansas 41 100 100
Kentucky 48 91 100
Louisiana 34 44 56
Maine 13 16 16
Maryland 87 100 100
Massachusetts 74 100 100
Michigan 17 42 66
Minnesota 22 60 63
Mississippi 37 100 100
Missouri 52 92 100
Montana 22 60 60
Nebraska 47 65 71
Nevada 31 85 100
New Hampshire 81 100 100
New Jersey 60 75 100
New Mexico 48 78 100
New York 41 67 70
North Carolina 51 58 58
North Dakota 27 61 87
Ohio 39 65 65
Oklahoma 50 91 100
Oregon 29 84 88
Pennsylvania 35 85 100
Rhode Island 100 100 100
South Carolina 48 74 100
South Dakota 35 87 100
Tennessee 59 100 100
Texas 21 39 41
Utah 42 95 100
Vermont 82 94 94
Virginia 57 100 100
Washington 19 29 38
West Virginia 62 100 100
Wisconsin 41 89 100
Wyoming 36 96 100
U.S. 35 71 79
1 Hydrologic Unit Codes used to identify watersheds in the United
States.  There are 2,111 8-digit watersheds, 600 6-digit watersheds,
and 99 4-digit watersheds. and Schwab, 1988), which holds that State and local
governments engage in active competitions with each
other for new business (jobs and tax base).  Under
these conditions, local officials do not propose tax
rates or environmental regulations that go much
beyond those in “competing” States.  The costs of
environmental regulation on business are more easily
translated into monetary terms than benefits, and are
concentrated on a relatively few entities (polluters)
(Esty, 1996).  The end result is that all States under-
provide environmental quality, leading to an inefficient
allocation of resources.
This scenario is hotly debated (Revesz, 1992; Esty,
1996).  While the argument is plausible, there has been
little systematic analysis of whether States actually
engage in distortionary competition (Oates and
Schwab, 1988; Braden and Matsueda, 1997).  Oates
and Schwab used a neoclassical model to demonstrate
that a race to the bottom is not inevitable and that
States can provide the optimal level of public goods.
However, this result requires some stringent assump-
tions, including no distortionary taxes (such as taxes
on capital) and a “benevolent” bureaucracy that seeks
and knows public values for nonmarket goods.  When
these assumptions do not hold, a race to the bottom
cannot be discounted (Oates and Schwab, 1988). 
Lester (1994) identified a number of States that are
capable of providing a higher level of environmental
quality but have chosen not to do so.  The differences
between States in the level of environmental protection
is not, however, evidence of destructive competition.
In fact, different environmental protection across
States could be consistent with an efficient market
solution.  Destructive competition would be evident if
environmental protection, given citizen demand for
quality and the costs of control, is less than optimal in
at least some States.  There is currently no empirical
data that destructive competition occurs (U.S.
Congress, 1997).
Summary and Conclusions
Nonpoint-source pollution is produced at inefficiently
high levels because farmers do not generally account
for pollution’s costs to others when making their pro-
duction decisions.  An ideal goal of policy to control
such pollution is to get farmers to consider these exter-
nal costs (an efficient solution).  However, such a goal
may be unattainable if the governing agency has limit-
ed information about damages or the pollution process.
As an alternative, policy may be designed to attain
specific water quality or input and technology goals
(e.g., a limit on mean ambient pollution levels, or a
limit on mean runoff levels) at least cost (a cost-
effective solution).
The characteristics of nonpoint-source pollution pose
particular challenges for designing and implementing
efficient or cost-effective pollution control policies.
These characteristics include:
• runoff and loadings cannot be observed;
• NPS pollution is characterized by natural (weather-
related) variability;
• characteristics of NPS pollution vary over geo-
graphic space; 
• pollution can travel long distances;
• water quality damages are difficult to observe or to
measure;
• considerable time lags complicate assessment.
Policymakers have a number of policy tools available
for addressing agricultural nonpoint-source pollution,
including economic incentives (taxes, subsidies, permit
trading), standards, liability, education, and research.
Which ones are most appropriate depends on a number
of economic, distributional, and political considerations,
including how well the tool achieves the policy goals,
the costs of administering and enforcing the policy, the
ability of the policy to adjust to different economic and
physical conditions, how well the policy encourages
innovation, and political and legal feasibility.   
Another issue is whether a policy is best implemented
by local, State, or national levels of government, and
the degree of coordination necessary for effective pol-
lution control.  The success of a particular institutional
structure is influenced by geographic variability in
nonpoint-source pollution characteristics, the ability of
special interest groups to move a policy away from the
optimal economic solution, the ability of the institu-
tional structure to address uncertainty, the geographic
scale of the pollution problem, and the likelihood of
interjurisdictional competition’s resulting in less-than-
optimal policies.
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Pollution Policy Conditions for
Efficiency10
Consider a situation in which a particular resource
(e.g., a lake) is damaged by a single residual (e.g.,
nitrogen) from nonpoint sources of pollution.  The
ambient concentration of the pollutant is given by
a = a(r1, r2, ..., rn, W)
where a is the ambient concentration (¶a/¶r1 > 0), ri
(i = 1, 2,..., n) is runoff from the ith agricultural pro-
duction site, and W reflects the influences of weather
and other stochastic events on the transport process.
Runoff from a particular site is a function of the pro-
duction activities on that site.  Production activities
will involve either choices made along a continuum
(e.g., chemical application rates, irrigation rates, etc.)
or discontinuous choices (e.g., tillage, chemical appli-
cation methods, crop choice, rotation, etc.).
Continuous choices are assumed to correspond to vari-
able input use.  Denote the (m x 1) vector of inputs
chosen for use on the ith acre by xi.  For simplicity,
discontinuous choices are represented by a scalar, Ai ,
which is referred to as the technology in use.  For
example, Ai = 1 might correspond to the production of
continuous corn with no-till tillage, Ai = 2 might corre-
spond to production using a rotation of corn and soy-
beans, using mulch-till tillage, etc.  Runoff from the
ith site is given by the runoff function, ri = ri(xi, Ai,
vi), where vi is a site-specific random variable describ-
ing natural occurrences affecting runoff.  No assump-
tions are made about the relation between the technol-
ogy’s productivity and runoff (i.e., a more productive
technology does not necessarily correspond to greater
or lesser runoff levels).  Instead, a variety of possibili-
ties could arise, depending on the technology.
Farmers are assumed to be risk-neutral.  The expected
profit from site i for any choice of inputs and technol-
ogy is given by the strictly concave function pi (xi, Ai).
Larger values of i are assumed to correspond to sites
with less productive land and that are more conducive
to NPS pollution generation (e.g., soil type, slope of
land, distance from water etc.).11 For simplicity, farm-
ers in this particular region are assumed not to have
any collective influence on the prices of inputs or out-
puts, and that input and output markets are free from
distortions.  Finally, the economic cost of damages
caused by pollution is given by D(a) (D¢,  D¢¢ ³ 0)
An ex ante efficient allocation maximizes the expected
net surplus (quasi-rents, less environmental damage
costs) to society (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 1982,
Freeman 1993).  The appropriate objective function,
restricted on technology, is the following12
The necessary conditions for a maximum are
where DD (a) = D (a (r1, . . ., rn, W)) - D (a (r1, . . ., rn-1,
W)) (i.e., the difference in damages with and without
site n).
Condition (2A-1) equates marginal net private benefits
from the use of xij with expected marginal external
damages from the use of the input.  If the externality is
ignored, then condition (2A-1) is violated and the level
of input use for inputs that increase runoff (i.e., inputs
for which ¶ri / ¶xij > 0) will be too high while the level
of input use for inputs that decrease runoff (i.e., inputs
for which ¶ri / ¶xij < 0) will be too low.  The resulting
runoff levels will be too high and a Pareto maximum
will not be achieved.
Condition (2A-2) describes the incremental impact of
the nth site on expected net benefits.  If the nth site is
defined optimally, then the addition of any other site
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10This appendix develops the mathematical foundations for
Pareto efficiency.  The basic framework closely follows that of
Horan et al. (1998a) and Shortle et al. (1998a).
11 In reality, the relationship between site productivity and con-
duciveness to runoff is not one-to-one.  A more realistic specifica-
tion would include separate, jointly distributed indices for these
two attributes.  See Shortle and others (1997) for a model with
dual indices and Horan and others (1998a) for a formal derivation
that makes use of information on both productivity and conducive-
ness to runoff.
12 Following most NPS pollution literature, it is assumed that
society is risk-neutral.  A more general model would choose input
levels in an expected utility framework.
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(2A-1)
(2A-2)will have a negative incremental impact.  Positive
profits are earned on the marginal site, n, and all infra-
marginal sites because E{DD(a)} > 0.  If external
damages are ignored, the amount of land able to pro-
duce profitably is greater than otherwise.  The result is
increased runoff due to increased production in the
industry, and hence ambient pollution levels will be
higher than is economically efficient.  Together, condi-
tions (2A-1) and (2A-2) define the efficient scale of
production for the marginal site. 
Finally, the optimal technology vector, A*, is deter-
mined by solving for an efficient allocation for each
possible value of A and comparing expected net bene-
fits.  Technology A* is more efficient than technology
A¢ when J(A*) - J(A¢) > J(A¢).  Thus, the optimal tech-





*, ni).  The choice of technol-
ogy will be inefficient if the externality is ignored, due
to the technology’s impacts on runoff.   
Appendix 2B—
Cost-Effective Policy Design
Pollution control policies can be designed to minimize
costs (or, equivalently, to maximize net benefits in the
absence of damages) subject to a constraint based on
the ambient pollution level, a set of constraints based
on runoff when the damage and pollutant transport
relationships are unknown, or input and technology
constraints.  Policy designed in this situation will gen-
erally not be efficient; however, it can lead to a cost-
effective solution as input use is allocated among
farms at least cost to meet an exogenously specified
constraint.  Specifically, the resource management
agency’s problem can be written as
subject to a constraint or set of constraints based on an
ambient or runoff target(s).
The degree of reliability with which water quality or
runoff targets are to be achieved must be specified
because a particular policy will produce a distribution
of outcomes (Braden and Segerson 1993).  Many con-
straints have been proposed in the literature, however,
two are of particular interest (Beavis and Walker 1983;
Beavis and Dobbs 1987; Shortle 1990; Horan 1998):13
E{a} £ ao
E{ri} £ rio  "i
where a0 is an exogenously chosen ambient target, and
ri0 is an exogenously chosen runoff target for the ith
site in production. 
A Cost-Effective Solution Based on a Mean
Ambient Target
The Lagrangian corresponding to the maximization of
(2B-1) subject to (2B-2) is
where l is the Lagrangian multiplier.  Assuming an
interior solution, the first-order conditions with respect
to input use and the number of sites are
where Da = a(r1, . . . , rn, W) - a(r1, . . . , rn-1, W).
These conditions have the same interpretation as con-
ditions (2A-1) and (2A-2), except that marginal costs
are defined in terms of the constraint as opposed to
damages.  The shadow value l is the value of the opti-
mal tax/subsidy rate when farmers and the resource
management agency share the same expectations about
the nonpoint process.
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13 Constraints may also be of the form P(a£ a0) = 1 - a where a
is the probability that a will exceed the target (Beavis and Walker
1983).  We do not focus on this type of constraint because it would
be difficult to use in practice (Shortle 1990).
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E a n » - » p l { } 0 (2B-5)Finally, the optimal technology vector, A*, is deter-
mined by solving for an optimal allocation for each
possible value of A and comparing aggregate profits.
The optimal technology vector satisfies the condition
In particular, the following condition must hold
Conditions (2B-6) and (2B-7) have the same interpre-
tation as (2A-3) and (2A-4).
The cost-effective solution will generally not be effi-
cient (Horan, 1999).14 Moreover, use of a smaller
ambient target, a1 < a0, may not result in a more effi-
cient outcome if the variability of a is increased as a
result of using the smaller target (Shortle, 1990).
A Cost-Effective Solution Based on Mean
Runoff Targets
The Lagrangian corresponding to the maximization of
(2B-1) subject to (2B-3) is
where li is the Lagrangian multiplier for the ith runoff
constraint.  Assuming an interior solution, the first-
order conditions with respect to input use and the
number of sites are
Condition (2B-8) has the same interpretation as condi-
tion (2A-1), except that marginal costs are defined in
terms of the constraint as opposed to damages.  The
shadow values li equal the optimal tax/subsidy rates
when farmers and the resource management agency
share the same expectations about the nonpoint
process.
Assuming the constraint (2B-3) is satisfied as an
equality, condition (2B-9) reduces to a zero profit con-
dition for the marginal site.  However, since input use
in the cost-effective solution will generally differ from
input use in the competitive solution, the marginal site
in the cost-effective solution will generally differ from
the marginal site in the competitive solution.
Finally, the optimal technology vector, A*, is deter-
mined by solving for an optimal allocation for each
possible value of A and comparing aggregate profits.
The optimal technology vector satisfies the condition
In particular, the following condition must hold
Conditions (2B-10) and (2B-11) have the same inter-
pretation as (2A-3) and (2A-4).
The cost-effective solution will generally not be effi-
cient.15 Moreover, use of smaller runoff targets, ri1 <
ri0 "i, may not result in a more efficient outcome if
the variability of ri for some i is increased as a result
of using the smaller targets (Shortle 1990).
A Cost-Effective Solution Based on Input Use
Input goals may be defined in terms of either site-
specific input use or aggregate input use within a
region such as a watershed.  For simplicity, only the
former case is considered here.  Goals may also be
defined either for all inputs that contribute to runoff,
or for only a subset of these inputs.  For example,
nitrogen runoff from agriculture depends not only on
the amount of nitrogen applied, but also on plant
uptake which is a function of crop yield.  Each input
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14 It is not possible to attain an efficient solution unless (1) there
is only one site with one production choice, or (2) the covariance
between marginal damages and marginal ambient pollution is zero
for all sites and inputs.
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(2B-9)that influences crop yield will therefore generally
influence runoff; however, policy goals may be speci-
fied only as reductions in nitrogen fertilizer use.
Let zi denote the (m¢ ´ 1) vector of inputs for which
goals are defined, and let yi denote the ([m - m¢] ´ 1)
vector of inputs for which there is no goal (xi¢ = [yi,
zi]).  Input-based goals are then defined by
where zij is the target for use of the jth input on the ith
site.  The goals defined by (2B-12) are flexible in that
they may be site-sp ecific, or they may be uniform
across firms within a region (in which case zij = z1j "i,
l).  Moreover, (2B-12) is equivalent to an input reduc-
tion goal (for those inputs that increase runoff) or an
input expansion goal (for those inputs that reduce
runoff), specified in either absolute terms (zij
c - zij £ A
= zij
c - zij  "i,j, where zij
c is firm i’s competitive level





c  "i,j).  An example of the latter goal
would be a 25-percent reduction in nitrogen applica-
tion rates within a region.  In this case, the goal is uni-
form while the input use target zij is, in general, site-
specific.
The Lagrangian corresponding to the maximization of
(2B-1) subject to (2B-12) is
where lij is the Lagrangian multiplier for the jth input
constraint for the ith site.  Assuming an interior solu-
tion, the first-order conditions with respect to input use
and the number of sites are
Condition (2B-13) has the same interpretation as con-
dition (2A-1), except that marginal costs are defined in
terms of the constraint as opposed to damages.  The
shadow values lij equal the optimal incentive rates for
input use.
Assuming the constraint (2B-12) is satisfied as an
equality, condition (2B-15) reduces to a zero profit
condition for the marginal acre.  However, since input
use in the cost-effective solution will generally differ
from input use in the competitive solution, the margin-
al site in the cost-effective solution will generally dif-
fer from the marginal site in the competitive solution.
Finally, the optimal technology vector, A*, unless it is
specified by policy goals, is determined by solving for
an optimal allocation for each possible value of A and
comparing aggregate profits.  The optimal technology
vector satisfies the condition (2B-10).  In particular,
the following condition must hold
Condition (2B-16) has the same interpretation as
(2A-4).
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Agricultural nonpoint-source pollution occurs at
greater levels than are socially optimal because mar-
kets fail to accurately relay the social costs of pollu-
tion to producers.  Economic incentive-based instru-
ments, such as taxes or subsidies, are used by policy-
makers to create prices for the externalities (i.e., eco-
nomic damages) that are produced. These policy
instruments effectively alter prices in existing markets
or create new markets so that producers have incen-
tives to control pollution at socially desirable levels.
Economists have suggested a variety of incentive-
based instruments to control nonpoint-source pollu-
tion.  However, no general comparison of instruments
exists.  In this chapter, we provide a detailed discus-
sion of a variety of economic incentive-based instru-
ments that may be used for nonpoint pollution control.
Specifically, we show that:
• Incentives must be designed to transmit the goals
of policymakers.  Producers respond differently to
various incentives, depending on the base to which
the incentive is applied (e.g., the incentive base of a
fertilizer tax is fertilizer) and the complexity of the
instrument.
• Design-based incentives are generally superior to
performance-based incentives.
• Second-best, input- and technology-based incen-
tives are most conducive to policy.
• Coordination of existing programs and improved
targeting of incentives are needed for further
improvements to water quality.
• Properly designed market-based systems may be
effective alternatives to existing programs to con-
trol nonpoint pollution.
This chapter begins with a general overview of incen-
tives.  Next, we review the two main classes of incen-
tive bases: (1) performance-based incentives (i.e.,
incentives based on runoff, measured ambient concen-
trations, or damages), and (2) design-based incentives
(i.e., incentives based on inputs and technology).
(Table 3-1 lists the economic incentives that are cov-
ered in this chapter and provides examples of actual
application of each.)  Within each class, we consider a
variety of specific incentive bases and how each has
been applied at the Federal level, evaluating each
instrument according to (1) the incentives it provides,
(2) its relative complexity, (3) informational require-
ments of a resource management agency in designing
the instrument and of producers in using the instru-
ment to evaluate their decisions, (4) flexibility of the
instrument to changing economic and environmental
conditions, and (5) potential administration and
enforcement costs.  In addition, we discuss how policy
design issues relate to policies that have been imple-
mented at the Federal level (noting that major State
policies are similar).  Finally, we review two alterna-
tive types of incentives—compliance mechanisms and
market mechanisms—and discuss practical experience
with these pollution control methods.1
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Chapter 3
Economic Incentives
Economic incentive-based instruments, such as taxes or subsidies, are used by 
policymakers to create prices for the externalities (i.e., economic damages) that
farming produces. These policy instruments effectively alter prices in existing mar-
kets or create new markets so that producers have incentives to control pollution at
socially desirable levels.  In this chapter, we detail a variety of economic incentive-
based instruments that may be used for nonpoint pollution control and evaluate
these instruments according to several criteria related to instrument design, imple-
mentation, and the incentives created.
1 We limit our focus to nonpoint policies.  However, point sources
of pollution will influence damages as well.  Point source and non-
point-source pollution control policies should therefore be con-
junctive (see  Shortle and Abler, 1997; Shortle and others, 1998a).Characteristics of 
Economic Incentives
Policymakers can use economic incentives to create
prices for nonpoint pollution externalities so that pro-
ducers will control pollution at more socially desirable
levels.  Incentives may alter prices in existing markets
(e.g., a nitrogen tax increases the price of nitrogen) or
they can create new markets that did not previously
exist (e.g., a market for expected runoff levels is creat-
ed by either taxing expected runoff levels and forcing
producers to “buy” expected runoff from society, or by
issuing permits for expected runoff levels to producers
and allowing them to sell permits among themselves).
Profit-maximizing producers are then forced to consid-
er the social cost of pollution when making manage-
ment decisions.  Management choices are then more
consistent with society’s environmental objectives.
Economic incentives are generally classified as either
a tax or a subsidy.2 In the case of nonpoint pollution,
taxes make it more expensive for producers to pollute
by increasing the cost of pollution-causing activities.
Alternatively, subsidies make it less expensive for pro-
ducers to not pollute by decreasing the cost of pollu-
tion-mitigating activities.  The effect of each can be
the same, depending on how they are applied. 
The major benefit of economic incentive-based poli-
cies is that producers can choose whatever strategy is
most profitable for them.  In addition, producers’
strategies can change as relative prices for inputs and
outputs change, or as new technologies become avail-
able.  Pollution abatement costs will generally be
lower with incentives than with command and control
policies because producers may be able to utilize site-
specific attributes (which a resource management
agency may have limited information about) to their
advantage in reducing control costs.  In addition, inno-
vators may have an incentive to develop and market
new approaches that help producers reduce pollution
control costs.
Two Types of Taxes and Subsidies
For simplicity, we focus on constant, per-unit incen-
tives (e.g., a sales tax) and lump sum incentives.  For a
tax, total payments equal the (constant) per-unit tax
rate multiplied by the tax base.  The relationship
between total subsidy receipts and the subsidy base is
slightly different.  A subsidy can be used to provide
the same outcome as a tax with the same per-unit rate.
However, subsidy payments are often determined rela-
tive to a benchmark level.  For example, a subsidy
applied to fertilizer use might be based on a reduction
in use from a specific level.  The greater the reduction
in total fertilizer use, the greater the subsidy.  No sub-
sidy would be provided if there were no reduction in
fertilizer use. 
A lump sum instrument is a fixed tax or subsidy that
can be used to influence discrete choices or to deter-
mine the distributional outcomes of policies.  With
respect to discrete choices, lump sum instruments can
be made contingent on particular actions.  For exam-
ple, a producer can be paid a lump sum amount if
he/she adopts a particular tillage practice, and paid
nothing if adoption does not occur.  Alternatively,
lump sum instruments that are not contingent on par-
ticular actions are not applied to a base and therefore
do not influence marginal incentives.
Subsidies Versus Taxes for Pollution Control
Taxes and subsidies can be designed to have the same
effect on producers’ production and pollution control
decisions.  However, taxes and subsidies will have dif-
ferent impacts on farm profits and on a resource man-
agement agency’s budget.  Taxes will generally reduce
farm profits and increase agency budgets, while subsi-
dies will have the opposite effect. However, it is possi-
ble to use taxes without reducing farm profits by pro-
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2 The permit price in a market for pollution permits essentially
operates as a tax.
Table 3-1—Types of incentives and examples 
from Federal programs
Incentives Federal program applications
Performance-based:
Runoff None in existence
Ambient None in existence
Design-based:
Expected runoff  None in existence
Variable inputs None in existence
Technology USDA Conservation 
(i.e., fixed inputs, prod- Compliance, Swamp-
uction techniques, etc.) buster, ACP, WQIP, 
EQIP
Acreage at the extensive  Conservation Reserve 
margin Programviding producers with a lump sum refund of expected
tax payments.  
Subsidies require specification of a benchmark level
from which they will be determined (e.g., with a point-
source emissions subsidy, firms receive a larger subsidy
the further emissions are reduced below the bench-
mark).  The specification of this benchmark may create
perverse incentives.  For example, suppose abatement
of point-source pollution is to be subsidized.
Establishing a firm-specific pollution abatement bench-
mark at current discharge levels would penalize firms
that have already undertaken pollution abatement.  For
example, a firm that has been able to reduce emissions
to 4 tons on its own would have a 4-ton benchmark
while a firm that has not reduced emissions and pro-
duces 8 tons would have an 8-ton benchmark.  For a
given pollution level, the firm with the 8-ton benchmark
will receive a larger subsidy and be rewarded for not
attempting to reduce pollution on its own.  Therefore,
establishing a benchmark at current discharge levels
would create an immediate, perverse incentive for a
firm to produce as large a discharge as possible in order
to elevate its benchmark (Baumol and Oates, 1988).
Finally, when subsidies are used, society (as opposed to
the polluter) must pay for pollution control.  
Performance-Based Incentives
Performance-based incentives are taxes or subsidies
pursuant to a firm’s production and pollution control
decisions.  Two outcomes of producers’ decisions are
the most logical targets of incentives for reducing non-
point water pollution: runoff from a field and ambient
water quality conditions.
In theory, a tax or subsidy can be based on how much
runoff leaves a site so that the external cost of pollu-
tion is considered by producers when they make their
production and pollution control decisions.3 This is
akin to an effluent tax on factory discharge.
Unfortunately, runoff cannot be monitored at reason-
able cost given current monitoring technologies.  Only
with advances in monitoring technologies will runoff-
based instruments become viable policy tools for con-
trolling nonpoint pollution.
Even if runoff was observable, its suitability as an
incentive basis would be limited by the natural vari-
ability of runoff and other nonpoint processes.
Optimally, incentives provide producers with informa-
tion about the impacts of their choices on expected
damages from pollution, and assign them responsibili-
ty accordingly.  However, a single runoff-based incen-
tive rate can only provide information about how indi-
vidual choices are expected to impact runoff and not
damages.  This is because a runoff-based incentive
induces producers to consider the impacts of their
choices on mean runoff levels, and choices made to
achieve a particular mean runoff level do not corre-
spond to a unique level of expected damages.  Instead,
these choices could have a variety of unintended
impacts to damages, due to random events.  Thus,
runoff-based incentives will not generally provide pro-
ducers with enough information to accurately consider
the external costs of each of their decisions.  Similar
results occur when trying to achieve an ambient water
quality goal at least cost.
Ambient-based incentives are based on the ambient
pollution levels in the water resources affected by
farming’s activities.  These incentives are (seemingly)
advantageous for two reasons.  First, economic theory
suggests instrument bases (ambient pollution levels)
should be close to the externality (damages from pol-
lution).  Second, ambient pollution can be monitored
without the resource management agency having to
observe the actions of each producer.  However, these
advantages quickly disappear when informational
requirements and other complexities associated with
policy design are taken into account (table 3.2).
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A subsidy implicitly supports the view that pol-
luters are not responsible for pollution.  Instead,
polluters are given the “right” to pollute and soci-
ety must pay polluters for cleaner water.  An alter-
native view is that society holds the “rights” to
cleaner water and that polluters should pay for
pollution control (i.e., the “polluter pays” princi-
ple).  This alternative view is supported by taxes
and regulatory policies, and has shaped many
point-source programs.  For example, point-
source control policies under the Clean Water Act
hold polluters responsible for treatment costs.  
3 Incentives can also be applied to each farm’s pollution loading to
the stream, which runs off from fields influenced by transport
characteristics. The results are similar.  The only difference is that
a loadings incentive requires the producer to determine some trans-
























































































Table 3-2—Evaluation of performance-based incentives
Criteria              Runoff-                                                                                                 Ambient-based
based                   Efficient, CE(r), CE(x)                                    Cost-effective: CE(a)                    Second-best (uniform, limited information) 
Incentives N/A  Instrument  exists  Poor Poor
provided only under 
very restrictive  Not efficient. Exists only when producers  Not cost-effective. Additional instruments 
assumptions. are all risk-neutral and when producers  required for optimal entry/exit.
and the resource management agency 
share identical expectations. Additional 
instruments required for optimal entry/exit.
Overall N/A  N/A Medium-High Medium-High
complexity
A producer must be able to evaluate  A producer must be able to evaluate how 
how he/she and others influence  he/she and others influence the incentive
the incentive base. base.
Information N/A  N/A High High
required by  
producers Each producer needs information about  Each producer needs information about
production and runoff characteristics of  production and runoff characteristics of all 
all producers and pollution transport. producers, and pollution transport.
Flexibility N/A N/A  High High
Producers can respond to changing  Producers can respond to changing
market conditions. Agency has to set  market conditions. Agency only has 
one rate for each producer. to set one uniform rate.
Administration/ Currently  N/A High Medium-High
enforcement prohibitive
costs     High information costs. Potentially high  Medium to high information costs.
monitoring costs in some cases. Potentially high monitoring costs.
N/A = not applicable because instrument is impractical. These rankings are subjective, based only on theoretical properties as opposed to empirical evidence. A more reliable table would
be based on empirical results that compare each type of policy according to a consistent modeling framework that is representative of the nonpoint problem.Incentives Provided by the Instruments
Ambient-based incentives can be designed to achieve
an efficient or cost-effective (CE) outcome only under
highly restrictive conditions (Horan and others,
1998a,b).  For example, a CE outcome designed to
achieve a mean ambient pollution target—a CE(a) out-
come—can be achieved only when producers are risk-
neutral and producers and the resource management
agency have the same expectations about the nonpoint
process.  The ambient tax/subsidy rate that leads to the
CE(a) outcome is uniformly applied across producers
and equals the social cost of a marginal increase in
mean ambient pollution levels.  Such a tax/subsidy
rate transmits the policy goal of the policymakers to
the producers.  A CE(a) outcome is possible in this
case because the goals of producers would coincide
with those of policymakers (i.e., to control mean ambi-
ent pollution levels at least cost).  When the expecta-
tions of producers and the resource management
agency differ, a cost-effective solution cannot be
achieved because the goals of the producers will differ
among themselves and from the goals of the resource
management agency (see appendix 3A).
Risk-averse producers will not like the additional risk
(due to the natural, weather-related uncertainty associ-
ated with ambient pollution levels) that ambient-based
incentives create.  Instead, risk-averse producers will
prefer design-based instruments that can produce the
same social outcome and have the same expected
impacts on profitability.  Moreover, ambient-based
instruments cannot produce the CE(a) outcome when
used alone.  This is because producers’ production and
pollution control choices have uncertain impacts on
ambient pollution levels, creating risk that cannot be
adequately controlled with an ambient-based incentive
alone (Horan and others, 1998b).
When some producers are risk-averse and/or when
ambient-based incentives cannot be designed to accu-
rately transmit the resource management agency’s
goals, then ambient-based incentives can only be sec-
ond-best (i.e., achieve policy goals at least cost given
risk aversion and heterogeneous expectations about the
nonpoint process).  Potentially high transaction costs
may necessitate that second-best incentives be applied
at uniform rates across producers.
Ambient pollution levels depend on the mix of sites in
production in the region.  If a suboptimal mix of sites
is in production, then each producer will face the
wrong incentives for input use and technology choices
(since these incentives depend on ambient pollution
levels, which depend on the mix of sites in produc-
tion), and equilibrium ambient pollution levels will be
suboptimal relative to CE(a) or second-best levels.
By themselves, ambient-based incentives do not pro-
vide incentives for optimal entry and exit.4 Additional
lump sum instruments, however, will induce optimal
entry and exit into production in the region  (Horan
and others, 1998a). The lump sum incentives would
take the form of a tax applied to producers who pro-
duce on extramarginal sites (if they do not produce on
this land, they pay no tax) or a subsidy given produc-
ers who voluntarily retire extramarginal acreage.5 It is
not necessary to apply lump sum taxes or subsidies to
producers who produce on marginal and inframarginal
land unless their decision to produce is influenced by
the magnitude of the tax.  A lump sum refund of their
expected tax would reduce their expected tax burden
to zero without compromising cost effectiveness. 
Relative Complexity of the Instruments
Ambient-based instruments are complex from a pro-
ducer’s perspective because producers must be able to
evaluate how their actions and the actions of others
affect the incentive base (since the incentive base
depends on group performance).  Given the large num-
ber of nonpoint polluters that may exist within a
region, such instruments are likely to be too complex
for producers to make accurate evaluations.  In that
case, producers will receive incorrect incentives from
ambient-based instruments.
Informational Requirements
Ambient-based instruments place a large informational
burden on producers.  To attain a CE(a) or second-best
outcome, each producer would have to have informa-
tion about the actions of other producers and how
these actions affect ambient pollution levels or expect-
ed damages.  Given the large number of nonpoint pol-
luters that may exist within a region, producers are not
likely to acquire such information.
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4 Entry and exit refer to the process of production sites being
entered into or removed from production.  Optimal entry and exit
occurs when production occurs at positive levels on the marginal
and inframarginal sites, but ceases on extramarginal sites.
5 For example, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) uses
subsidies to induce producers to retire environmentally sensitive
land from production.The resource management agency also has significant
informational requirements.  For any performance-
based or design-based instrument, the agency must
have information about producers and the pollution
process so that it can evaluate the impact of the policy
instrument on ambient water quality (more informa-
tion is better, although policies can be designed with
less than perfect information).  With ambient-based
instruments, the agency has the additional burden of
having to understand how producers evaluate the
impacts of their decisions on water quality.  In other
words, the agency must understand each producer’s
belief structure about the nonpoint process.  This
added requirement is likely to limit the ability of the
resource management agency to construct CE(a) or
second-best ambient-based incentives.
Flexibility Provided by the Instrument  
Producers have flexibility in their production and pol-
lution control decisions under ambient-based incen-
tives in that they may utilize any private knowledge
they may have to further reduce costs, or they may
alter their decisions as economic and environmental
conditions change.  The resource management agency
may have more flexibility than with some design-
based instruments because there is only a single incen-
tive rate to adjust as underlying economic and environ-
mental relationships change.  In contrast, several types
of rates must be altered as underlying relationships
change when incentives are applied to several inputs.
Administration and Enforcement Costs
Information costs associated with setting ambient-
based instruments at appropriate levels may be signifi-
cant.  Monitoring costs depend on how easy it is to
monitor ambient pollution levels or damages.
Monitoring may be relatively easy in some cases (small
reservoir or lake) but relatively difficult in others
(ground water or major river with many tributaries).
Application of Performance-Based
Incentives
Performance-based incentives have not generally been
applied in the United States.  One possible exception
is a tax being used in Florida to reduce phosphorus
discharges to the Everglades.  The Everglades Forever
Act calls for a uniform, per-acre tax on all cropland in
the Everglades Agricultural Area. The tax was imple-
mented in 1994 at a rate of $24.89 per acre per year,
and will increase every 4 years to a maximum of
$35.00 per acre by 2006 unless phosphorus is reduced
25 percent basinwide (State of Florida, 1995).
Reductions in phosphorus are determined through mon-
itoring of runoff water that collects in drainage ditches.
This type of tax is based on acres of cropland—a
design base; however, its application depends on phos-
phorus levels—a performance base.  The tax creates
the incentive to adopt best-management practices, and
also for producers to apply pressure on recalcitrant
neighbors. The number of producers is not so large that
free-riding is much of a problem.
This tool is flexible in that producers are not restricted
in how they manage their operations to meet the phos-
phorus goal.  However, the basis upon which the tax is
placed—acres of cropland—is not necessarily consis-
tent with the goal of the tax, phosphorus reduction.  A
more efficient approach (and potentially practical,
given the small number of polluters) would be to tax
phosphorus loads directly.
Design-Based Incentives
Design-based incentives are based on a producer’s
variable input use and production technology.6
Producers have no uncertainty about design-based
incentives when making decisions, and each produc-
er’s decisions may be observed by a resource manage-
ment agency (although not always easily).  However,
input use and technology are further removed from
damages than with performance-based instruments.
Design-based incentives can be based on expected
runoff (which is estimated based on inputs and tech-
nology) or on inputs and technology directly.  After
evaluating each subclass, we discuss practical applica-
tions of design-based incentives. 
Expected Runoff-Based Incentives
Expected runoff levels from cropland may be estimat-
ed (before runoff actually occurs) with a simulation
model that incorporates all production and pollution
control decisions.  The incentive base (expected
runoff) is therefore design-based because it depends
explicitly on inputs and technology (table 3-3).7
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6 The inputs and technology targeted by policy may include
aspects of pollution control that are unrelated to production.
7 There may be legal problems with basing permits on the
resource management agency’s expectations about runoff instead
of actual runoff, especially given the limited ability of modelers to


























































































Table 3-3—Evaluation of expected runoff-based incentives 
Criteria                          Efficient, CE(a), or CE(x)                              Cost-effective: CE(r)                           Second-best (imperfect information, uniform) 
Incentives Instrument exists only  Good Fair
provided under very restrictive
assumptions. Cost-effective but not efficient. Cost-effective but not efficient. Additional 
Additional instruments required  instruments targeted at entry/exit may 
to ensure cost-effective entry/exit. increase efficiency.
Overall N/A  Medium-High  Medium-High   
complexity
Instrument may be site-specific or    Instrument may be site-specific or uniform.
uniform. Producers must evaluate how   Producers must evaluate how their production
their production and pollution control  and pollution control decisions influence the
decisions influence the instrument base. instrument base.
Information required N/A Medium Medium
by producers 
Producers need information about   Producers need information about their own runoff 
their own runoff process. However,  process. However, this information can be provided 
this information can be provided   by the resource management agency.
by the resource management agency
Flexibility  N/A  High  High   
Producers are able to respond to   Producers are able to respond to changing
changing market conditions. Agency  market conditions. Agency has to set only
has to set only one rate for each   one rate for each producer.
producer
Administration and  N/A  High Medium-High
enforcement costs
A simulation model must be developed  Use of limited information may reduce costs.
to determine expected runoff levels    A simulation model must be developed to determine 
for each acre in production. All input  expected runoff levels for each acre in production.
and technology decisions must    All input and technology decisions must be 
be monitored. monitored.
N/A = not applicable because instrument not practical. These rankings are subjective, based only on theoretical properties as opposed to empirical evidence. A more reliable table
would be based on empirical results that compare each type of policy according to a consistent modeling framework that is representative of the nonpoint problem.Incentives Provided by the Instrument
Expected runoff-based tax/subsidy rates can be
designed to achieve an efficient outcome, (i.e., to con-
trol expected damages), CE(a) outcome (i.e., to control
expected ambient pollution levels), or CE(x) outcome
(i.e., to control input use and technology) only under
highly restrictive conditions (Shortle and others,
1998b).8 This is because expected runoff-based
instruments provide producers with incentives to con-
trol mean runoff levels from their field, and these
incentives generally differ from the goal of policymak-
ers who wish to achieve an efficient, CE(a), or CE(x)
outcome (Shortle, 1990; Horan 1998).  Expected
runoff-based instruments can be designed to achieve a
CE(r) outcome (to control runoff at least cost) because
the goals of producers then coincide with those of pol-
icymakers.  The optimal incentive rate in this case
would be site-specific, equal to the social value of a
marginal increase in mean runoff from the site.
An expected runoff-based instrument will be effective
only if producers understand how their production and
pollution control decisions influence expected runoff.
This information may be provided to producers by the
resource management agency in the form of a tax or
subsidy schedule based on input and technology choic-
es, or the agency may provide producers with access
to the runoff simulation models.  Differing expecta-
tions about the runoff process are not important here
as they were with ambient-based instruments because
the incentive is based on the resource management
agency’s expectations.  There would be no benefit to
producers from using their own expectations.
Political or legal reasons or transaction costs may pre-
vent a resource management agency from implement-
ing site-specific incentives.  Instead, a single incentive
rate may be applied uniformly to each site.  No matter
what policy goals are chosen, a uniform instrument
provides incentives for producers to reduce expected
runoff levels at least cost.  Therefore, the instrument is
a cost-effective method of achieving a set of mean
expected runoff levels, even if the mean levels
achieved do not correspond to the policy goals (i.e., a
uniform incentive always leads to a CE(r) outcome).  A
cost-effective uniform incentive rate equals the average
of the expected marginal social costs created by runoff
from each site, plus (in the case that policy goals are
not to control expected runoff) an additional term (a
risk premium) to account for the risk associated with
controlling expected runoff as opposed to the policy
goal (Shortle and others, 1998b).  A uniform expected
runoff incentive is not likely to reduce administration
costs significantly because the resource management
agency would have to construct a model of each site to
determine compliance and all inputs and technologies
would have to be monitored for use in the model. 
If expected runoff incentive rates are set at levels to
attain the CE(r) outcome, then the mix of production
sites may not be cost-effective because of suboptimal
entry and exit (see appendix 3A).  The cost-effective
mix of sites may be obtained by providing lump sum
incentives to producers who produce on marginal or
extramarginal sites.  It is not necessary to provide
lump sum subsidies to producers on inframarginal sites
unless, in the case of expected runoff taxes, their deci-
sion to produce is influenced by the magnitude of the
tax.  However, a lump sum refund of these producers’
taxes would reduce their tax burden to zero without
compromising efficiency.
Second-best policies may be designed when producers
retain private information.  The resource management
agency may have imperfect information about produc-
tion practices, land productivity, and other site-specific
characteristics that affect runoff or economic returns.
Producers may be reluctant to truthfully provide any
private information to the resource management agency
for fear that this information might be used against
them in the design of environmental policy.  While it
may be possible to develop a cost-effective incentive
scheme that induces producers to truthfully report their
private information, it is implausible due to large infor-
mational requirements and related monitoring and
enforcement costs (see Shortle and Abler (1994) for the
case of such an input-based incentive scheme).
Alternatively, it is possible to design incentives to attain
a second-best benchmark that allows producers to retain
their private information.9 In the absence of administra-
tion and enforcement costs, policy designed with limit-
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8 Specifically, an efficient rate exists when either (1) the producer
makes only a single decision that influences runoff or (2) the
covariance between marginal damages and marginal runoff levels
is zero for each input (Shortle and others, 1998b). 
9 Policies designed under imperfect information cannot be
designed to attain a specific outcome.  With limited information,
the resource management agency can design policy based only on
how it expects producers to react.  Therefore, policy would have to
be designed to attain an expected outcome.ed site-specific information will generally be less effi-
cient than policy designed under perfect information.
However, given the large costs of obtaining site-specific
information, policy designed where producers retain
their private information may actually be optimal.
The efficiency of a second-best incentive can be
increased if additional instruments are used for entry
and exit.  Lump sum incentives for achieving optimal
entry and exit would take the form of a tax applied to
producers producing on extramarginal sites (if they do
not produce on this land, they pay no tax) or a subsidy
applied to producers who voluntarily retire extramargin-
al sites (e.g., USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program).
It is not necessary to provide lump sum taxes or subsi-
dies to producers who produce on marginal and infra-
marginal sites unless, in the case of an expected runoff
tax, their decision to produce is influenced by the mag-
nitude of the tax.  However, a lump sum refund of their
expected tax would reduce their expected tax burden to
zero without compromising optimality.
Overall Complexity of the Instrument
An expected runoff incentive is administratively com-
plex because input use and technology must be moni-
tored for each site in order to determine expected
runoff levels (using a simulation model).  In addition,
the resource management agency would have to devel-
op a model to simulate runoff from each agricultural
production site.
Informational Requirements 
Each producer must understand how production and
pollution control decisions affect runoff if the instru-
ment is to be effective.  Information on the relation-
ship between runoff and production and pollution con-
trol decisions may be provided to each producer by the
resource management agency.  To attain a cost-effec-
tive outcome, the resource management agency
requires perfect information about production and
runoff characteristics.  Less information is required in
designing policies to achieve second-best outcomes.
However, efficiency is increased as more information
is used to design policy.
Flexibility Provided by Instrument
An expected runoff-based incentive is fairly flexible.
Producers have flexibility in that they may utilize any
private knowledge they may have to further reduce
costs, or they may alter production decisions as eco-
nomic and environmental conditions change.  The
resource management agency may have more flexibili-
ty than with some design-based instruments because
there is only a single instrument base (expected runoff
levels) for which incentive rates must be altered as
underlying economic and environmental relationships
change.  When incentives are applied to several inputs,
several types of rates must be altered as underlying
relationships change.
Administration and Enforcement Costs 
Monitoring costs are high for expected runoff-based
instruments because the use of each input and technol-
ogy must be monitored to determine (through the use
of a simulation model) expected runoff.  Also, provid-
ing producers with information about runoff relation-
ships for each production site (by providing access to
simulation models) would likely be expensive.
Information and administration costs would be higher
with site-specific instruments than with uniform or 




The second subclass of design-based incentives is
based more directly on inputs and technology (Shortle
and Abler, 1994).  A summary of input- and technolo-
gy-based instruments (not including expected runoff-
based instruments), according to evaluative criteria, is
presented in table 3-4. 
Incentives Provided by the Instruments
Input- and technology-based incentives can be
designed to achieve an efficient or any type of cost-
effective outcome (i.e., a CE(a), CE(r), or CE(x) out-
come; see table 2-1).  The reason is that input and
technology choices, while not always equivalent to
specific policy goals, are the means by which a
resource management agency can achieve its goals.
For example, if a resource management agency had
absolute control over agricultural production in a
region and wanted to achieve an efficient outcome, it
would do so by specifying input use and technologies
for the region.
Instruments must target all inputs and technology choic-
es to attain an efficient, CE(a), or CE(r) outcome.  The
cost-effective incentive rate would be site-specific,
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in the use of the input (Shortle and others, 1998a;
Shortle and Abler, 1997).  Note that the social cost of a
marginal increase in the use of an input is negative for
those inputs that decrease pollution (e.g., a nitrogen
inhibitor).  The use of such inputs should be subsidized.
The use of per-unit, input-based incentives alone will
not create the incentives necessary to induce producers
to adopt the efficient technology (e.g., placing the
appropriate taxes on variable inputs may not induce a
switch from conventional tillage to conservation
tillage).10 If a suboptimal technology is used, then
input use may also be suboptimal since all production
decisions are interdependent.  Therefore, the optimali-
ty of input taxes/subsidies is conditional on the tech-
nology chosen.  Additional instruments, targeted at
technology, are required to attain the efficient, CE(a),
or CE(r) outcome.
Lump sum incentives that are contingent on technolo-
gy choices can produce optimal adoption.  For exam-
ple, a lump sum tax can be applied to producers who
adopt a suboptimal technology, or a lump sum subsidy
can be applied to producers who adopt the optimal
technology.  If there are adjustment costs to technolo-
gy adoption, a cost-sharing approach can also be used
to induce adoption.
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10 This is because the choice of production technology has a non-
marginal impact on damages, but the linear instruments only
account for the marginal impacts of each producer’s choices.  
Table 3-4—An evaluation of input- and technology-based incentives
Evaluative criteria  Efficient or cost-effective: CE(a), CE(r), or CE(x)  Second-best (i.e., uniform, limited set of inputs,
imperfect information) 
Incentives provided Good Fair
Additional instruments are needed to ensure  Not efficient. Additional instruments required
optimal entry/exit. for optimal entry/exit.
Relative complexity Medium Low
Efficiently or cost-effectively designed instrument  Incentives applied only to a few input
is site-specific and applied to each input and  and technology choices, and may be 
technology choice. Producers can easily evaluate uniformly applied to all producers.
instruments. Producers can easily evaluate instruments.
Information required Low Low
by producers 
Producers need information about only their  Producers need information about only their
own production processes. own production processes.
Flexibility                   Medium Medium-High
Producers are able to respond to changing market  Producers are able to respond to changing
conditions. Incentives for each production and  market conditions. Incentives for only some 
pollution control decision. Resource management  production and pollution control decisions.
agency must set multiple rates for each producer. Resource management agency must set 
multiple rates for each producer.
Administration and  Medium-High Low-Medium
enforcement costs
Site-specific incentive applied to each production  Costs are reduced the more uniformly the
and pollution control choice requires an extensive  incentives are administered, the fewer
amount of monitoring. inputs are targeted, and the less site-specific
information the resource management 
agency pursues.
Note:These rankings are subjective, based only on theoretical properties as opposed to empirical evidence. A more reliable table would be based
on empirical results that compare each type of policy according to a consistent modeling framework that is representative of the nonpoint problem.Producers may have available to them a variety of
crop production and pollution control technologies and
will likely be operating with a suboptimal technology
prior to the implementation of nonpoint pollution con-
trol policies.  The cost of switching to an alternative
technology may be significant.  Nowak (1987) identi-
fies 15 constraints to adoption (see box, p. 50), most
having to do with the costs of obtaining information,
management and capital constraints, and perceptions
about risk.  These constraints explain the frequent use
of suboptimal crop management strategies.
Additional instruments may be necessary to ensure
optimal entry and exit.  The use of input and lump
sum technology taxes/subsidies may not result in effi-
cient or cost-effective entry and exit into the region.  It
may therefore be necessary to apply a lump sum
tax/subsidy to producers producing on extramarginal
sites to ensure optimal entry and exit.  Otherwise,
there will be an inefficient mix of sites in production,
resulting in too much pollution for the region.  The
optimal lump sum tax would be applied to producers
who produce on extramarginal sites and would ensure
that they do not earn after-tax profits on these sites.
Alternatively, a lump sum subsidy could be given to
producers who retire extramarginal sites.  The optimal
value would ensure that these producers are better off
when they do not produce on extramarginal sites.
Lump sum subsidies to producers on marginal and
inframarginal sites are unnecessary unless, in the case
of input and technology taxes, their decision to pro-
duce is influenced by the magnitude of the other taxes.
However, a lump sum refund of these producers’ taxes
would reduce their tax burden to zero without further
compromising efficiency.
The resource management agency may have imperfect
information about production practices, land productiv-
ity, and other site-specific characteristics that affect
runoff or economic returns, and producers may be
reluctant to truthfully reveal any private information.
The agency may therefore have to design a second-best
benchmark that allows producers to retain their private
information.11 In the absence of administration and
enforcement costs, policy designed with limited site-
specific information will generally be less efficient than
policy designed under perfect information.  However,
given the large costs of obtaining site-specific informa-
tion, policy designed when producers retain their pri-
vate information may actually be optimal.
Political or legal reasons or costs may limit the ability
of a resource management agency to implement site-
specific incentives for each input that contributes to
pollution.  Instead, incentives may be applied uniform-
ly across sites and applied to only a few inputs, reduc-
ing administration costs.  The choice of inputs to target
could be based on ease of observation or measure-
ment.  Some management practices, such as the rate at
which chemicals are applied, are very difficult to
observe without intensive and obtrusive monitoring.  
An optimal uniform incentive rate equals the average
of the expected marginal social costs created by the
input use at each site, plus adjustments to account for
the average marginal impacts of input substitution on
expected social costs and profit levels (Shortle and
others, 1998a).  The adjustments are needed because
placing incentives on the most easily observed inputs
can lead to substitution distortions and undesirable
changes in the input mix (Eiswerth, 1993; Stephenson,
Kerns, and Shabman, 1996).  For example, a tax on
herbicides would reduce herbicide use, but may
increase mechanical cultivation and soil erosion,
which in turn has undesirable impacts on water quali-
ty.  The resource management agency would have to
carefully consider the management alternatives to the
undesirable practices, and have in place economic
incentives or other measures to counter any undesir-
able characteristics of the alternatives. 
The efficiency of second-best, input-based incentives
can be increased if additional instruments are used for
technology adoption and entry/exit.  Specifically, lump
sum technology taxes/subsidies could be administered
to all producers to ensure optimal technology adop-
tion, and lump sum taxes/subsidies could be adminis-
tered to producers on extramarginal sites to ensure
proper entry and exit (e.g., the CRP).  The efficiency
gain from using these lump sum instruments diminish-
es as the uniformity of the lump sum taxes/subsidies
grows.  Lump sum tax refunds could be provided to
producers on marginal and inframarginal sites, reduc-
ing their tax burden to zero without further compro-
mising efficiency.
Relative Complexity of the Instrument
Input-based instruments are relatively simple because
they are applied as an excise tax/subsidy on variable
inputs.  Technology-based instruments, since they are
lump sum, are also relatively simple.  However, the
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11 See footnote 10.site-specific nature of efficient or cost-effective instru-
ments increases their administrative complexity.
Second-best instruments are designed to be more sim-
ple.  Other things equal, uniform instruments will be
administratively less complex than site-specific instru-
ments, and instruments applied to only a few inputs
will be less complex to administer than instruments
applied to all inputs.  Finally, instruments designed
with limited information will be less complex from an
administrative perspective.  
Informational Requirements
The resource management agency must have perfect
information about production and runoff functions for
any efficient or cost-effective solution that attempts to
control nonpoint pollution.  However, second-best
policies may be designed with only limited informa-
tion about site-specific characteristics.  Producers have
no special informational requirements with input- and
technology-based incentives.
Flexibility Provided by Instrument
Producers have flexibility in their production and pol-
lution control decisions under input- and technology-
based incentives in that they may utilize any private
knowledge they may have to further reduce costs, or
they may alter their decisions as economic and envi-
ronmental conditions change.  A resource management
agency would have less flexibility with these instru-
ments since a number of incentive rates would have to
be adjusted as underlying environmental and economic
relationships change. 
Administration and Enforcement Costs 
Administration, monitoring, and enforcement costs are
relatively high for all efficient or cost-effective input-
and technology-based instruments due to their site-
specific nature and the necessity of monitoring each
input and technology used.  Second-best instruments
are less costly to apply because they do not have to be
site-specific, nor does every input and technology
choice have to be monitored for each producer.
Information costs may also be reduced with second-
best policies.
Application of Design-Based Incentives
Studies of actual or proposed economic incentive-
based policies for reducing agricultural nonpoint-
source pollution are limited.  Only a few States have
used input-based incentives, and their impact on agri-
cultural nonpoint pollution problems has not been
determined.  Economists must therefore rely on simu-
lative modeling techniques to gauge how these instru-
ments might perform.  Technology subsidies (cost-
sharing and incentive payments) and land retirement
(extensive margin) subsidies (CRP) are the only tools
that have been extensively used for reducing agricul-
tural nonpoint-source pollution.
Input-Based Incentives
The empirical literature on input-based incentives con-
sists primarily of different incentive policy simulations
(e.g., Abrahams and Shortle, 1997; Babcock et al.,
1997; Helfand and House, 1995; Larson, Helfand, and
House, 1996; Tsai and Shortle, 1998; Weinberg and
Wilen, 1997).  These studies all contend that incen-
tives can be targeted at a limited number of inputs
(such as irrigation water or chemical use) and still
achieve environmental goals with cost effectiveness.
However, the choice of base is important.  Cost effec-
tiveness is increased if incentive bases are highly cor-
related with policy goals (Russell, 1986), and if the
incentives encourage producers to reduce sufficiently
the use of pollution-causing inputs while not using
more of other pollution-causing inputs or less of pollu-
tion-mitigating inputs.  For example, Helfand and
House (1995) and Larson, Helfand, and House (1996)
explore alternative tax policies to limit aggregate
expected nitrogen runoff levels from lettuce produc-
tion in the Salinas Valley, California.  They find that
taxing irrigation water is more cost-effective than tax-
ing nitrogen fertilizer inputs, and almost as cost-effec-
tive as regulating both inputs optimally.  Water had a
higher correlation with runoff, and producers were
more likely to use less water than less nitrogen when
faced with a given incentive.  Peters, McDowell, and
House (1997) also found that tax rates on nitrogen fer-
tilizer must be high to reduce expected nitrogen loss
due to an inelastic demand for fertilizer.
The uniformity of incentives across sites is also an
issue.  Helfand and House (1995) determined the use of
uniform input taxes within a region to be almost as cost-
effective as site-specific taxes.  This result is not sup-
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Russell (1986), and Tsai and Shortle (1998) find that
targeting incentives to specific sites may significantly
outperform uniform approaches due to local geographic
and hydrologic conditions.  These studies, however, did
not consider the additional administrative and informa-
tion costs associated with improved targeting.
Finally, empirical research suggests that input-based
incentives are likely to have only indirect effects on
technology choices (or other types of discrete choices
such as crop choice and rotation) (Hopkins, Schnitkey,
and Tweeten, 1996; Taylor, Adams, and Miller, 1992).
If a set of input taxes induces an inefficient set of dis-
crete choices, then input use is likely to remain ineffi-
cient as well.  For example,  inefficient input use can
be expected if an input tax policy induces farmers to
adopt an inefficient crop rotation. This is because the
(efficient) tax rates will fail to provide farmers with
appropriate incentives under the production relation-
ships that correspond to an inefficient rotation.  The
result may be inefficiently high pollution levels
(Hopkins, Schnitkey, and Tweeten, 1996; Taylor,
Adams, and Miller, 1992).
Technology Adoption Subsidies
USDA and most States have long offered farmers
incentive payments for the adoption of conservation
practices.  Historically, payments were based on the
installation cost of primarily structural practices, such
as terraces.  More recently, the advent of programs
such as the Water Quality Incentive Program (WQIP)
and Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP)
have made payments available for nonstructural man-
agement practices, such as conservation tillage.  These
payments are designed to offset any private losses a
farmer may incur by adopting the practice, any
increased risk (in terms of uncertain yields) over the
first several years of implementation, and any other
short-term adoption constraints (see box, “Constraints
to Adoption of Alternative Management Practices”).
The incentive payments offered by USDA are technol-
ogy-intensive in that they focus on management prac-
tices.  Efficiency will be increased if technology-based
incentives are used in conjunction with input-based
incentives.  In order for the short-term subsidy to elicit
a change in technology, it must equal the present value
of the stream of expected net losses from adopting the
practice, if the practice reduces profits.  If the practice
increases profits, then the subsidy’s value is simply that
amount necessary to overcome adoption constraints.
Even though incentive payments have been an impor-
tant tool for many programs, their effectiveness may
be limited.  USDA financial assistance programs indi-
cate that practice profitability, rather than short-term
subsidies, is the most important factor for long-term
adoption.  The Rural Clean Water Program of the
1980’s demonstrated that cost-shared practices had to
be attractive on their own merits (EPA, 1990).  In a
study of soil conservation decisions in Virginia, Norris
and Batie (1987) found that farm financial factors, as
opposed to cost-sharing, were the most important
influences on the use of conservation practices.  This
suggests that either subsidy levels were not high
enough or that subsidies were not offered long enough
to be effective.
WQIP incentives may also have been inadequate for
encouraging many farmers to adopt practices less dam-
aging to water quality.  A 1994 Sustainable Agriculture
Coalition study found that WQIP incentive payments
were too low in some regions to secure the adoption of
recommended practices, including waste management
systems, conservation cover, conservation tillage, criti-
cal area planting, filter strips, pasture and hayland
management, pasture and hayland planting, planned
grazing systems, stripcropping, nutrient management,
pest management, and recordkeeping (Higgins, 1995).
An Economic Research Service (ERS) study (Cooper
and Keim, 1996) used the results of farmer surveys
from the Eastern Iowa-Illinois Basin, Albemarle-
Pamlico, Georgia-Florida, and Upper Snake Area
Study projects (joint ERS-Natural Resources
Conservation Service (NRCS)-U.S. Geological Survey
projects to study relationships between production
practices and water quality) to model the probability of
adopting a preferred farming practice as a function of
WQIP incentive payments.  The practices studied
included split fertilizer applications, integrated pest
management, legume crediting, manure crediting, and
soil moisture testing.  Results suggested that adoption
rates of 12 to 20 percent could be achieved with no
payment, indicating that some practices were prof-
itable on their own merit in some regions.  However,
the adoption rate would not increase beyond 30 per-
cent with the actual WQIP payments of $10/acre.  A
substantial payment increase would be required to
encourage 50-percent adoption for any of the prac-
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Constraints to Adoption of Alternative Management Practices
Nowak (1991) identified 15 constraints to adoption:
1. Basic information about the practice is lacking.  Producers do not have adequate information to assess the economic
and agronomic properties of a practice, and how the practice might meet overall goals (e.g., profitability or steward-
ship).  A producer will not blindly adopt a new practice without adequate information.
2. Cost of obtaining information is too high.  Information is not costless, and the cost or difficulty of obtaining site-spe-
cific information may be prohibitive to the producer.
3. Complexity of the proposed production system is too great.  There is an inverse relationship between the complexity
of a practice and adoption rate.  
4. Practice is too expensive.  If adoption costs are high in terms of capital outlays and reduced margins, then producers
will not be in an economic position to adopt the practice, even if water quality protection is an important goal.
5. Labor requirements are excessive.  If a practice requires more labor than the farm manager feels is available, then the
practice cannot be adopted.  
6. Planning horizon is too short.  Some producers may have a short planning horizon because of planned retirement or
other factors.  If the time associated with recouping initial investments, learning costs, or depreciation of new equip-
ment is beyond the operator’s planning horizon, then the practice will not be adopted.
7. Supporting infrastructure is lacking.  Producers rely on a network of providers of support and services, such as chemi-
cal dealers, implement dealers, extension agents, and other producers.  An innovative practice may not be part of the
traditional support network’s knowledge base.  A producer could not adopt such a practice without an adequate support
network in place.
8. Producer lacks adequate managerial skill.  Many of the new production systems rely on increased management skills,
particularly IPM, nutrient management, and precision farming.  Producers who do not have the necessary management
skills will not adopt such practices.
9. Producer has little or no control over adoption decision.  In some cases, a producer cannot make a decision to adopt an
alternative practice or production system without the input and approval of partners, landlord, or lender.  If these other
parties are not convinced of the merits of a proposed change, then the practice cannot be adopted.
10. Information about the practice is inconsistent and conflicting.  A producer may hear different messages about the
impact of a practice on farm profitability, input needs, and water quality.  A producer will be reluctant to adopt a prac-
tice until the information about it becomes more consistent.
11. Available information is irrelevant.  The information available about the performance of a practice may be based on
performance in another county or even another State.  A producer may be unwilling to adopt a new practice until infor-
mation about the practice under local conditions is developed, especially if the new practice entails some investments
or changes that are essentially irreversible.
12. Current production goals and new technology conflict.  A new technology may not fit into existing production sys-
tems or policy settings.  For instance, participating in the commodity programs may restrict the ability of a producer to
incorporate rotations into his or her operation.  A producer may be unwilling to adapt his current operation to fit a new
practice.
13. The practice is inappropriate for the physical setting.  A practice that was developed for one particular setting, such
as flat fertile fields in the Midwest, may cause yield losses, reductions in net returns, or even environmental damage
when applied in another setting.  A producer will be unwilling to adopt a practice that is inappropriate for his or her
setting.
14. Practice increases risk.  A new practice may increase the variability of returns.  An increase in the risk of a negative
outcome may be unacceptable to producers who are risk-averse.  
15. Belief in traditional practices outweighs new technology.  Some producers are unwilling to abandon practices that are
“tried and true,” and are therefore perceived as being less risky.tices.  Thus, WQIP payments may be insufficient for
adopting and maintaining practices beyond the 3 years
that incentives are provided.
The ERS results are supported by a Cornbelt survey
(Kraft, Lant, and Gillman, 1996) in which only 17.5
percent of farmers indicated they would be interested
in enrolling in WQIP.  An additional 27.8 percent stat-
ed they might be interested.  The average payment
requested by those expressing some interest in the pro-
gram was almost $76 per acre, much greater than the
WQIP maximum of $25.  Only 18.8 percent were will-
ing to accept $25 per acre or less.
Practice subsidies have also been found to increase the
adoption of alternative management practices.  Ervin
and Ervin (1982) found that government cost-sharing
was a significant variable for explaining soil conserva-
tion efforts in one Missouri county.  Similarly, Nielsen,
Miranowski, and Morehart (1989) studied aggregate
soil conservation investments and found that cost-shares
were a significant variable when conservation tillage
was included as an investment.  It is important to note
that soil-conserving practices produce water quality
benefits only as an indirect effect.  These practices are
designed primarily to enhance long-term soil productiv-
ity, which is of immediate economic concern to farmers.
Entry and Exit Subsidies: Land Retirement 
The USDA Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) uses
subsidies to retire cropland especially prone to produc-
ing environmental problems.  In exchange for retiring
highly erodible or other environmentally sensitive
cropland for 10-15 years, CRP participants are provid-
ed with an annual per-acre rent and half the cost of
establishing a permanent land cover (usually grass or
trees).  Payments are provided for as long as the land
is kept out of production.  These subsidies ensure a
degree of extramarginal efficiency (i.e., that entry/exit
issues are considered to some degree).
CRP eligibility has been based on soil erosion (first 9
signups) and potential environmental benefits (signups
10 and up).  With the 10th signup, the cost effective-
ness of CRP outlays was increased by using an envi-
ronmental benefits index (EBI) to target funds to more
environmentally sensitive areas.  The EBI measures
the potential contribution of enrollment bids to conser-
vation and environmental program goals.  The seven
coequal EBI components are surface-water quality
improvement, groundwater quality improvements,
preservation of soil productivity, assistance to farmers
most affected by conservation compliance, encourage-
ment of tree planting, enrollment in Hydrologic Unit
Area Projects of USDA’s Water Quality Program, and
enrollment in established conservation priority areas.
Enrollment bids with a higher EBI to rental payment
ratio were accepted ahead of bids with lower ratios.
Thus, to some degree, the EBI ensures that land with
characteristics most related to environmental quality is
enrolled first.
The CRP has converted a total of 36.4 million acres of
cropland to conservation uses since 1985, about 8 per-
cent of U.S. cropland.  Net social benefits of the CRP
are estimated at $4.2-$9 billion (Hrubovcak, LeBlanc,
and Eakin, 1995).
Compliance Mechanisms
Instead of offering farmers a payment to adopt alterna-
tive practices, existing program benefits can be with-
held unless the change is made.  So-called compliance
mechanisms tie receipt of benefits from unrelated pro-
grams to some level of environmental performance.
Examples include USDA’s Conservation Compliance
program to reduce soil erosion and the Swampbuster
program to discourage the drainage of wetlands
(USDA, ERS, 1994).  As applied to agricultural non-
point-source pollution, program benefits could be with-
held if a conservation or water quality plan containing
the appropriate technologies is not developed and
implemented.  Producers would have an incentive to
develop the plan as long as the expected program bene-
fits outweighed the costs of implementing the plan.
The effectiveness of compliance mechanisms for con-
trolling agricultural nonpoint-source pollution is limited
by the extent to which those receiving program benefits
are contributing to water quality problems.  In addition,
the effectiveness of a compliance approach varies with
economic conditions.  Generally, program benefits
decrease when crop prices are high.  It is precisely dur-
ing these times that agriculture’s pressures on the envi-
ronment are greatest and the incentive effects of compli-
ance are at their lowest.  Budgetary reasons may also
force the reduction of program benefits, reducing the
incentive effect of compliance mechanisms.12
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of 1996 reduces commodity support programs through 2003.The compliance approach’s cost effectiveness depends
on how the policy is designed.  If the policy requires
that particular practices be adopted, then cost effec-
tiveness would be poor if it is not possible to choose
the practices optimally.  If compliance is based on per-
formance, then producers have an incentive to find the
least-cost approach to meeting the performance
requirements.  However, compliance cannot generally
allocate pollution control among farms in a least-cost
way because program incentives are unlikely to be dis-
tributed in a way that reflects contributions to water
quality damages (farms with high damages receiving
more program benefits).  The administration and
enforcement costs for compliance may be high.
Individual water quality plans must be developed, and
farm-level monitoring and enforcement carried out.
The Food Security Act of 1985 enacted conservation
compliance provisions for the purpose of reducing soil
erosion.  The provisions require producers of program
crops who farm highly erodible land (HEL) to imple-
ment a soil conservation plan.  Reducing soil erosion
has implications for water quality. Violation of the
plan would result in the loss of price support, loan
rate, disaster relief, CRP, and FmHA benefits. 
The 1996 NRCS Status Review (USDA, NRCS, 1996)
determined that only 3 percent of the nearly 2.7 mil-
lion fields required to have a conservation compliance
plan were not in compliance.  USDA estimates that
nearly 95 percent have an approved conservation sys-
tem in place.  An additional 3.8 percent are following
an approved conservation plan with a variance granted
on the basis of hardship, climate, or determination of
minimal effect.  These results indicate that farmers had
sufficient incentives to develop and adopt alternative
conservation practices.
Evaluations of conservation compliance report mini-
mal or moderate increases in crop production costs and
significant reductions in soil erosion (Thompson and
others, 1989; Dicks, 1986), although regional assess-
ments show significant variation in costs and benefits.
Two studies conclude that conservation compliance is
a win-win situation with increased farm income and
reduced soil loss (Osborn and Setia, 1988; Prato and
Wu, 1991).  However, others show reductions in soil
loss are achieved only with decreases in net farm
income (Hickman, Rowell, and Williams, 1989;
Nelson and Seitz, 1979; Lee, Lacewell, and
Richardson, 1991; Richardson et al., 1989; Hoag and
Holloway, 1991; Young, Walker, and Kanjo, 1991).
The majority of HEL can apparently be brought into
compliance without a significant economic burden.  A
national survey of producers subject to compliance
found that 73 percent expected compliance would not
decrease their earnings (Esseks and Kraft, 1993).
Conservation compliance has resulted in significant
reductions in soil erosion.  Annual soil losses on HEL
cropland have been reduced by nearly 900 million tons
(USDA, NRCS, 1996).  Average soil erosion rates on
over 50 million HEL acres have been reduced to “T,”
or the rate at which soil can erode without harming the
long-term productivity of the soil.  If conservation
plans were fully applied on all HEL acreage, the aver-
age soil erosion rate would drop from 16.8 tons per
acre per year to 5.8 tons (USDA, NRCS, 1996).
Finally, conservation compliance has been calculated
to result in a large social dividend,  primarily due to
offsite benefits.  An evaluation using 1994 HEL data
indicates the national benefit/cost ratio for compliance
is greater than 2 to 1 (although the ratios vary widely
across regions) (USDA, ERS, 1994).  In other words,
the monetary benefits associated with air/water quality
and productivity outweigh the costs to government and
producers by at least 2 to 1.  Average annual water
quality benefits from conservation compliance were
estimated to be about $13.80 per acre (USDA, ERS,
1994).  However, these findings do not necessarily
indicate that existing compliance programs are cost-
effective nonpoint pollution-control mechanisms.
Market Mechanisms
The creation of markets for pollution allowances is an
innovative approach to reducing pollution from sources
with different marginal costs of control.  For point
sources of pollution, a simple market works as follows.
Each source is provided with a permit defining the
level of emissions it may discharge, where aggregate
allowable emissions for the watershed are determined
based on some policy goal.13 A market is then created
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13 Permits may be allocated to polluters in a number of ways.
They may be auctioned or sold to polluting firms by the govern-
ment, or distributed free of charge on any basis that is deemed fair.
The implicit assumption when firms must pay for permits is that
they do not hold the right to pollute.  When permits are provided
free of charge, initial property rights reside with polluters.  The
initial allocation does not affect the final outcome, only the distri-
bution of wealth.by letting firms redistribute emissions levels among
themselves by buying or selling “allowances,” which
are essentially authorizations to increase emissions. For
example, if firm A purchases an allowance from firm
B, then firm A can increase its emissions by the amount
specified by the allowance and firm B must decrease
its emissions by the same level.  
Firms with initial emission levels greater than their ini-
tial permit holdings will have to either purchase more
allowances or reduce emissions, depending on the rel-
ative cost of each method.  Firms with higher marginal
costs of emissions reduction will purchase allowances
from firms with a lower marginal cost of emissions
reduction.  This sort of trading scheme makes it bene-
ficial for firms with lower pollution control costs to
reduce emissions by more than firms with higher con-
trol costs, reducing pollution control costs for the
watershed as a whole.  Point-source allowance markets
have been used for a number of years with varying
degrees of success.  Most successful has been the mar-
ket for SO2 emissions allowances, which has signifi-
cantly reduced firms’ compliance costs for meeting air
quality regulations (USGAO, 1997).  
Permit Markets Involving 
Nonpoint Sources
A market could be designed to include nonpoint
sources.  In such a program, point sources would have
the option of purchasing allowances from nonpoint
sources to meet their emissions reductions require-
ments.  Trading between point sources and nonpoint
sources is possible when the pollutants are common to
both point and nonpoint sources (e.g., nitrogen and
phosphorus), or when the effects of pollutants on
expected damages can be used to determine appropri-
ate trading ratios between different types of pollutants.
Costs of reducing agricultural nonpoint-source loads in
a watershed may be less than reducing point-source
loads, especially where point-source discharges are
already being constrained by the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits of the
Clean Water Act.
Point/nonpoint trading is most feasible when both point
and nonpoint sources contribute significantly to total
pollutant loads (Bartfeld, 1993).  If the nonpoint source
contributions are very large in relation to the point-
source contributions, then the point sources will be
unable to purchase enough nonpoint-source allowances
to make much difference in water quality.  On the other
hand, if point sources are very large in relation to the
nonpoint sources, savings from trading may not justify
the administrative expense of a trading program.
However, point/nonpoint trading is not suitable for all
types of water bodies (Bartfeld, 1993).  Trading is most
suitable for water bodies with long pollutant residence
times, such as lakes and estuaries.  In water bodies with
short pollutant residence times, water quality impacts
of nonpoint-source pollution vary with flow levels.
During wet periods when nonpoint-source discharges
are greatest, stream flow is also higher, and the impacts
of nonpoint-source pollutants on stream water quality
are lessened through dilution.  On the other hand,
streams will experience little nonpoint-source discharge
during dry periods when flow is low.  It is during these
periods that point-source discharge impacts on water
quality are most severe.  Trading will do little to pro-
tect water quality during these low-flow conditions.
Efficiency of a trading program is increased if non-
point sources can trade with other nonpoint sources.
Trading between nonpoint sources will occur, howev-
er, only if there is an enforceable cap on runoff (or
expected runoff).  Otherwise, producers would have no
incentive to purchase pollution allowances.  As with
all pollution control policies, trading will be effective
only if policy goals represent an improvement over
current situations.  
Choice of Permit Base for Nonpoint Sources
As with other incentives, the characteristics of nonpoint
pollution make it difficult to establish effective markets
for nonpoint pollution allowances.  Allowances for non-
point emissions cannot be directly traded because these
emissions cannot be measured (Letson, Crutchfield, and
Malik, 1993).  Even if emissions permits were allocated
to nonpoint sources, there would be no way of knowing
whether a source was in compliance.
Nonpoint permits provide producers with incentives to
reduce pollution.  Therefore, as we have shown
throughout this chapter, permits can be applied to a
number of bases.  In this section, we consider two
types of permit markets.  The first market is defined
by point-source polluters trading emissions allowances
for allowances based on expected runoff by nonpoint
polluters.  The second market is defined by point-
source polluters trading emissions allowances for
allowances based on input use by nonpoint sources.  In
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ing trades to occur among like sources.
No matter which base is chosen, nonpoint allowances
will not generally be traded for point-source
allowances one-for-one due to the different allowance
bases, the random nature of nonpoint pollution, and
the heterogeneous nature of nonpoint-source contribu-
tions to pollution.  Instead, a trading ratio must be
established to define how many nonpoint allowances
must be purchased by a point source to equal one unit
of emissions allowances, and vice versa.
Permit Market Based on Expected Runoff 
A market based on allowances for expected runoff cre-
ates the same incentives as taxes/subsidies applied to
expected runoff.  Under such a system, an efficient,
CE(a), or CE(x) outcome will be attainable only under
very restrictive conditions (Shortle and others, 1998b).
However, a CE(r) outcome is possible in which
allowances are traded at a uniform rate.  Optimally,
agricultural producers would be allowed to trade
allowances among themselves, and also with point-
source polluters.  Expected runoff allowances cannot
be traded one-for-one with point-source emissions
allowances, however.  A uniform trading ratio equal to
the price of an emissions allowance relative to the
price of an expected runoff allowance defines the
number of emissions allowances that must be traded
for one unit of expected runoff.  As a result of the uni-
form trading ratio, high social-cost nonpoint polluters
will use more inputs than is efficient while low social-
cost nonpoint polluters will use fewer inputs than is
efficient.  Similarly, high social-cost point-source pol-
luters will emit more than is efficient while low social-
cost point-source firms will emit less than is efficient.
There are several problems with basing an allowance
market on expected runoff.  First, monitoring and
enforcement costs will be high because the simulation
models used to determine compliance require that the
technology used and the use of each input be moni-
tored.  Second, producers must know how their pro-
duction decisions affect runoff if the market is to be
effective.  Government intervention to help ensure that
the necessary information is available to producers
would likely be expensive. Finally, legal problems
may be created if permits are based on the resource
management agency’s expectations about runoff as
opposed to actual runoff, especially given the limited
ability of modelers to accurately predict runoff from
input use and management practices.
Permit Market Based on Input Use
Shortle and Abler (1997) suggest trading point-source
emissions for nonpoint variable production inputs.  The
efficient trading ratio is defined to be the marginal rate
of substitution of emissions for input use such that
expected damages and pre-permit profits are held con-
stant (Shortle and Abler, 1997).  With n production
sites and m inputs that influence pollution, n x m mar-
kets (trading ratios) are required to achieve efficiency.
Obviously, the transaction costs of such a market sys-
tem would be considerable (Shortle and others, 1998b).  
A second-best allocation could be obtained by allow-
ing trades to occur at uniform rates and by limiting the
number of inputs to be traded.  The resulting outcome
is the same as would occur when uniform input taxes
are applied to the same limited set of inputs.  The sec-
ond-best input allowance market economizes on trans-
action costs associated with monitoring and enforce-
ment of permits for the unrestricted inputs and would
reduce the incentives for noncompliance by reducing
arbitrage opportunities.  Little can be said qualitatively
about the second-best prices relative to efficient prices
derived by Shortle and Abler (1997).  Whether the
input allowance prices in the restricted set are higher
or lower than their efficient counterparts depends not
only on the effects of the input on environmental qual-
ity, but also on substitution relationships with other
restricted and unrestricted factors.
Uniformity of prices across polluters reduces the cost-
effectiveness of pollution control because it eliminates
potential gains from different treatment of polluters
according to their relative impacts on ambient condi-
tions.  The inefficiencies that occur from uniform input
prices when differential prices are optimal are analo-
gous to the inefficiencies that can occur when uniform
emissions charges are used in place of an optimally
differentiated structure (Baumol and Oates, 1988).
High control-cost or low social-cost polluters will end
up devoting too many resources to pollution control
while low control-cost or high social-cost polluters
will devote too few resources to pollution control.
However, if the differences in the economic gains are
small before transaction costs are considered, then
even small savings in transaction costs may be justi-
fied.  If the differences in the gains are large, then the
transaction cost savings must be comparably large.
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best prospects for regulation will depend on the nature
of any resulting substitution effects, correlation with
environmental quality, and enforcement and monitor-
ing costs.  Finally, monitoring and enforcement would
be easier for a second-best input market than a market
based on expected runoff.  Consequently, the costs
associated with these activities will probably be less
under a market for inputs. 
Empirical Evidence
Point/nonpoint trading programs have been set up to
restore water quality in several U.S. water bodies,
notably Dillon and Cherry Creek Reservoirs in
Colorado, and Tar-Pamlico Basin in North Carolina
(Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997).  These existing pro-
grams are designed such that point-source polluters
purchase emissions allowances from nonpoint pol-
luters.  The amount of allowances purchased depends
on the amount of expected runoff to be reduced by
nonpoint polluters, and the trading ratio.  Under exist-
ing programs, expected runoff reductions from non-
point sources in the basin occur through installation of
best-management practices (BMP’s) and the develop-
ment of nutrient management plans.  For example, the
ratio at which nonpoint expected runoff allowances
can be converted to point-source emissions allowances
is 2:1 for the Dillon Reservoir, and 3:1 for cropland
and 2:1 for livestock for Tar-Pamlico.  However, it
should be noted that permits were not issued to non-
point sources.
In several existing programs, the expected cost of
reducing nonpoint-source loadings was estimated to be
lower than the cost of (further) reducing point-source
loadings (table 3-5), suggesting that trades may be
beneficial for both parties.  However, no trades have
occurred (Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997).  One signifi-
cant factor may be program design.  Because nonpoint
sources are not regulated, any trades are not enforce-
able.  Instead, if nonpoint-source reductions failed to
meet water quality goals, then point sources would be
held responsible for meeting the goal through
increased point-source controls. Also, agricultural pro-
ducers may not have wished to participate for fear of
being labeled as polluters and becoming regulated in
the future.
The Tar-Pamlico program provides good examples of
several other problems facing existing point/nonpoint
trading programs.  The largest point-source polluters in
this area formed an association and traded as a group
(to reduce transaction costs) at a pre-determined price.
Members of the association could purchase nitrogen
reduction allowances by contributing to the North
Carolina Agricultural Cost Share Program at a fixed
price of $56/kg (this price has recently been reduced to
$29/kg).  The State would then handle the task of get-
ting agricultural producers to participate in the pro-
gram and deciding how much reduction alternative
farming practices would achieve.  However, the fixed
price was based on average control costs, thus reduc-
ing the potential benefits that would have been
obtained through margin pricing (Hoag and Hughes-
Popp, 1997).  Also, the program’s requirement of a 2:1
trading ratio may have increased the cost of a trade to
levels that have been unattractive to point sources.
Initial loading reduction goals for the program were
met by the point sources through changes in the pro-
duction process at a cost of less than $56/kg.  Finally,
the program is hampered by a lack of generally appli-
cable models or data linking land use practices to
water quality effects (Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997).
No markets currently exist for trading allowances
based on nonpoint inputs.  However, literature on sec-
ond-best input taxation offers some insights into the
efficiency loss resulting from the use of uniform prices
and trading ratios applied to only a few inputs (see the
discussion of input-based incentives in this chapter
under the heading, “Applications of Design-Based
Incentives”).
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Table 3-5—Estimated marginal phosphorus 
abatement costs for point and nonpoint sources
Abatement cost                 
Location                         Point source      Nonpoint source
$/pound
Dillon Reservoir, CO 860-7,861 119
Upper Wicomico River, MD 16-88 0-12
Honey Creek, OH 0-10 0-34
Boone Reservoir, TN 2-84 0-305
The range of estimates in each case reflects varying stringency of
controls or differences among sources (for example, agricultural ver-
sus urban sources).
Source: Malik, Larson, and Ribaudo, 1992.Summary
Economic incentives have many desirable characteris-
tics.  They rely on market systems to achieve desired
outcomes, they allow producers to respond to changes
in economic conditions, and (for a given policy objec-
tive) they allocate costs of control efficiently among
producers by allowing producers to use their own spe-
cialized knowledge about their operations.14 This chap-
ter has focused primarily on the two main classes of
incentives: performance-based and design-based.  The
choice of base is important in determining (1) the types
of incentives provided to producers, (2) the degree of
flexibility producers retain in their production and pol-
lution control decisions, (3) the complexity of policy
design, (4) the informational requirements of both pro-
ducers and the resource management agency, and (5)
the administration and enforcement costs of the policy.  
Instruments perform best when the incentives pro-
vided by the instrument coincide with the goals of
the resource management agency.  For example, an
ambient-based instrument can be designed to achieve a
mean ambient goal at least cost (when producers have
appropriate expectations about the nonpoint process).
However, an ambient-based instrument cannot be
designed to achieve an efficient outcome because the
incentives provided by the instrument (i.e., to control
expected ambient pollution levels) differ from goals of
policymakers (i.e., to control expected damages).
Likewise, a cost-effective expected runoff-based
instrument exists when the objective of policymakers
is to achieve a mean runoff goal.  However, an expect-
ed runoff-based instrument cannot be used to achieve
an efficient outcome or to achieve an ambient water
quality goal at least cost due to differences in policy
goals and incentives provided by the instrument.  As
another example, suppose nitrogen runoff is a problem
in a particular watershed.  In this case, incentives
applied to fertilizer use and irrigation are likely to be
more effective than incentives applied to technology
choices that are less correlated with water quality or
incentives designed to retire land from production.
Performance-based instruments can be inferior to
design-based instruments on several grounds.  First,
runoff-based instruments are not presently feasible
because runoff cannot currently be monitored at reason-
able cost with current monitoring technology.  Second,
optimal ambient-based instruments exist only when pro-
ducers and the resource management agency share the
same expectations about the nonpoint process.
Third, the informational requirements for both the
resource management agency and producers are
increased with ambient-based instruments relative to
design-based instruments.  For example, producers
must be able to evaluate how their actions and the
actions of others influence the incentive base for ambi-
ent-based instruments to be effective.  Moreover, pro-
ducers have to make predictions about the actions of
other polluters before they can predict how their own
actions will influence the incentive base.  Similarly,
the resource management agency must understand
how producers will evaluate the incentives.  Thus, the
agency is required to know what information is avail-
able to each producer and how each producer will
evaluate that information.  Neither producers nor a
resource management agency are likely to be able to
obtain and process such large amounts of information,
which are not required with design-based instruments.
Finally, ambient-based instruments will be less effec-
tive if producers are risk averse.  In this case, efficien-
cy can be increased if these performance-based instru-
ments are combined with design-based instruments.
Of the two types of design-based instruments
described (i.e., instruments based on expected
runoff and instruments based directly on input use
and technology adoption), second-best input- and
technology-based incentives are most conducive to
meeting specified policy goals.  Ideally, instruments
should be applied to all inputs and technologies used
and be site-specific.  However, empirical evidence
suggests only a slight welfare loss from using uniform
policies applied to only a few key inputs and technolo-
gies.  The degree of uniformity, the inputs and tech-
nologies targeted, and the amount of site-specific
information utilized in policy design that provides the
best level of control at lowest welfare and administra-
tion cost is conditional on local setting, availability of
information, and the skill of the resource management
agency.  Input and technology incentives may be con-
structed to perform relatively well in promoting least-
cost control when the tax or subsidy is closely corre-
lated to pollution control performance (Russell, 1986).
For example, if fertilizer application rates are closely
correlated with nutrient loadings to a stream because
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14 Economic incentive policies also create incentives for research
into more efficient technologies.  This is discussed in chapter 7.of local geographic and hydrologic conditions, then a
tax on fertilizer application will achieve a level of con-
trol almost as efficiently as a tax on nutrient loadings
(Russell, 1986). 
In contrast, expected runoff-based instruments are
likely to be more costly to administer than other
design-based instruments because the resource man-
agement agency has to monitor input use and technol-
ogy choices for each production site and develop a
model to predict runoff from all sites.
Regardless of the choice of instrument base, eco-
nomic efficiency is increased when additional
instruments are used to limit the scale of produc-
tion in the region.  Otherwise, the mix of production
sites will be suboptimal, resulting in too much pollu-
tion.  Optimal policies would ensure that an optimal
mix of land remains in production.  However, deter-
mining the optimal mix involves a comparison of each
site’s private net returns to the site’s contribution to
external social costs, an impractical process when
there are a large number of agricultural production
sites.  Instead, second-best principles can be used to
limit the costs of such policies.  As with the CRP, the
resource management agency may develop alternative
criteria on which to limit production, such as identify-
ing extramarginal land on the basis of resource charac-
teristics.  For example, land consisting of poor soils,
steep slopes, or sandy soils overlying ground water
used for drinking water, or land that is close to reser-
voirs might be identified as extramarginal in the sense
that the management practices necessary to reduce the
risk of water quality damages to acceptable levels
would be prohibitive.  Such cropland could be retired
through a number of mechanisms, including lump sum
taxes, subsidies, regulation, or long-term easements.
Coordination of existing programs and improved
targeting of incentives will lead to further water
quality improvements.  Design-based subsidies are
being used by USDA and States to promote the adop-
tion of management practices believed to protect water
quality.  One drawback is that these subsidies are not
designed to affect the long-term profitability of a prac-
tice.  As a result, evidence suggests that they have not
successfully promoted the long-term adoption of prac-
tices believed necessary to meet water quality goals.
A subsidy-based policy could be strengthened by
offering long-term subsidies that increase net returns.
Another drawback is the technology-based focus of
these incentives.  While input use may be altered as an
indirect effect of adopting alternative practices or tech-
nologies, programs will be more successful if incen-
tives are applied directly to input use when this use is
highly correlated to water quality impairment.
A final drawback of a subsidy-based policy is that it
encourages increases in the scale of production (i.e.,
production on extramarginal acreage), resulting in
more pollution.  A separate policy instrument may be
required to decrease the scale of production and
increase relative efficiency.  A lump sum payment or
subsidy to retire marginal cropland could achieve this
control.  (A lump sum tax could also achieve this goal,
but such a tax carries the same political baggage as a
design tax.)  Such a payment is similar to the current
CRP, which retires marginal cropland in order to
achieve environmental benefits.  Coordinating a CRP-
like program with long-term incentive programs tar-
geted at both technologies and input use could provide
more cost-effective control of nonpoint-source pollu-
tion in sensitive watersheds than current programs. 
Properly designed market-based systems may be effec-
tive alternatives to existing incentive programs.
Market-based systems would reduce overall pollution
control costs by combining point-source and nonpoint-
source policies and allowing markets to allocate pollu-
tion control costs more efficiently.  The two types of
market-based systems that seem to offer the greatest
potential are those based on expected runoff and those
based on input use.  Which type of system performs
better is an empirical issue.  However, the principles
from second-best design incentives may be used in the
construction of markets for polluting inputs.  A market
based on a limited number of inputs may minimize
administration costs and still achieve significant pollu-
tion control if the inputs are highly correlated with
water quality impairments.
The current institutional setting makes point/nonpoint
trading difficult and does not favor the establishment of
nonpoint/nonpoint trading.  A necessary component of a
trading program is that the activity the permits are based
on (emissions or inputs) can be regulated.  Regulations,
in the form of emissions permits authorized under the
Clean Water Act, exist for point sources.  However,
nonpoint sources are currently exempt from any regula-
tions.  Binding constraints must be imposed on the per-
mitted activities through an enforceable permit system if
the market is to operate effectively.    
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Illustration of Some Results
Proposition 1.  An ambient-based incentive can be
designed to achieve the cost-effective solution based
on a mean ambient target only when producers and the
resource management agency share the same expecta-
tions about the nonpoint process.
Proof.  Denote a producer’s site-specific joint distribu-
tion function defined over all random variables as 
hi (v, W) where v is an (nx1) vector with ith element
vi.  In general, a producer’s site-specific joint distribu-
tion, hi (v, W), differs from the resource management
agency’s, denoted by g (v, W).
Denote the site-specific ambient tax rate by ti.  Assum-
ing producers to be risk-neutral, each producer will
choose input use to maximize expected after-tax profit,
restricted on the choice of technology:
where Ei is the mean operator corresponding to hi (v,
W).  The first-order necessary condition for an interior
solution is
Comparison of (3A-1) with (2B-4) implies the follow-
ing condition must hold in the optimal solution:
where the superscript (*) denotes that these variables
are set at their optimal levels in the cost-effective solu-
tion.  Further manipulation of (3A-2) yields the condi-
tion
In general, equation (3A-3) is overdetermined with m
equations and one unknown.  An optimal tax rate
exists only when either (1) producers have a single
production choice that influences runoff, or (2) hi (ν ,
W) = g(ν,  W) ∀ i,j.
Proposition 2.  A cost-effective expected runoff incen-
tive tax will result in too few sites in production.
Proof.  The optimal tax rate is λ i
*, where λ i
* is
defined as the value of λ i in the solution to equations
(2B-8) and (2B-9).  When faced with an optimal
expected runoff tax, the after-tax profits associated
with production on the ith site are
In a competitive market, production will occur on a
site as long as after-tax profits are positive, i.e., as
long as
The marginal site, n, is the site for which after-tax
profits vanish, i.e., 
In general, n ≠  n* where n* is the solution to (2B-8)
and (2B-9) unless (2B-9) is satisfied. Assuming con-
straint (2B-3) is binding, condition (2B-9) requires that
π n* = 0, which generally differs from (3A-4), which
implies π n (xn, An) = λ n
*E{rn} > 0.  Therefore, the
number of production sites will be too small.  An addi-
tional instrument is needed to ensure optimal entry and
exit.  A lump sum refund of the total tax bill would be
sufficient to satisfy (2B-9). 
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Economic incentives use the price system to get pro-
ducers to take into account externalities such as pollut-
ed runoff. An alternative approach is to legally require
or mandate that producers behave in a specified man-
ner.  For example, producers may be required to limit
input use to a specified level, or they may be required
to adopt a specific technology.  Behavioral mandates
are traditionally referred to as command and control
regulations or standards.  Traditional water quality
policies in the United States, aimed primarily at point
sources, have relied on standards.   
Standards can be applied either to producers’ actions
(design standards) or to the results of their actions
(performance standards).  For point sources, the pre-
ferred basis for choosing a standard is emissions
because emissions are closely tied to damages and are
easy to measure (Baumol and Oates, 1988).  However,
the choice is not so clear for nonpoint sources, where
runoff and other physical processes are difficult or
even impossible to observe.  
In this chapter, we detail two classes of incentive bases
that may be used for nonpoint pollution control: 
(1) performance-based standards (i.e., standards in the
form of runoff or ambient concentrations), and 
(2) design-based standards (i.e., standards in the form
of restrictions on inputs and technology).  We discuss
the major characteristics of and policymakers’ experi-
ence with a variety of specific standards (table 4-1 lists
the standards that are covered in this chapter and pro-
vides examples of actual applications of each).
Specifically, the optimal form of each standard is
developed and evaluated according to (1) its relative
efficiency, (2) its relative complexity, (3) informational
requirements of regulators in designing the standard
and of producers in using the standard to evaluate their
decisions, (4) the flexibility of the standard to chang-
ing economic and environmental conditions, and (5)
potential administration and enforcement costs. 
Performance Standards
Performance standards consist of regulations placed on
observable outcomes of a polluter’s decisions.  For
point sources, performance standards are placed on the
amounts of pollutants in the effluent leaving the plant.
Such discharges are easy to observe and to monitor.
The situation is more complex for agricultural non-
point pollution, however.  Agricultural performance
bases (i.e., runoff, ambient pollution levels, or dam-
ages) cannot be controlled deterministically (without
randomness) due to the natural variability associated
with the nonpoint process.  Therefore, agricultural per-
formance-based standards must be defined in terms of
the probability of attainment.  For example, consider a
standard based on runoff.  The standard could be
defined in terms of the mean or variance (or other
moments) of runoff levels, or it could be defined in
terms of a probability (e.g., runoff must not exceed a
target level more than 95 percent of the time). 
Performance-based standards have several drawbacks.
Monitoring would have to occur over a period of time
to determine the sample distribution of the base.  For
example, suppose the standard requires that a produc-
er’s mean monthly runoff levels are no greater than z.
In this situation, it would not be appropriate to take a
single monthly measurement and determine a producer
to be noncompliant if actual runoff levels are greater
than z.  Instead, measurements must take place over a
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Chapter 4
Standards
Standards legally require or mandate that producers behave in a specified 
manner.  Policymakers use standards to control nonpoint pollution by mandating
that producers act in a more environmentally conscious manner.  In this chapter,
we detail a variety of standards that may be used for nonpoint pollution control
and evaluate them according to several criteria related to instrument design and
implementation.number of months to obtain a large enough sample to
have a good estimate of mean monthly runoff levels.
Only then could a producer be determined to be in or
out of compliance.  The required timeframe for moni-
toring may be significantly longer for some pollutants
due to long time lags associated with the delivery of
the pollutant to a water body.  Some agricultural
chemicals, such as phosphorus, can build up in the
soil.  Changes in management may not result in
changes in water quality until the chemical stored in
the soil is depleted.  It may therefore take years to
determine if producers are in compliance with an
ambient standard.
Neither the resource management agency nor produc-
ers can observe runoff, so it is not possible to deter-
mine whether or not a producer is in compliance with
such a standard.  For ambient standards, producers
must have perfect information about their own contri-
bution to ambient pollution levels and also the contri-
butions of others for the standard to be effective
(because they must be able to predict how their actions
will influence ambient pollution levels).  In addition,
all producers must have identical expectations about
random processes.  These requirements severely
decrease the likelihood of an ambient standard’s being
an effective policy measure.
In summary, performance standards based on runoff or
ambient quality are not feasible policies for controlling
nonpoint-source pollution, given current monitoring
technology.  Fortunately, removing runoff- or ambient-
based performance standards from the set of possible
policy tools does not necessarily imply a loss of effi-
ciency.  Shortle and Dunn (1986) have shown that
design-based standards are more efficient than those
based on runoff when economic and environmental
uncertainty exists.
Design Standards
Design standards place restrictions on the use of pol-
luting inputs and/or production and pollution control
technologies that are consistent with meeting particu-
lar environmental goals.  A producer’s actions, which
are inherently observable by a resource management
agency, are therefore the basis for compliance as
opposed to whether or not an environmental goal is
actually achieved.1 Two subclasses of design-based
standards are discussed in this section.  The first sub-
class is based on expected runoff.  The second sub-
class is based directly on inputs and technology. 
Expected-Runoff Standards
Expected runoff is the level of runoff that is expected
to result from a producer’s production and pollution
control decisions (i.e., input use and technology choic-
es).  A design standard based on expected runoff dif-
fers from a performance standard based on mean
runoff levels because compliance under the former is
determined by monitoring each producer’s input and
technology choices, and then using computer models
to determine expected runoff levels.  Under such a
standard, producers are free to choose input levels and
technology in the most efficient combinations as long
as the standard is achieved.  In addition, an expected
runoff standard allows producers to make use of any
private knowledge they might have about combining
inputs and technology, but only to the extent that the
private knowledge can be captured by a model.
Special knowledge that is not recognized by the model
is of no use to the producer.
Important to note is that there may be legal problems
with basing standards on the resource management
agency’s expectations about runoff as opposed to actu-
al runoff, especially given the current limited ability of
models to accurately predict runoff from input use and
technology choice.  A summary of expected runoff-
based instruments is presented in table 4-2.  
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1 Design standards have played an important role in U.S. water
quality policy toward point sources of pollution.  The 1972 amend-
ments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act require all indus-
trial and municipal point sources of water pollution to install “best
practicable treatment,” “best available treatment,” or “best conven-
tional treatment.”  Implementation of these rules involved defining
specific technologies that had to be adopted.  
Table 4-1—Types of standards and examples
Standards Actual applications
Performance-based:
Runoff None in existence
Ambient None in existence
Design-based:
Inputs Pesticide label rates; nutrient 
control laws in several States
Technology Water quality protection laws in a 
number of States; Coastal Zone 
Act Reauthorization Amendments
Expected runoff Erosion law in OhioIncentives Provided
Any set of runoff standards will lead to a cost-effec-
tive solution.  A runoff-based, cost-effective solution is
one in which producers will endeavor to meet a mean
runoff standard at least cost.  As long as producers are
profit maximizers, this will be their goal when faced
with any expected runoff standard.  Optimal entry/exit
in the sector is ensured by setting the standard at a
level such that it is more profitable for extramarginal
farms to retire land from production.
The relative efficiency of the outcome depends on
what standards are set.  As illustrated in appendix 2B,
the use of expected runoff standards will lead to an
efficient outcome or an outcome that achieves a mean
ambient pollution goal at least cost only under highly
restrictive conditions (Horan 1998).2 Even so, a target
that better reflects a site’s contribution to expected
damages will be more efficient than one that does not.  
Applying uniform standards to all farms is a relatively
inefficient method of controlling nonpoint pollution.
Given that a resource management agency would have
to construct a model of each site to determine compli-
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Table 4-2—Evaluation of expected runoff-based standards
Criteria                              Efficient                            Cost-effective                                           Second-best
(maximize social welfare)             (runoff targets)                    (Uniform standard, imperfect information)
Incentives provided Instrument  Good Fair
does not  
exist Provides incentives for optimal  Cost-effective but not efficient.
technology adoption.  Additional  Does not account for heterogeneity 
instruments required to ensure  in pollution contributions. Additional 
optimal entry/exit.  instruments targeted at technology 
adoption and entry/exit may increase 
efficiency. 
Overall complexity N/A  Medium Low
Optimally designed instrument is  Optimally designed instrument is 
site-specific.  Use of model  uniform across farms.  The use
simplifies implementation. of a model simplifies implementation.
Information required  N/A Medium Medium
by producers
Access to same model as  Access to same model as resource
resource management agency  management agency simplifies 
simplifies producer’s understanding  producer’s understanding of link 
of link between farming practices  between farming practices and runoff.
and runoff. 
Flexibility  N/A  Medium Medium
Producers are able to respond to  Producers are able to respond
changing market conditions, within to changing market conditions,
the constraints imposed  within the constraints imposed by the
by the model. model.
Administration and N/A  High High
enforcement costs
Input and technology choices of  Input and technology choices of each
each farm must be determined.  farm must be determined.
N/A = Not applicable.  
Note: These rankings are subjective, based only on theoretical properties as opposed to empirical evidence.  A more reliable table would be
based on empirical results that compare each type of policy according to a consistent modeling framework that is representative of the nonpoint
problem.
2 Specifically, an efficient standard exists when either (1) the pro-
ducer makes only a single decision that influences runoff or (2) the
covariance between marginal damages and marginal runoff levels is
zero for each input (Horan, 1998). ance, the cost savings of a uniform approach would
likely be minimal.  Failing to tailor standards to site-
specific or regional circumstances results in poor
allocative efficiency.  As with uniform taxes, uniform
standards result in high- (low-) damage-cost farms
using more (less) of each pollution-increasing input
than is efficient and less (more) of each pollution-
decreasing input than is efficient.  In addition, uniform
standards may not limit acreage in production in the
region.  Thus, uniform standards do not provide for the
efficient scale of the sector.  Failure to impose addition-
al standards or other instruments on producers operat-
ing on extramarginal acreage further compromises effi-
ciency.
An expected runoff standard will be effective only if
producers understand how their production and pollu-
tion control decisions will influence expected runoff.
The resource management agency may provide pro-
ducers with this information by giving them access to
runoff models that are used for determining compli-
ance.  Note that heterogeneous expectations are not a
concern here as they are for performance-based stan-
dards because compliance is determined using the
resource management agency’s expectations.  There
would be no benefit to producers from using their own
expectations.
Relative Complexity of the Standard 
An expected runoff standard is administratively com-
plex because input use and technology choices must be
monitored for each site to determine expected runoff
levels (using a model).  In addition, producers have to
understand how their production and pollution control
decisions influence runoff from their farms.
Informational Requirements  
The resource management agency requires no special
information to set cost-effective standards since the
mean runoff target is specified exogenously (i.e., the
mean runoff target is not based on any sort of cost-
benefit analysis).  The resource management agency
also requires information on technology and input use
from each farm so that runoff can be estimated with a
model.  The resource management agency’s informa-
tional requirements are decreased only slightly when a
uniform expected runoff standard is used.  Only a sin-
gle standard needs to be set, rather than a standard for
each farm, but information from each farm is still nec-
essary to determine whether the expected runoff stan-
dard is being met.
Finally, each producer would have to know how
his/her production decisions affect runoff if the instru-
ment is to be effective.  Information on the relation-
ship between runoff and production decisions may be
provided to each producer by the resource manage-
ment agency.
Flexibility Provided by Standard 
An expected runoff-based standard is moderately flexi-
ble.  Producers are not restricted in how they meet the
standard and have some flexibility in adapting to
changing economic conditions.  However, their ability
to take full advantage of their special knowledge is
limited by the sophistication of the models being used
to predict expected runoff.  Compliance is based on
the model predictions.  
Administration and Enforcement Costs 
Administration, monitoring, and enforcement costs are
high for expected runoff standards due to their site-
specific nature and because the use of each input and
technology by each producer must be monitored to
determine (through the use of a model) expected
runoff.  Costs may be only slightly reduced if uniform
standards are implemented, as the expected runoff
model must still be applied to each farm to determine
whether the standard is being met.  Finally, any gov-
ernment assistance to ensure that producers have infor-
mation about runoff relationships for their farm would
likely be expensive. 
Input- and Technology-Based Standards
The second subclass of design standards is based more
directly on inputs  (e.g., levels and forms of agricultural
chemicals) and technology (e.g., erosion and runoff
controls, irrigation equipment, and collection and use of
animal waste).  Currently, agricultural design standards
have limited use at both the Federal and State levels.
Common standards include pesticide use restrictions
and bans, the design of animal waste storage lagoons
for large concentrated animal feeding operations, and
use of nutrient management practices in areas where
drinking water is threatened by polluted runoff. 
A summary of input- and technology-based standards
(not including expected runoff-based standards) is pre-
sented in table 4-3. 
62 •   USDA/Economic Research Service AER-782   •   Economics of Water Quality ProtectionIncentives Provided
Input and technology subsidies can be designed to
achieve an efficient or (any type of) cost-effective out-
come (i.e., an outcome that achieves a mean ambient
water quality or runoff goal at least cost.  See table 2-
1).  The reason is that input and technology choices,
while not equivalent to specific policy goals, are the
means by which a resource management agency can
achieve its goals.  For example, if a resource manage-
ment agency had absolute control over farm produc-
tion in a region and wanted to achieve an efficient out-
come, it could achieve that outcome by choosing “cor-
rect” input use and technologies for the region.
Instruments must target all inputs and technology choic-
es to attain an efficient or cost-effective outcome.
Assuming a competitive agricultural sector with no
market distortions, ex ante efficient standards would
require each producer to employ the efficient site-spe-
cific technology and input levels characterized by the
three efficiency conditions ((2A-1), (2A-2), and (2A-4))
in appendix 2A.  Similarly, cost-effective standards
would be the solution to the optimality conditions
derived in appendix 2B.  Efficient or cost-effective stan-
dards are site specific due to land heterogeneity.  For
example, identical fertilizer application rates on two
fields may result in different discharges to surface water
because of differences in topography and vegetation
between fields and water resources.  In addition, stan-
dards must be applied to each input that influences pol-
lution, including those that are not currently being used.
Input standards typically represent a maximum level of
input use that is allowed by law.  However, for inputs
that reduce runoff, input standards must be defined as
the minimum level of input use allowed.
Using standards to control technology is more straight-
forward than using incentives because the technology
choice is mandated as opposed to induced.  As a result,
the choice of technology in the following discussion is
trivial.  The resource management agency chooses the
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Table 4-3—An evaluation of design-based standards
Evaluative criteria                                     Efficient or cost-effective                                                Second-best
(maximize social welfare or runoff target)                        (uniform, limited set of inputs,
imperfect information) 
Incentives provided  Good Fair
Provides incentives for optimal input use,  Not efficient.  Additional instruments 
optimal technology adoption, and   may be  required to ensure optimal
efficient entry/exit technology adoption and optimal 
entry/exit. 
Overall complexity High Low
Standards are site-specific, and must be set for  Standards set for few inputs or
each input and technology.  are uniform across fields. 
Information required Low Low
by producers
No special information required No special information required. 
Flexibility Low Low
Regulator must change standards as prices  Regulator must change standards as
change or new technologies are introduced. prices change or new technologies
are introduced. 
Administration and  High Medium
enforcement costs
Use of each input and technology choice  Use of easily observed inputs must
must be monitored.  be monitored. 
Note: These rankings are subjective, based only on theoretical properties as opposed to empirical evidence.  A more reliable table would be
based on empirical results that compare each type of policy according to a consistent modeling framework that is representative of the nonpoint
problem.technology that yields the greatest level of expected
net benefits for society under the framework imposed
(i.e., efficient or second-best).
Finally, the efficient scale of production in the industry
is guaranteed by setting technology and input stan-
dards for production on extramarginal land at levels to
prevent profitable operation on this land. 
Policies may be designed optimally even when pro-
ducers retain private information.  The resource man-
agement agency may have imperfect information
about production practices, land productivity, and
other site-specific characteristics that affect runoff or
economic returns, and producers may be reluctant to
truthfully reveal any private information they possess.
The resource management agency may therefore have
to design a second-best benchmark that does not
require obtaining producers’ private information.3
Optimal standards would be the solution to such a
benchmark.4
Without considering administration and enforcement
costs, policy designed with limited site-specific infor-
mation will generally be less efficient than policy
designed under perfect information.  However, given
the large costs of obtaining site-specific information,
policy designed without the benefit of producers’ pri-
vate information may actually be preferred.  
Political or legal reasons or costs may limit the ability
of a resource management agency to implement site-
specific standards for each input that contributes to
pollution.  Instead, standards may be applied uniform-
ly across sites and applied to only a few inputs, gener-
ally reducing administration costs.  Inputs to target
could be based on ease of observation or measure-
ment.  Some management practices, such as the rate at
which chemicals are applied, are very difficult to
observe without intensive and obtrusive monitoring.
As with incentives applied to a limited number of
inputs, optimal standards must be designed to account
for input substitution (see appendix 4A).  Placing stan-
dards on the most easily observed inputs can lead to
substitution distortions and undesirable changes in the
input mix (Eiswerth, 1993; Stephenson, Kerns, and
Shabman, 1996).  For example, a standard on herbi-
cides would reduce herbicide use, but may increase
mechanical cultivation and soil erosion, which in turn
impairs water quality.  The resource management
agency would have to carefully consider the manage-
ment alternatives to the undesirable practices, and
have in place other measures to counter any undesir-
able characteristics of the alternatives.
Failing to tailor standards to site-specific circum-
stances results in poor allocative efficiency.  The
resource management agency cannot easily target low-
cost pollution abaters, and therefore cannot efficiently
allocate pollution control efforts to minimize abate-
ment costs.  As with uniform taxes, uniform standards
result in high (low) damage-cost farms using more
(less) of each pollution-increasing input than is effi-
cient and less (more) of each pollution-decreasing input
than is efficient.  However, unlike the case of uniform
input taxes, marginal per acre profits are not equated
across farms under uniform standards.  In addition, uni-
form standards may not limit the acreage in production
in the region.  Thus, uniform standards do not provide
for the efficient scale of the sector.  Failure to impose
additional standards or other instruments on producers
producing on extramarginal sites further compromises
efficiency.
In general, there is a tradeoff between administration
costs and allocative efficiency.  Nationwide design
standards that are easy to observe, to administer,  and
to enforce can lower administration costs.  Gathering
information to better target where controls are applied
and developing a broader set of design standards that
apply to diverse conditions can significantly increase
administration costs.  Efficiency is improved if local,
rather than national, standards are applied. 
Relative Complexity of the Standard 
Input- and technology-based standards are relatively
simple because they are applied directly to the most
basic production decisions.  However, these standards
are administratively complex because each input and
technology choice must be monitored for each farm.
Other things equal, site-specific standards will be
administratively more complex than uniform stan-
dards, and standards applied to each input will be
more complex to administer than standards applied to
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3 Policies designed under imperfect information cannot be
designed to attain a specific outcome.  With limited information,
the resource management agency can design policy based only on
how it expects producers to react.  Therefore, policy would have to
be designed to attain an expected outcome.
4 Second-best standards, while having many of the same proper-
ties as second-best incentives, will generally result in different out-
comes.  This is addressed in chapter 8.only a few inputs.  Finally, standards designed with
limited information will be less complex from an
administrative perspective.  
Informational Requirements 
The resource management agency must have perfect
information about production and runoff functions for
each acre of land in production to achieve efficient or
cost-effective pollution control.  However, second-best
policies may be designed with only limited informa-
tion about site-specific characteristics.  Producers have
no special informational requirements with (efficient,
cost-effective, or second-best) input- and technology-
based standards.  They simply operate under the con-
straints imposed by the standards.
Flexibility Provided by the Instrument 
Input- and technology-based standards (efficient or
second-best) leave producers and administrators with
little flexibility in making decisions or in adjusting
policies to meet changing economic and environmen-
tal conditions.  Specifically, producers are constrained
by the standard, and all adjustments to changing eco-
nomic conditions must be made through changes in the
use of unrestricted inputs and technologies.  Changes
in economic conditions require the resource manage-
ment agency to set new standards if pollution control
is to be cost effective. 
Administration and Enforcement Costs 
Administration, monitoring, and enforcement costs are
high for all efficient (or cost-effective) design-based
standards due to their site-specific nature and because
use of each input and technology must be monitored.
Second-best standards are less costly to apply because
they do not have to be site-specific, nor does every
input and technology choice have to be monitored for
each acre of land in production.
Application of Design-Based Standards
Until recently, standards had only a limited history of
application to agricultural nonpoint-source problems.
Performance standards have not been applied to non-
point-source pollution because it cannot be observed.
However, design standards are becoming a more impor-
tant part of nonpoint-source pollution control policies,
primarily at the State level.  The performance of most of
these programs has yet to be evaluated.  Some of the
examples presented below are empirical studies of
hypothetical nonpoint pollution control programs.
Input Standards
Helfand and House (1995), in a study of lettuce pro-
duction in Salinas Valley, California, determined cost-
effective and second-best input standards when only
two inputs—nitrogen and water—influence runoff.  To
achieve a 20-percent reduction in nitrogen runoff, they
found that a uniform rollback of both water and nitro-
gen use resulted in a welfare loss (relative to the cost-
effective baseline) only slightly higher than input
taxes.  A single standard on water or nitrogen use only
resulted in a greater welfare loss. 
A study of the economic impacts of alternate atrazine
control policies concluded that a partial ban, targeted to
particular areas to meet Safe Drinking Water Act stan-
dards, was more cost effective than a total ban on
atrazine (Ribaudo and Bouzaher, 1994).  The cost of
reducing surface-water exposure to herbicides under the
partial ban was about one-fifth the cost per unit under a
total ban.  Partial bans allow most producers to continue
to use the pesticide, thus limiting increased production
costs to relatively few producers.  Administration and
enforcement costs are higher for partial bans. 
Technology Standards
Many States have incorporated enforceable mecha-
nisms for agricultural runoff in their water quality poli-
cies (table 1-5 in chapter 1).  These mechanisms almost
always consist of a farm-level management plan built
around “acceptable” management practices.  In areas
where water quality impairments are known to occur,
more stringent practices and enforcement are called for.
Most of these laws have been passed only recently, and
results in terms of reduced runoff, costs to producers,
and costs to States have yet to be documented.
Design Standards With Triggers
A program in Nebraska uses design standards in con-
junction with performance measures (Bishop, 1994).
Increasing concentrations of nitrate in groundwater led
to a 1986 law requiring Natural Resource Management
Districts (NRD’s) to require best-management prac-
tices to protect water quality.  The practices required
depended on nitrate concentrations in groundwater.  In
Phase I areas (the least contaminated), fall applications
of commercial nitrogen fertilizer are banned on sandy
soils.  In Phase II areas (12.6-20 ppm nitrate-N con-
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sampled, irrigation applications metered, deep soil
analysis for nitrate required on every field, a ban on
fall fertilizer applications instituted on sandy soils, and
a ban on any application on heavier soils until after
November 1.  Phase III (greater than 20 ppm) is the
same as Phase II, plus all fall and winter fertilizer
applications are banned, and spring applications must
be split applications or must use an approved
inhibitor.5 This policy approach is similar to a design
standard with imperfect information.  The NRD does
not know a priori which set of management practices
will achieve the groundwater quality goal.  Design
standards are instead changed in response to observed
changes in groundwater quality.  
Monitoring in the Central Platte NRD, which had the
greatest problem, has shown a decrease in groundwater
nitrate (Bishop, 1994).  No economic assessment on
the benefits and costs of the policy has been conducted.  
Wisconsin’s programs for protecting groundwater from
pesticides derive from the Wisconsin Groundwater Law
(1983) (Wisc. Stats., Chapter 160), which requires the
State to undertake remedial and preventive actions
when concentration “triggers” are reached in ground-
water for substances of public health concern, includ-
ing a number of pesticides.  Two triggers are estab-
lished for each chemical, an enforcement standard and
prevention action limit (PAL).  The PAL is 10, 20, or
50 percent of the enforcement standard, depending on
the toxicological characteristics of the substances.
When a PAL is exceeded, a plan for preventing further
degradation is prepared.  When the enforcement stan-
dard is exceeded, the chemical is prohibited in that area
overlaying the contaminated aquifer.
For example, the enforcement standard for atrazine is
3.5 ppb, and the PAL is 0.35 ppb.  Well monitoring
found atrazine concentrations in many areas of the
State above the PAL (Wolf and Nowak, 1996) and in
some areas above the enforcement standard.  This
prompted the passage of the Atrazine Rule, which
established maximum atrazine application rates and
conditional use restrictions for the State (Wisc. Admin.
Code, Agri. Trade & Cons. Prot. Ag30), as well as
zones where additional restrictions are imposed on top
of the statewide rules.  The result is a three-tiered
management plan: statewide atrazine restriction,
Atrazine Management Areas where concentrations
exceed the PAL, and Atrazine Prohibition Areas where
concentrations are above the enforcement standard.
Statewide atrazine restrictions impose soil-based maxi-
mum application rates, restrict when atrazine can be
applied, and prohibit applications through irrigation
systems.  Further restrictions are placed on application
rates in the Atrazine Management Areas.  In 1993, 6
management areas and 14 prohibition areas had been
established (Wolf and Nowak, 1996). 
An assessment of the Atrazine Rule reported that pro-
ducers in the Atrazine Management Areas were not at
a disadvantage to producers who were not in such
areas, as represented by comparisons of yield loss pre-
dictions and assessment of weed intensity (Wolf and
Nowak, 1996).  However, an assessment of compli-
ance costs was not made.  
Summary
Standards use the regulatory system to mandate that
producers adopt more socially efficient production
methods.  These mandates may leave producers with
little freedom when it comes to their production and
pollution control choices.  This chapter has focused on
the two main classes of standards: performance-based
and design-based.  The choice of base is important in
determining (1) the relative efficiency of the standard,
(2) the degree of flexibility producers retain in their
production and pollution control decisions, (3) the
complexity of policy design, (4) the informational
requirements of both producers and the resource man-
agement agency, and (5) the administration and
enforcement costs of the policy.
The relative efficiency of the standards is greatest
when they coincide with or support the goals of the
resource management agency. Expected runoff stan-
dards are cost effective because they can always be used
to achieve a mean runoff goal at least cost.  However, an
expected runoff-based instrument cannot be used to
achieve an efficient outcome or to achieve an ambient
water quality goal at least cost.  As another example,
suppose nitrogen runoff is a problem in a particular
watershed.  In this case, standards applied to fertilizer
use and irrigation are likely to be more effective than
standards that are applied to the type of crop grown.
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5 Soil inhibitors reduce the rate at which nitrogen is converted to
the soluble nitrate form, thus reducing losses to leaching or runoff.Performance standards can be inferior to design
standards on several grounds. All of the drawbacks
for performance-based incentives hold for standards as
well, with an additional drawback for performance stan-
dards that is probably even more troublesome.  Due to
the natural variability associated with the nonpoint
process, performance-based standards must be defined
in terms of a limit on mean ambient pollution or runoff
levels or in terms of a probability associated with the
occurrence of certain outcomes.  As a result, monitoring
would have to occur over a period of time to determine
the sample distribution of the base.  Only then could a
producer be determined to be in or out of compliance.
The required timeframe for monitoring may be years for
some pollutants due to long time lags associated with
the delivery of the pollutant to a water body.
Standards leave producers with little flexibility.
Standards, since they mandate or limit specific actions,
leave producers with little flexibility in adapting to a
changing economic environment.  Expected runoff
standards leave producers with the most flexibility
because specific production methods are not specified
and producers are free to adjust production as econom-
ic conditions change (as long as the standard is met).
In contrast, standards on inputs and technologies are
totally inflexible.  Producers can respond to changing
economic conditions only by altering the use of inputs
and technologies that are not targeted by the standards.
Some flexibility may be imparted by basing standards
on environmental triggers.  Allowing continued use of
a pesticide after it has been detected in groundwater,
but at lower rates, is less costly to producers than
immediately banning it.  Such an approach lessens
excessive regulatory burden resulting from the uncer-
tainties of the effectiveness of best management prac-
tices in reducing nonpoint-source pollution.  This flex-
ibility comes at a cost of greater administration and
monitoring costs.
Second-best input and technology standards are
more practical from an implementation standpoint.
Ideally, standards should be applied to all inputs and
technologies used, and be site specific.  However,
empirical evidence suggests only a moderate welfare
loss from using uniform policies applied to only a few
key inputs and technologies.  The degree of uniformi-
ty, inputs and technologies targeted, and the amount of
site-specific information utilized in policy design that
provides the best level of control at lowest welfare and
administration cost is an empirical question.  These
issues will generally depend on the local setting, avail-
ability of information, and the skill of the resource
management agency.  
Input and technology standards may be constructed to
perform relatively well in promoting least-cost control
when the standard is closely correlated to pollution con-
trol (Russell, 1986).  For example, if fertilizer applica-
tion rates are closely correlated with nutrient loadings to
a stream because of local geographic and hydrologic
conditions, then a standard on fertilizer applications will
achieve a level of control almost as efficiently as a stan-
dard on nutrient loadings (Russell, 1986).
In contrast, expected runoff standards are likely to be
more costly to administer than other design standards
because the resource management agency has to monitor
input use and technology choices for each production
site and develop a model to predict runoff from all sites.  
Broadening the scope of current programs and
improved targeting would lead to further water
quality improvements. A limited number of pro-
grams now include design standards as a method of
improving water quality.  These exist primarily in two
forms: standards on technologies and bans on haz-
ardous chemical inputs.  A chemical ban is probably
reasonable for extremely hazardous chemicals being
used in environmentally sensitive areas.  However, for
areas that are less sensitive and for chemicals with
limited risk, a more flexible approach may be more
efficient.  Some States are addressing this issue by
using water quality measures to define specific geo-
graphic areas where design standards are imposed and
environmental triggers within these areas to define the
particular set(s) of standards that are required.
While input use may be altered as an indirect effect of
mandating alternative practices or technologies, more
direct effects may be desired.  Programs will be more
successful if policies are applied directly to input use
when this use is highly correlated to water quality
impairment. 
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A Limited Set of Input Standards6
For simplicity, suppose standards are site-specific but
applied only to a subset of the total number of inputs.
Also for simplicity, we do not explicitly consider tech-
nology choices.  Let zi denote the (m¢ ´ 1) vector of
inputs whose use is standardized, and let yi denote the
([m - m¢] ´ 1) vector of inputs that are chosen freely by
producers (note that xi = [yi zi]).  Each producer faces
the following problem for production on each acre:
where zij represents that standard for the jth restricted
input.  Inputs denoted by j Î [1, k] are assumed to be
pollution-increasing while inputs denoted by  j Î [k,
m¢] are assumed to be pollution-reducing.  The
Lagrangian corresponding to the ith acre is
where lij is the Lagrangian multiplier for the jth
restricted input used on the ith acre.  Assuming an
interior solution for all inputs and that all constraints
are binding, the necessary conditions for a maximum
are
Note that lij < 0 for inputs that reduce runoff.  Input
use on the ith acre is determined by the simultaneous
solution to m + m¢  conditions in (4A-1)-(4A-3).  Use
of (unrestricted) input j will be a function of the stan-
dards for all restricted inputs, yij(zi), where zi is an (m¢
x 1) vector whose jth element is zij.  
For simplicity, assume that producers hold no private
information.  Optimal input standards are determined
by plugging the (unrestricted) input demand functions
(i.e., yij(zi)) into the agency’s objective function and
choosing input standards to maximize expected net
benefits, restricted on technology.
The first-order conditions are given by (2A-2) and
Using (4A-1) and (4A-2), condition (4A-4) can be
simplified to yield
The optimal shadow value for the uth restricted input
for the ith acre is equal to the marginal damage created
by use of the uth restricted input on that acre, plus an
adjustment term to account for the indirect effect on
damages resulting from the effect of the standard on
the use of other inputs.
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6 The mathematical foundations for input standards, applied to a
limited set of inputs, are developed in this appendix.  Unless other-
wise stated, the underlying model and assumptions are as devel-
oped in appendix 2A.
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Individuals who are damaged monetarily or otherwise
by the activities of others may have the right to sue for
damages in a court of law.  If the suit is successful, the
court may be guided in its compensation decision by a
rule of law or precedent, known as a liability rule.
The liability rule, while imposed ex post, serves as an
ex ante incentive to deter individuals or firms from
engaging in activities that may be damaging to others.
For example, liability rules can be designed to hold
polluters liable for the damages they cause.  If pol-
luters feel that their production decisions may result in
damages for which they may be held liable, then they
will likely weigh the benefits from participating in pol-
lution-related activities against the penalties that they
may expect to face as a result of their actions.  
In this chapter, we will review how liability creates
incentives to influence producer behavior, and the dif-
ferent forms these rules can take.  For each form, we
discuss the properties of the rule and compare them
with other types of incentives. 
Important Features of Liability 
Liability rules are a form of performance-based incen-
tive in that they are imposed after damages are real-
ized (Shavell 1987).  However, liability rules differ
from traditional performance-based incentives because
they are imposed only if a suit is privately or publicly
initiated, and if a court of law rules in favor of the
damaged parties.1 Instances may therefore arise in
which damages occur but no payments are made. 
Liability rules can be developed under two different
frameworks that are relevant for polluters: (1) strict
liability and (2) negligence.  Polluters are held
absolutely liable for payment of any damages that
occur under strict liability. Polluters are liable under a
negligence rule only if they failed to act with the “due
standard of care” (Segerson, 1995).  For example, a
producer would presumably not be found negligent
(and hence liable) in the pesticide contamination of
groundwater if the pesticide was applied in accordance
with the manufacturer’s specification and the laws
regarding application procedures.
When multiple polluters exist, the principle of  “joint
and several liability” allows damage costs to be divid-
ed among polluters according to any distribution of the
court’s choosing (unless a specific distributional rule
takes precedent).  The distribution does not have to be
based on the polluter’s marginal contribution to dam-
ages.  In fact, it is possible that one polluter could be
held liable for all damages.  That polluter is then free
to sue other responsible parties to share the burden
(Miceli and Segerson, 1991; Segerson 1995).  
The relationship between polluters and the victims is
important for choosing an appropriate liability rule.  The
relationship may be defined as one of either unilateral
care or bilateral care (Segerson, 1995).  Unilateral care
is a situation in which only the polluter influences dam-
ages.  In other words, the victim has no way of protect-
ing himself.  Alternatively, it is sometimes possible for
the victim to protect himself.  For example, the victim
may be able to purchase a filtration system to protect
against contaminated ground water.  This situation is
known as bilateral care, and any liability rule takes
into account the potential for each party to act to reduce
damages.  Under some rules, liability is not assessed to
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Chapter 5
Liability Rules
Liability rules are used to guide compensation decisions when polluters are sued
for damages in a court of law.  Such rules, although employed only after damages
occur and only if victims are successful in their suit, can provide ex ante incen-
tives for polluters to use more environmentally friendly production practices.  In
this chapter, we discuss two relevant types of liability rules.
1 Shavell (1987) discusses circumstances for which publicly and
privately initiated approaches are most appropriate.polluters if the victim failed to take reasonable preven-
tive actions (Segerson 1995).
Liability When Victims Cannot
Protect Themselves 
(Unilateral Care)
The following discussion is based on the assumption
of joint and several liability.  In addition, unilateral
care is assumed because strict liability rules are effi-
cient if polluters can undertake preventive actions for
the victims (Segerson 1990) (e.g., producers could
purchase water purifiers for all victims if that is the
least-cost solution for efficient pollution abatement).  
Strict Liability Rules
Producers face uncertainty as to whether or not they
will successfully be sued for damages resulting from
agricultural nonpoint pollution.  This uncertainty is
likely to be site-specific and to depend on the ambient
pollution level that results from the collective actions
of all producers, as well as other uncertain factors such
as knowledge of pollutant transport and the ability to
identify individual pollutant sources.  Consequently,
each producer has expectations relating to natural
events that influence pollution, the probability of suc-
cessfully being sued, and other uncertain factors that
might influence this probability.  In general, produc-
ers’ expectations may differ from those of the resource
management agency defining the rules.
A strict liability rule that can be used to attain efficient
nonpoint-source pollution control is developed in
appendix 5A.  The rule is developed so that each pro-
ducer expects to pay the total expected damages from
pollution, plus or minus a lump sum component that
distributes payments across polluters so that total pay-
ments equal total damages.  However, while each pro-
ducer expects to pay the same variable portion of the
liability rule, the actual rule would have to be site-spe-
cific to account for each producer’s beliefs about the
nonpoint process and about the probability of being
sued and found liable.  Liability must be higher for
producers who do not believe they will be sued and/or
found liable to achieve optimal pollution control.
Effectively, the site-specific aspects of the rule alter
the uncertainty each producer faces about random
events (weather, economic conditions) and the
prospect of being sued and held liable so that the pro-
ducers’ and the resource management agency’s expec-
tations about uncertain events are the same.  Equiva-
lent expectations is a condition for efficient pollution
control.
Finally, lump sum components must be applied to pro-
ducers operating on extra-marginal land to ensure opti-
mal entry and exit.  Unlike other incentive-based
instruments such as taxes, it is not possible to use
lump sum instruments to reduce producers’ payments
to zero under liability rules because the victims must
be compensated.  Therefore, lump sum portions of the
liability rule can be applied to producers operating on
marginal and inframarginal acreage and designed to
ensure that total liability payments equal total dam-
ages.  This could be accomplished by providing each
producer with a refund of the variable liability pay-
ment, and dividing total damages among all producers
according to some distributional rule.
Negligence Rules2
Under a liability rule based on negligence, a producer
is held liable only if he/she failed to operate under the
“standards of due care.”  “Due care” can be measured
either in terms of performance-based outcomes or in
terms of a producer’s actions.  Producers may collec-
tively be held negligent if realized damages from pol-
lution in a water body are found to be in excess of
some acceptable level.  Excess damages would be an
indication that at least some producers in the water-
shed are not using acceptable production practices.
Under this rule, all producers in a watershed would be
liable for damages if affected parties brought suit.
Such a negligence rule, however, does not correct for
suboptimal entry and exit.  Because the rule applies
only to those producers operating at the time the dam-
ages occurred, there is no mechanism for applying
lump sum components to guarantee optimal entry and
exit (Miceli and Segerson, 1991).  In addition, by pro-
ducing at suboptimal levels to avoid the possibility of
liability, producers may bring into production more
than the economically efficient amount of land (Miceli
and Segerson, 1991).  
Alternatively, an individual producer may be held neg-
ligent if inputs that increase runoff are used above
optimal levels, inputs that mitigate runoff are used
below optimal levels, or if the technology in use per-
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2The mathematical basis for negligence rules is developed in
appendix 5B.forms poorly in reducing runoff relative to the optimal
technology.  Damages would be paid only by those
producers not using acceptable production practices.
This approach would be more costly to administer than
the pollution-based rule, since the acceptable manage-
ment practices would have to be identified for each
site, and each site would have to be monitored for
compliance.  However, it is more fair in that only
those producers who are likely generating unaccept-
able levels of runoff would be liable.  In addition, an
efficient solution will generally be attainable.
Liability When Victims 
Can Protect Themselves 
(Bilateral Care)
Situations may exist in which victims have opportuni-
ties to take precautions that producers cannot take for
them (Wetzstein and Centner, 1992).  If so, then strict
liability rules applied to producers are no longer effi-
cient because victims may suboptimally protect them-
selves if they feel that they can collect the full amount
of damages.  This result would apply to the negligence
rules derived in appendix 5B as well, since the compo-
nents of these rules are based on strict liability.
Wetzstein and Centner (1992) suggest the use of a
modified strict liability rule based on victim precau-
tion requirements.  While not derived here, a modified
rule as they propose could be incorporated into either
of the negligence rules developed in Appendix 5B.
For example, negligence rules would be recommended
for relatively safe agricultural chemicals, while strict
liability would be recommended for the use of more
hazardous materials. 
Empirical Evidence
Both State and Federal regulators have tended to hold
producers liable for damages resulting from chemical
use only if they failed to apply registered chemicals in
accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and
any related laws (Wetzstein and Centner, 1992;
Segerson, 1990; Segerson, 1995).  For example, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act (CERCLA) restricts produc-
ers’ liability in this manner. 
In more than 30 States, agricultural producers applying
chemicals that contaminate groundwater may be held
liable under a strict liability standard (Centner, 1990).
Groundwater exemption legislation that holds produc-
ers to a negligence rule has been passed or proposed in
Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, New
York, and Vermont.  Producers in these States would
be exempt from strict liability if they use chemicals
“properly.”  In Connecticut, a producer is required to
keep records of pesticide use and groundwater protec-
tion plans for 20 years after application to demonstrate
due care (Lee and Leonard, 1990).
Many States make compliance with acceptable agricul-
tural best-management practices a defense to nuisance
actions (ELI, 1997).  Negligence rules of this sort are
consistent with the philosophy that producers have a
basic “right to farm” and that they should not be
penalized as long as they adhere to standard, accepted
practices.   However, because current negligence rules
are based on what has been accepted historically, they
may not reflect the current damages caused by previ-
ous “standard, accepted practices,” and pollution lev-
els will be excessive relative to optimal levels.  
Summary
The characteristics of nonpoint-source pollution,
including dispersion of harm and the inability to iden-
tify sources, could make very small the probability of
a producer being sued and held liable under strict lia-
bility rules.  A negligence rule may be more appropri-
ate in these cases because it is not necessary to prove a
producer’s contribution to damages.  A producer
would not be held liable if he/she complied with
acceptable farming practices.
In general, liability rules suffer from many of the same
problems that ambient-based incentives do.  To
achieve an optimal solution, all producers must have
realistic beliefs about their collective effects on ambi-
ent pollution levels, the profit functions for all sites,
and the joint distribution functions of all other produc-
ers.  The rule-making system must account for each
producer’s beliefs about the actions of other producers
and about aspects of the nonpoint process.  For negli-
gence rules, the system must also have site-specific
information about producers as well as information
about the nonpoint process in order to identify the
“optimal” set of practices that defines “due care.”
These unrealistic assumptions about the information
required for producers and the rule-making system
limit the feasibility of liability rules.
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sive relative to other regulatory methods (Shortle and
Abler, 1997).  This expense may prevent individuals
from attempting to claim damages, letting polluters go
unregulated (Shavell, 1987).  Thus, liability rules are
likely to be at most second-best when transaction costs
are considered, and are probably best suited for the con-
trol of pollution related to the use of hazardous materi-
als or for infrequent occurrences such as accidental
chemical spills or manure lagoon breaks (Wetzstein and
Centner, 1992; Shortle and Abler, 1997). 
Appendix 5A—
Strict Liability Rules3
Suppose the extent of producers’ liability depends on
the damages that arise as a result of the ambient pollu-
tion level.  It is appropriate for the liability rule to
depend on the ambient pollution level as well.  Define
a site-specific liability rule in general terms by the
function Li (a).  Producers are held liable only if they
are sued by a damaged party and are found to be
responsible.  Therefore, producers face additional
uncertainty about whether or not they will be held
liable.  Producers have their own beliefs regarding the
site-specific probability that they will be sued and held
liable, and their own beliefs about the distribution of
random variables influencing natural events.  Denote
the site-specific probability that a producer will be
sued and held liable as qi (a, hi), where hi is a vector
of random variables that may influence this probabili-
ty.4 Similarly, denote a producer’s site-specific joint
distribution function defined over all random variables
as hi (v, W, h) where v is an (nx1) vector with ith ele-
ment vi, and h is an (nx1) vector with ith element hi.
In general, a producer’s site-specific joint distribution,
hi (v, W, h), differs from the rule-making system’s,
denoted by g (v, W).
Assuming producers to be risk-neutral, each producer
will choose input use to maximize expected per-acre
profit, restricted on the choice of technology
where Ei is the mean operator corresponding to hi (v,
W, hi).  The first-order necessary condition for an
interior solution is
The solution to (5A-1) yields input use as a function of
technology choice, xi(Ai).  The producer’s optimal
choice of technology, Ai
**, will satisfy the following
condition
where a** = a(r1
**,..., rn






**, vi), and xi(Ai
**).  
An Efficient Liability Rule
Comparison of (5A-1) with (2A-1) implies that the fol-
lowing liability rule, when applied under strict liabili-
ty, ensures the marginal conditions for efficiency will
be satisfied:
where ki is a lump sum amount that is yet to be
defined.  To see that rule (5A-3) leads to the efficient
marginal conditions, note that the liability each pro-
ducer expects to be held responsible for ex ante under
rule (5A-3) is
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3 The mathematical foundations for efficient, strict liability rules
are developed in this appendix.  Unless otherwise stated, the under-
lying model and assumptions are as developed in Appendix 2A.
4 Segerson (1995) defines q as a deterministic function of a.
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(5A-4)Thus, each producer expects to pay an amount equal to
total expected damages, plus a constant.  The produc-
er’s marginal conditions for input use (conditional on
technology) will be efficient because taxes of the same
form as the left-hand side of (5A-4) have been shown
to induce the efficient marginal conditions (Horan et
al. 1998a,b; Hansen 1998).
For the special case in which qi = 1 and g(n, W) =
hi(n, W, h), the liability rule defined by (5A-3)
becomes uniform.  More generally, however, the liabil-
ity rule in (5A-3) is also a nonlinear function of ambi-
ent pollution levels and is site specific.  Even though
the efficient liability rules are site specific in general,
each producer will expect to pay the same variable
amount, plus or minus a lump sum amount.
Each producer expects to pay the same variable por-
tion of the liability rule because the liability rule is
designed to offset the effects of heterogeneity.  In
effect, the “correction term” g(×)/(qi(a, hi)hi(×)) alters
the uncertainty that each producer faces about random
events and the prospect of being held liable so that
each faces the same uncertainty as the resource man-
agement agency.  Liability must be higher for produc-
ers who either believe they will not be found liable
(i.e., qi (a, hi) is small) or who feel they do not con-
tribute to ambient pollution levels (i.e., hi(×) is small)
in order to induce them to operate efficiently. 
The lump sum part of the liability rule is used to
ensure longrun efficiency and to ensure that total pay-
ments equal total damages, as is required in a liability
framework.  For producers operating on extramarginal
land, the lump sum component can be set to ensure
that these producers expect it to be more profitable to
retire extramarginal acreage from production.  For pro-
ducers operating on marginal or inframarginal land,
setting the lump sum portion of the expected liability
rule as follows ensures that polluters in the region are
held liable for total damages
where ri defines the manner in which damages will be
distributed among producers (åri = 1).  Thus, total
damages are divided among producers on a site-specif-
ic basis, minus a lump sum refund of the variable pay-
ment.  Because ki depends on the realization of the
term D (a*), ki, is random ex ante.
The distribution of payments (i.e., ri) can take a vari-
ety of forms.  For example, suppose that   
Then, a budget-balancing solution will exist when
each producer operating on marginal or inframarginal
land expects to earn profits after liability payments
Condition (5A-6) can be written as
which implies that the ex ante budget-balancing condi-
tion is feasible (i.e., no marginal or inframarginal land
will be retired due to the expected liability payment) if
This condition requires that aggregate pre-liability
profits be greater than expected damages when qi = 1,
and less than expected damages otherwise.  Uniform
and other distributions for ri are feasible under more
stringent conditions (see e.g., Horan and others, 1998a
for a discussion of budget-balancing solutions for
ambient-based taxes).
The informational requirements necessary to attain an
efficient outcome under strict liability are extreme.
The resource management agency must have perfect
information on each producer’s production, runoff, and
joint density functions, and fate and transport.  Each
producer must also have perfect information on his
own as well as other producers’ production, runoff,
and joint density functions.
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Under a negligence rule, producers are held liable only
if they failed to use the “due standard of care.”  This
standard may be defined either in terms of a damage
(or other performance-based) target, D0, or in terms of
design (i.e., input use and technology) standards.  
First, consider the class of negligence rules based on
input use and technology.  Define Qi as the set of Ai
such that E{D(a*)} £ E{D(ai*)}, where
Then an optimal negligence rule is
where yi is the subset of inputs that increases runoff
levels, zi is the subset of inputs that reduces runoff
levels, and Li(a) is the liability rule defined by (5A-3)
and (5A-5).  
Efficient entry and exit are ensured by setting input
and technology standards y¢i, z¢i and Q¢i at levels such
that profitable operation on acres i > n is not possible
without being held liable.  Thus, producers who fail to
retire extramarginal land will be subject to liability if
they attempt to produce at profitable levels.  However,
because the liability rules, Li(a), have been designed to
ensure efficient entry and exit, production on extra-
marginal land will not be expected to be profitable.
Alternatively, producers operating on marginal or
inframarginal land will choose to operate at the effi-
cient level and pay no penalty.  If they chose to oper-
ate at greater levels of yi, smaller levels of zi, or at
technology outside of the set Qi, then they would be
subject to a significant penalty in the form of the lia-
bility rule.  Thus, producers expect to be more prof-
itable by operating at the efficient level.
Alternatively, a negligence rule could be based on a
damage target, D0.  For the damage target, all produc-
ers are held liable whenever D(a) >D0.  Otherwise, no
producer is held liable.  Consider the following negli-
gence rule 
where Li(a) is again the liability rule defined by (5A-
3).  The ki terms (in Li(a), see 5A-3), however, are not
necessarily defined as in (5A-6).  In the strict liability
case, the ki terms are constructed to ensure efficient
entry and exit and that the aggregate liability equals
total damages.  However, such a construction will not
necessarily be effective in limiting entry when a negli-
gence rule is imposed because it is not possible to tar-
get specific polluters and specific production practices
as it is with the negligence rule (5B-1).  Instead, pol-
luters may all avoid liability by producing at subopti-
mal levels (Miceli and Segerson, 1991), and produc-
tion may be profitable on more than the efficient num-
ber of acres without the threat of a liability penalty. 
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5 The mathematical foundations for efficient negligence rules are
developed in this appendix.  Unless otherwise stated, the underly-
ing model and assumptions are as developed in Appendix 2-A.Introduction and Overview
Education plays a significant role in many State and
Federal nonpoint-source water quality programs, most
recently in the Clean Water Action Plan (EPA-USDA,
1998; Nowak and others, 1997).  Educational pro-
grams are designed to provide agricultural producers
with better knowledge about production relationships
for current technologies (so that inputs can be used
more efficiently) and/or about alternative technologies
that may be more profitable and pollution-abating.  In
addition, producers may be shown how they contribute
to nonpoint pollution and how this may affect them-
selves and others.  Methods for conveying information
include demonstration projects, technical assistance,
newsletters, seminars, and field days.
Education is popular as a nonpoint strategy for a num-
ber of reasons.  It is less costly to implement than a
cost-share program, and the infrastructure for carrying
out such a program is largely in place (county exten-
sion, Natural Resources Conservation Service field
offices, land grant universities).  Education has been
effective in getting producers to adopt certain environ-
mentally friendly practices (Gould, Saupe, and
Klemme, 1989; Bosch, Cook, and Fuglie, 1995; Knox,
Jackson, and Nevers, 1995).  Specifically, educational
assistance is often seen as a means of achieving  “win-
win” solutions to water quality problems, whereby
information encourages producers to operate in ways
that improve both net returns and water quality (EPA-
USDA, 1998; EPA, 1998a).  Some practices that have
been shown to achieve both aims include conservation
tillage, nutrient management, irrigation water manage-
ment, and integrated pest management (Bull and
Sandretto, 1995; Ervin, 1995;  Conant, Duffy, and
Holub, 1993;  Fox and others, 1991). 
This chapter begins with education’s role in changing
producers’ expectations about the performance of cur-
rent technologies.  Next, we show how education
works under different levels of stewardship or altruism
on the part of the producer, and with different levels of
private benefits generated by water quality-protecting
practices.  We then present evidence that education
programs have had a limited impact on changing pro-
ducer behavior when water quality practices are pro-
moted.
Assessing Education as a Water
Quality Protection Tool
Figure 6.1 depicts the relationships between production
and expected water quality for a single farm, (which
may be one of many contributors to nonpoint pollution
in a watershed), for the simplified case in which a sin-
gle input leads to water quality impairment. The rela-
tionship between input use and the producer’s net
returns (i.e., the restricted profit function) is illustrated
in quadrant I.  Without loss of generality, the profit (y)
axis could be thought of as the expected utility of prof-
its for risk-averse producers when there is production
uncertainty.  Tradeoffs would then be made between
expected utility and expected water quality.  The rela-
tionship between input use on the farm and expected
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Chapter 6
Education
Education is used to provide producers with information on how to farm more effi-
ciently with current technologies or new technologies that generate less pollution
and are more profitable.  While such “win-win” solutions to water quality prob-
lems are attractive, education cannot be considered a strong tool for water quality
protection.  Its success depends on alternative practices being more profitable than
conventional practices, or on the notion that producers value cleaner water
enough to accept potentially lower profits.  Evidence suggests, however, that net
returns are the chief concern of producers when they adopt alternative manage-
ment practices.  In this chapter, we review the economic framework behind educa-
tion, and review the empirical evidence for the potential role of education in a 
pollution control policy.water quality, taking the actions of all other nonpoint
polluters as given, is represented in quadrant II.
Finally, the relationship between expected water quality
and net returns—or how producers account for water
quality in their production decisions—is quadrant IV.
A utility indifference map showing the rates at which a
producer is willing to trade net returns for increased
water quality can be constructed.  The point along the
water quality–net returns frontier where a producer will
operate is at the point of tangency with an indifference
curve, or where the marginal rate of substitution (MRS)
between net returns and water quality is equal to the
slope of the net returns–water quality frontier.  At this
point, the producer’s utility is maximized.
Producers commonly face varying degrees of uncer-
tainty in many aspects of production.  For a given pro-
duction technology, uncertainty about the production
frontier (i.e., how to attain the greatest yield or profit
levels for a given combination of  inputs) may lead
producers to use inputs inefficiently.  This situation is
represented by curve T2, which reflects the production
technology the producer is currently using (i.e., the set
of tillage, pest control, nutrient management, and con-
servation practices used to grow a particular crop or
set of crops), and the skill with which he is using it.
Producers may also have limited knowledge about
alternative production technologies and their economic
and environmental characteristics, as well as about
how their production decisions affect water quality. 
The resource management agency’s (RMA’s) expecta-
tions about the relationship between net returns and
input x are defined by T1.  The RMA’s beliefs about
the relationship between input use and potential profits
are assumed to be more accurate than the producer’s
due to publicly supported research on how x can be
used more efficiently than under the producer’s current




























B¢technology set.  The RMA may also have better infor-
mation about alternative technologies (which could
also be represented by T1) and about the relationship
between input use and water quality (curve R1).
Suppose the Pareto-efficient level of expected water
quality is at Q* (with production occurring at point C
on curve T1), but that existing expected water quality
levels are well below this.  Such inefficiencies arise
when (1) producers do not consider the economic
impacts of their production decisions on water quality
and/or (2) producers face uncertainty or have a limited
understanding of the production and environmental
impacts of their management choices.  The purpose of
educational programs is to reduce producers’uncertain-
ty and to improve their knowledge about production
and environmental relationships (both for current and
alternative technologies).  Proponents of such programs
believe expected water quality will be improved if the
information provided encourages producers to (1) con-
sider the environmental impacts of their choices and/or
(2) simultaneously improve expected water quality and
profitability by using existing technologies more effi-
ciently or by adopting alternative, more environmental-
ly friendly technologies (Nowak and others, 1997).
Education’s Appeal to Profit,
Altruism, Efficiency
Below, we discuss the ability of educational programs
to provide incentives for improving expected water
quality.  For simplicity, we ignore shortrun influences
such as risk and learning.  Instead, we take a longrun
view and assume that a practice will eventually be
adopted if education can convince producers that it
will make them better off (increase expected utility).
We note, however, that uncertainty and other factors
could slow or prevent the adoption of practices that
might, in the long run, increase producers’ net returns
and improve water quality (see chapter 3).  Such fac-
tors represent additional limitations that educational
programs would have to overcome.
No private benefits from water quality 
improvement and no altruistic/stewardship
motives
Suppose a profit-maximizing producer who, due to pro-
duction uncertainty, produces inefficiently along T2 at
point A in figure 1.  The producer is assumed to receive
no private benefits from environmental improvement
(i.e., chemical use does not affect the quality of the
producer’s water supply or of recreation areas the pro-
ducer visits) and to have no altruistic or stewardship
motives (i.e., the producer does not include social dam-
ages in his decision set).  In this setting and in the
absence of any outside programs or intervention, the
producer would not voluntarily move to point D so that
the RMA’s goals are achieved, since net returns would
be reduced without any compensating private benefits.
In quadrant IV, the MRS between net returns and water
quality is 0 (horizontal line), and producers operate at
point A′ (where the slope of S2 is 0).
How might education encourage more efficient
resource use and improve expected water quality in
this situation?  It would be pointless for the RMA to
educate the producer about the relationships between
production and water quality since the producer has no
altruistic or stewardship motives.  However, by edu-
cating the producer about the frontier T1, where profits
are higher for each level of input use, the RMA could
encourage the producer to use existing management
practices more efficiently or to adopt alternative prac-
tices so that he/she operates along T1.
Once on T1, the producer could operate at the Pareto-
efficient point C to meet the expected water quality
goal and at the same time increase net returns relative
to operation at point A on T2 (although there may be
values of C for which net returns might be reduced).
Such an outcome appears to be a “win-win” solution
for the farmer.  However, even though the producer is
producing along a more socially efficient production
frontier, his/her goals of production will still generally
differ from society’s.  As long as producers consider
only profitability, the producer will operate at point B
(note that point C is necessarily to the left of B).  The
expected water quality levels that correspond to B are
an improvement over A, but are still less than efficient.
Thus, educational assistance alone is not enough to
ensure that the water quality goal is met.
Providing education about production practices might
even reduce expected water quality.  Suppose the pro-
ducer originally produced according to T3, so that prof-
its were maximized at E.  After receiving educational
assistance, the producer would have an incentive to pro-
duce at point B on T1.  Net returns increase in this case,
but so does the use of input x.  The result is that expect-
ed water quality is worse than it was before education
was provided.  This result is more than just a curiosity.
There is evidence that some IPM practices have actually
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(Fernandez-Cornejo, Jans, and Smith, 1998).
Altruistic/stewardship motives
Producers may have altruistic or stewardship motives
when it comes to the effects of their production deci-
sions on others and on the environment.  They may be
willing to sacrifice some net returns in order to protect
water quality.  If so, then education that encourages
producers to broadly consider the consequences of pol-
luting practices on water quality and on water users
may be somewhat effective.  Research has demonstrat-
ed that producers are often well informed of many
environmental problems, and that most U.S. producers
hold very favorable attitudes toward the environment
and perceive themselves as stewards of the land
(Camboni and Napier, 1994).  Educational programs
could take advantage of altruism or stewardship by
informing producers about local environmental condi-
tions and about how a change in management practices
could improve local water quality.  This would be
accomplished by providing producers with information
about T1, and also about the relationship between their
production practices and water quality, R1.
Suppose an altruistic producer does not believe he/she
is contributing to water quality problems and is not
aware of T1 (fig. 2).  Production will initially take
place along T2 at A (or at A′ in quadrant IV).  Since
the producer is unaware of R1, the producer’s MRS
between net returns and water quality is 0.  Suppose
that the producer is informed of how the use of x is
affecting water quality (becomes aware of the relation-
ships expressed by R1 and S2).  Where the producer
now operates will be determined by his/her willingness
to give up some net returns to protect water quality,
expressed by the indifference curves in quadrant IV.
Production on T2 will now occur to the left of A, at F
(F′ in quadrant IV), where indifference curve U2 is
tangent to S2.  In the example, water quality is





























A¢improved and utility increased (point A′ lies below
U2).  This is a win-win situation for the producer in
terms of utility, even though net returns are reduced
relative to A.
Suppose now the producer is educated about T1.  The
altruistic producer will have an incentive to make pro-
duction decisions based on the tradeoffs defined by S1
and U1, operating now at point G.  In this example,
both water quality and net returns are higher than for
points A and F, a win-win situation.  However, this
need not be the case.  The ultimate impacts to water
quality will generally depend on the nature of T1 and
R1 relative to T2, and on the MRS between net returns
and water quality.  If expected water quality does
improve as a result of education, the degree of
improvement relative to the RMA’s goal of Q*
depends on how strongly the producer values environ-
mental quality.  Efficiency is obtained only for the spe-
cial case in which each producer makes production
decisions while fully internalizing his/her marginal
contribution to expected environmental damages.  
Experience with education programs indicates that
altruism or concern over the local environment plays
only a very small role in producers’ decisions to adopt
alternative management practices.  Agricultural mar-
kets are competitive, and at a time when commodity
program payments to producers are being reduced and
trade is being liberalized, market pressures make it
unlikely that the average producer will adopt costly or
risky pollution control measures for altruistic reasons
alone, especially when the primary beneficiaries are
downstream (Bohm and Russell, 1985; Abler and
Shortle, 1991; Nowak, 1987; Napier and Camboni,
1993).   A survey of Pennsylvania field crop producers
found that private profitability was the motivating
force in adopting environmental practices, although
altruistism was also a determinant (Weaver, 1996).
Camboni and Napier (1994) found that education was
not effective in promoting adoption of practices that
were less profitable than current practices.
USDA’s Water Quality Demonstration Projects—now
discontinued—provided educational assistance to pro-
ducers in 16 areas where agriculture was known to be
affecting water quality (Nowak and others, 1997).  A
study of producer adoption of improved farming prac-
tices for protecting water quality was conducted using
a sample of these projects.  It compared adoption rates
of similar management practices in the Demonstration
Project areas and in control areas where education was
not provided, and found little difference in awareness,
familiarity, and adoption. In fact, only 1 case out of 20
showed a significantly greater adoption rate in the
Demonstration Projects than in the comparison sites
during 1992-94 (Nowak and others, 1997).  It is possi-
ble that information spillovers from the Demonstration
Projects influenced the control sites, but it is just as
possible that producers are generally looking for man-
agement practices that increase net returns and that
education alone was inadequate for accelerating the
adoption of practices that protect water quality.
In another example, California’s Fertilizer Research
and Education Program, a voluntary nitrate manage-
ment program, has not had much success in altering
fertilizer management practices, despite well-publicized
groundwater quality problems (Franco, Schad, and
Cady, 1994).  More public supply wells in California
have been closed for nitrate violations than for any
other contaminant.  Four years of education efforts
have not fundamentally changed fertilizer management
practices.  To date, appeals to stewardship have not
overcome concerns over maintaining high yields.
Altruism can motivate change only if producers
believe there is a problem that needs to be addressed
and that their actions make a difference (Napier and
Brown, 1993; Padgitt, 1989).  Surveys consistently
find that producers generally do not perceive that their
activities affect the local environment, even when local
water quality problems are known to exist
(Lichtenberg and Lessley, 1992; Nowak and others,
1997; Pease and Bosch, 1994; Hoban and Wimberly,
1992).  Producers’ perceptions about their impacts on
water quality did not significantly change over the
course of USDA’s Demonstration Projects, even
though the projects were located in areas with known
water quality problems (Nowak and others, 1997).
This indicates either a lack of effort to educate produc-
ers on their role in protecting local water quality or the
difficulty of convincing producers of their role in solv-
ing the problem.
Convincing producers of their contribution to a non-
point-source pollution problem is inherently difficult.
Nonpoint-source pollution from a farm cannot be
observed, and its impacts on water quality are the
result of a complex process and are often felt down-
stream from the source.  If there are many other pro-
ducers in the watershed, a single producer may justifi-
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loads is very small.  This means that producers will
have to take as a matter of faith the RMA’s description
of the relationship between production and water qual-
ity, R1.  Even if a producer does take appropriate
actions to improve water quality, he/she generally will
not be able to observe whether these changes in man-
agement actually improved water quality.  Once again,
the producer will have to take as a matter of faith any
information the RMA may provide about the impacts
of his/her efforts to improve water quality.
Practices generate private benefits 
from water quality improvement
There are cases in which a producer’s practices may
affect the farm’s drinking water supply and his/her
family’s health, or in which water quality influences
onfarm productivity.  A producer in such a situation
may be willing to forgo some profit for an increase in
expected water quality if the expected onfarm environ-
mental impacts are sufficiently large (expected utility
from profits and water quality increase).  Therefore, an
educational program that addresses these onfarm envi-
ronmental impacts may motivate the producer to
change production practices to improve expected water
quality.  The analysis is similar to that for altruistic
farmers, except the impacts on water quality are felt
closer to home and it is probably easier for the RMA
to establish the consequences of polluted water.  This
is illustrated in figure 2 as the producer moves from A
toward D on T2 after being informed of the potential
onfarm impacts.  The actual point of production rela-
tive to D depends on the perceived significance of the
risk and the value placed on that risk, reflected by the
indifference curves.  If the producer is also provided
with information on T1, he/she will have incentive to
operate along T1 somewhere to the left of B.  Both
producer utility and water quality increase as a result
of education.
If onfarm impacts were the only possible water quality
problems from farming, then consideration of these
impacts in production decisions would result in an
efficient allocation of resources (there is no externali-
ty).  However, if onfarm impacts are being used by the
RMA as a proxy for other offsite impacts, then ineffi-
ciencies would still exist in the allocation of produc-
tion resources.  An analysis of the impact of user safe-
ty concerns over herbicides used on corn and soybeans
in four States found that herbicide toxicity did not
have a sizable impact on herbicide use decisions
(Beach and Carlson, 1993).  The herbicides used were
generally not very toxic to humans, and productivity
effects dominated herbicide use decisions.  Decisions
based on protecting human health were inadequate for
protecting environmental quality.
Producers have been shown to respond to education
programs when their own water supply is at stake
(Napier and Brown, 1993).  This is demonstrated by
the Farm*A*Syst program.  This program, developed
by the Wisconsin Cooperative Extension Service and
supported by USDA, teaches producers to assess
impacts of farming operations around the farmstead
(Knox, Jackson, and Nevers, 1995).  Educating pro-
ducers raises their self-interest for altering certain
practices, primarily around private wells.  Producer
education has succeeded in getting individuals to take
cost-effective actions to remediate problems from
leaking fuel storage tanks, pesticide spills, and drink-
ing water wells contaminated by runoff from confined
animals.  Studies from Minnesota, Wisconsin, and
Louisiana show producers to be receptivite to
Farm*A*Syst and voluntarily willing to take action to
reduce high risks by changing management practices
and facility design (Knox, Jackson, and Nevers, 1995;
Anderson, Bergsrud, and Ahles, 1995; Moreau and
Strasma, 1995).  The key to the program’s apparent
success is the ability to identify the source of a threat
to the producer, his family, and his employees.
Education and Industry Structure
Educational programs do not influence decisions about
entry and exit into the industry.  Acreage that would be
classified as extramarginal in the efficient or cost-
effective solution may still remain in production if
educational assistance is the only form of government
intervention.  It is unlikely that any producer would
voluntarily retire land from production if provided
information on alternative practices or how his/her
operation may be affecting water quality.
Current USDA education programs unwittingly may
be disproportionately helping larger farms.  Small pro-
ducers have been found to be less likely to adopt new
practices than large producers (Lichtenberg, Strand,
and Lessley, 1993; Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Gould,
Saupe, and Klemme, 1989; Norris and Batie, 1987).  A
study of producers around the Chesapeake Bay found
that cost sharing and subsidized technical assistance
were used much more by larger farms than smaller
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management, and soil erosion control (Lichtenberg,
Strand, and Lessley, 1993).  Smaller farms may face
tighter credit constraints and be more risk averse.
Education efforts may also be directed more at larger
farms, based on the assumption that changing practices
on these farms would generate the greatest environ-
mental benefits.  If new practices enhance net returns,
then larger farms benefiting from education efforts
may be putting smaller farms at greater economic dis-
advantage relative to larger farms.  This may conflict
with a societal goal of protecting small, resource-limit-
ed producers.
Summary
Water quality policies based on education are currently
popular because education is a benign form of inter-
vention (i.e., producers are not forced to change their
management), it is relatively inexpensive to adminis-
ter, and it may teach producers how to achieve higher
returns.  From a practical standpoint, the institutional
structure necessary to implement this approach—
USDA, State conservation agencies, and land-grant
institutions—is already in place (Easter, 1993).  If edu-
cation succeeds in raising a producer’s awareness
about a local environmental problem, and the producer
places a value on protecting environmental health, the
effect on producer willingness to adopt alternative
practices can be significant.
However, education has some important shortcomings
in achieving the water quality levels demanded by the
public, even when ignoring the short-term constraints
to adoption.  Educational programs will improve water
quality only if the information provided to producers
encourages them to take actions that lead to water
quality improvements.  Such incentives exist when 
(1) the actions that improve water quality also increase
profitability, (2) producers have strong altruistic or
stewardship motives, and/or (3) the onfarm costs of
water quality impairments are shown to be sufficiently
large.  However, none of these three conditions guar-
antees an expected improvement in water quality.  In
general, the outcome of educational programs depends
on how actual profitability–water quality frontiers
compare with the producer’s initial understanding of
these frontiers.  Moreover, in the absence of altruistic
or stewardship motives, alternative practices that
simultaneously increase expected net returns over the
long term and improve water quality are very few.
Many education programs may not devote enough
effort to convincing producers of their role in water
quality protection.  Failure to do so limits the extent to
which stewardship influences producer decisions.  The
influence of stewardship is also probably limited by
the longrun financial viability of the farming opera-
tion, including current and anticipated risks.  If the
socially efficient outcome can be achieved only
through significant reductions in producer net returns,
then education will probably not be effective in
achieving the desired water quality goal, even if pro-
ducers understand the relationship between production
practices and water quality.
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Extensive public and private resources are devoted
each year in the United States to agricultural research
and development.  Research and development can pro-
vide producers with new or improved inputs, technolo-
gies, and management techniques that can address
concerns such as productivity, net income, and envi-
ronmental quality.  In this chapter, we discuss the role
of research in reducing water pollution generated by
farming and the factors that generate demand for inno-
vation.  We show that incentives for private research
are inadequate because many benefits of research are
not captured by private markets.  In other words, there
are social benefits from research that do not result in
returns to investors.  Consequently, research will be
underfunded relative to levels that would occur if
investors were to consider these additional social bene-
fits.  Government can provide incentives for private
research by establishing a system of intellectual prop-
erty rights, and fund research that produces goods that
are public in nature.
This chapter begins by discussing the types of innova-
tions that can reduce water pollution from agriculture.
Next, we show why appropriate incentives do not exist
for investment in research leading to innovations to
improve water quality when there is no government
intervention to correct externalities.  We then show
how policies based on standards and economic incen-
tives create incentives for private research.  Finally,
government’s role in the research and development
process is discussed, along with a description of how
public support has influenced research and develop-
ment programs in the United States.
Innovations That Improve 
Water Quality
Innovations having positive water quality impacts can
broadly be classified as (1) augmenting factors, 
(2) reducing pollution, or (3) introducing entirely new
inputs and technologies (see table 7-1), although an
innovation may exhibit aspects of each. 
Factor-augmenting innovations allow the same
quantity of output to be produced with less of the aug-
mented factors (i.e., inputs).  Examples related to non-
point pollution include more effective pesticides and
fertilizers, new seed varieties that are higher yielding
or require fewer inputs, and enhanced irrigation effi-
ciencies.  Factor-augmenting innovations may result in
reduced use of polluting inputs and, consequently,
reduced runoff and ambient pollution levels.  This may
not always be the case, however.  The use of polluting
inputs may increase due to input substitutions and
changes in the scale of production.  In a simulation of
U.S. corn production, Abler and Shortle (1995) found
that capital-augmenting innovations would increase
fertilizer and pesticide use.  They also found that pesti-
cide use would be increased by land- and seed-
augmenting innovations and decreased by pesticide-
augmenting technologies.1
82 •   USDA/Economic Research Service AER-782   •   Economics of Water Quality Protection
Chapter 7 
Research and Development
Research and development are important tools in reducing agricultural nonpoint-
source pollution because they provide producers and society with more efficient
ways of meeting environmental goals.  However, producers and private firms will
likely underinvest in research and development on improving water quality.  Public
involvement is therefore necessary either to carry out this research or to provide
producers and the private sector with incentives (economic incentives or regula-
tions) that result in more efficient research investments.  Finally, R&D cannot
independently provide a solution to water quality problems.  Instead, it is a valu-
able component of other approaches. 
1Abler and Shortle’s results were driven largely by the high elas-
ticity of demand for corn.Pollution-reducing innovations have no impact on
crop production relationships, but they do reduce
runoff (and hence pollution) for any level of input use.
This type of innovation is essentially an improvement
in runoff abatement technology.  For example, a pollu-
tion-reducing innovation may increase buffer strip
effectiveness in filtering out nutrients before they
reach a water body. 
Advances in science may result in the introduction of
entirely new inputs to agricultural production.  For
example, research on extracting atmospheric nitrogen
for manufacturing explosives resulted in the introduc-
tion of inorganic nitrogen fertilizers to agriculture.
Other examples related to nonpoint pollution include
satellite and computer technologies for increasing pre-
cision application of chemicals and the development
and introduction of new crops.  Such innovations will
likely result in producers’ using new combinations of
existing inputs and changing the scale of production (or
possibly shifting to alternative commodities).
Economically attractive innovations that allow produc-
ers to completely substitute polluting inputs with alter-
native technologies will improve environmental quality.
Private Incentives for 
Water Quality R&D
Research and development (R&D) is a process by
which investment in scientific study leads to future
technological innovations.  Research programs may
proceed along a variety of paths.  For example, crop
pest control may be improved by genetically enhanc-
ing the pest-resistance qualities of a particular crop, by
enhancing current or discovering new pesticides, or by
developing alternative cropping systems.  Unfortu-
nately, innovations are uncertain in terms of timing (if
they occur at all), required investment costs, and
importance.  In the example above, the importance of
an innovation in genetic research might refer to the
amount of increased pest resistance relative to that of
existing crop varieties.  Years of effort may result in
only a marginal improvement (if any) over existing
crop varieties.
Even in the absence of externalities, R&D programs
will be underfunded without government intervention to
ensure that innovators receive the economic benefits
from the sale of the innovation.  Underfunding occurs
because the results of research often have the character-
istics of a public good.  Specifically, once an innovation
occurs, it is not always possible to exclude others from
acquiring the knowledge to use the innovation.  Without
a legal claim to this knowledge (e.g., a patent or copy-
right), only a share of the total economic benefits can be
captured by private research organizations that develop
innovations (Fuglie and others, 1996).  A potential prob-
lem with intellectual property rights is that they convey
monopoly power to the developers of new innovations
(Fuglie and others, 1996; Moschini and Lapan, 1997).
Under monopoly conditions, use of the innovation will
generally be less and the price higher than if it were
provided under perfect competition.  The intellectual
property right may reduce the social value of the inno-
vation, but it is better than not having the innovation at
all (Fuglie and others, 1996).
Market-Based Incentives and Externalities
Given that mechanisms are in place to protect innova-
tors, private incentives for investment in R&D exist.
Economic theory and empirical evidence show
research organizations have incentives to invest in
agricultural research devoted to factor augmentation or
new innovations that shift production from relatively
scarce (or costly) inputs toward relatively abundant (or
cheaper) inputs (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Ruttan and
Hayami, 1989; Antle and McGuckin, 1993).
Continuing with the pest-resistance example, suppose
current pest control methods rely heavily on pesticide
use.  A relative increase in pesticide prices creates an
incentive to invest in any of the aforementioned
research paths (i.e., genetically enhancing crops, alter-
ing cropping practices, etc.) that promise to reduce
pesticide costs.
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Table 7-1—Types of innovations 
Innovation type  Example
Factor-augmenting Soil-nitrogen testing 
technology 





Pollution-reducing  Buffer strips
(runoff abatement Sediment basins
technology)  Microbial phytase (feed additive)
Entirely new inputs  New pesticides and 
other chemicals Moreover, economic incentives (created by market or
institutional forces) are important determinants of the
expected private return to investment for each poten-
tial research path.  Consequently, these incentives also
play an important role in the allocation of investments
for each path.2 For example, the expected marginal
return to pesticide research may be small relative to
that of genetic engineering research if chemical restric-
tions are expected to become more stringent relative to
regulations on genetic-engineered products.  Increased
regulation of pesticides to make them safer to farm-
workers and to the environment may have reduced the
introduction of new materials (Ollinger and Fernandez-
Cornejo, 1998). 
Inputs that create (inhibit) nonpoint pollution are
underpriced (overpriced) without government interven-
tion because private markets do not reflect the social
costs of input use.  Private research organizations
therefore do not have the economic incentives to
invest efficiently in R&D programs that may lead to
innovations in improving water quality.3 For example,
heavy use of nutrients in agriculture is widespread
because nutrients have historically been relatively
inexpensive and government regulation of the exter-
nalities caused by their use has been minimal or non-
existent.  Consequently, incentives to develop new
crop varieties that require fewer nutrients are not
strong.  Although nutrients have been seen as inexpen-
sive in private markets, the social costs of nutrient use
have been higher because they contribute to nonpoint
pollution.  R&D may have evolved along another path
had nutrients been priced more appropriately.  
Producer Incentive To Adopt Innovations
The incentives for private R&D on pollution-reducing
innovations are virtually nonexistent without govern-
ment intervention, even with intellectual property
rights.  Pollution-reducing innovations are not likely to
generate private benefits to producers because they
have no positive impacts on profitability.
If incentives are inadequate for private research on
innovations that improve water quality, the public sec-
tor can fund research on such innovations.  Even if
such innovations occur, however, there is no assurance
that producers will adopt them.  In this case, the inno-
vation would not be truly successful.  A producer’s
adoption decision depends greatly on profitability.  In
a competitive market without government intervention,
producers who consider water quality impacts may
lose a competitive edge because of the inherent trade-
off between profitability and water quality.  Figure 7.1
illustrates that a water quality innovation would need
to change the shape of the water quality-net return
frontier from F1 to F2 (so that a producer maximizes
profit at point i as opposed to point a) in order for
adoption to be profitable.  In this case, both water
quality and profitability are improved.  However, prof-
itability must still be weighed against the cost of adop-
tion and the profitability of existing technologies and
other innovations. 
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2Assuming investors are risk-neutral and profit-maximizing,
investment will occur where marginal expected returns are equated
across each path. Factors that influence expectations about returns
include the probability of a successful innovation, the expected
importance of the innovation, and other relevant economic and
institutional factors (such as the current or expected policy envi-
ronment).
3 The social effectiveness of research can be measured by the
social rate of return on research, defined as the social benefit/cost
ratio of research (Fuglie et al., 1996).  Research on environment-
enhancing technologies compares poorly with other research
opportunities when environmental benefits either are not consid-
ered or are undervalued.Government Intervention Changes
Incentives for Water Quality R&D
Even with the appropriate signals, the private sector
will underinvest in environmental research due to its
nature as a public good.  Private research will focus on
innovations that it can control, such as new chemicals,
nutrients, machinery, and plant varieties.  Research on
management-oriented innovations, such as timing
nutrient applications, rotations, and tillage practices,
will most likely be carried out in the public sector.
Furthermore, public sector R&D aimed at developing
cheap and effective water-quality-monitoring tech-
niques and devices could remove barriers now pre-
venting the efficient use of standards.  An effective
R&D policy must remain responsive to price and regu-
latory signals provided by the economy and society
(Fuglie and others, 1996). 
Effective intervention requires that investment incen-
tives be altered to reflect the costs that nonpoint pollu-
tion imposes on society.  Investment incentives can be
altered by policies that either assign prices to external-
ities or increase the relative price of pollution-causing
inputs or technologies (see chapters 3 and 4).
Regulations and economic incentives are one way of
increasing the price of polluting inputs relative to non-
polluting inputs. The increased relative price of pollut-
ing inputs causes producers to seek alternative prac-
tices that require less of these inputs.  For example,
producers would benefit from innovations that shift the
frontier in figure 7.2 from F1 to F2 or F3 when a stan-
dard requires that production results in an expected
water quality level of Q2.4 Regulations and economic
incentives therefore provide producers and their input
suppliers with incentives to invest in research that con-
siders more effective ways of meeting environmental
objectives and to adopt resulting innovations.
There is a qualitative difference in the ability of eco-
nomic incentives and standards to provide incentives
for research.  Economic performance or design-based
incentives provide a “reward” for continued reduction
in polluting activities in the form of reduced tax bur-
den or increased subsidy.  Standards, on the other
hand, do not provide incentives to improve water qual-
ity beyond the level defined by the performance stan-
dard or the design standard.  There is no “reward” for
providing an extra measure of control.  For example, if
a standard is set for a polluting input and a producer is
already meeting the standard, there is no demand from
the producer for innovations that result in less of the
input being used.  If instead a tax is placed on the
input, an incentive is created for innovations that result
in less of the taxed input being used, regardless of a
particular water quality goal.  
Applying incentives or regulatory policies to different
bases will provide different incentives for investment
in R&D.  Bases that are closer to the externality (i.e.,
performance bases, expected runoff) are generally
more effective in providing the appropriate incentives
for investment in each of the three types of innova-
tions.  Input- and technology-based instruments are
somewhat effective in promoting investment in factor-
augmenting innovations and the development of new
inputs, depending on the impact the innovation will
have on profitability relative to water quality (that is,
incentives will be smaller for innovations that lead to
improved water quality but do not enhance produc-
tion).  However, input- and technology-based instru-
ments that are related only to production do not induce
producers to consider water quality impacts of innova-
tions that are not related to production and do not have
positive impacts on profitability.  Therefore, input- and
technology-based instruments may produce only small
incentives for investment in pollution-reducing innova-
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4Neither of these technologies would be attractive if there were
no constraints on water quality.tions or the development of new inputs that affect only
water quality (and not productivity).
Effective government intervention also must provide
producers with the appropriate incentives to adopt
innovations that provide cost-effective pollution con-
trol.  As shown in chapter 2, producers would have an
incentive to adopt the most socially efficient innova-
tions if all externalities were priced at their efficient
levels.  Applying incentives or regulatory policies to
different bases will provide different incentives for the
adoption of innovations.  The adoption incentives pro-
vided by each base (table 7-3) are almost identical to
those provided for R&D investment (table 7-2). Bases
that are closer to the externality are generally more
effective in providing the appropriate incentives for
the adoption of each innovation type, including pollu-
tion-reducing innovations.  Input- and technology-
based instruments are somewhat effective in promot-
ing adoption of factor-augmenting innovations and the
development of new inputs, depending on the impact
the innovation will have on profitability relative to
water quality.  In addition, input- and technology-
based subsidies and standards are likely to be effective
in inducing producers to adopt pollution-reducing
innovations that are not related to production because
these instruments make it profitable (or necessary) for
producers to consider these impacts.
The second-best incentive or regulatory policies that
are most likely to be implemented (due to the informa-
tion, administration, and implementation costs associ-
ated with efficient policies) will not necessarily pro-
vide producers with incentives to adopt cost-effective
water quality innovations as they become available.
When input-based standards or economic incentives
are used, the resource management agency needs to
adjust the standards or incentives on all inputs or tech-
nology to reflect the new innovations.  Not doing so
will result in a level of pollution control that is not
cost effective.
Has Research Helped?
Public and private research has had a few successes in
developing complementary technologies that enable
producers to both achieve water quality improvements
and increase net returns.  For example, some
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) categories use
enhanced information and multiple pest control strate-
gies (chemical, biological, and cultural) to manage
pest populations in an economically efficient and eco-
logically sound manner.  A review of 61 farm-level
economic evaluations concluded that IPM was gener-
ally profitable (U.S. Congress, OTA, 1995).  This find-
ing is supported by the fact that more than half the
fruit, nut, corn, soybean, and fall potato acreages were
using an IPM approach during 1991-1993 (Vandeman
and others, 1994). 
Conservation tillage is a family of  tillage practices
that leave at least 30-percent of the planted soil surface
covered by crop residue to reduce soil erosion by
water and polluted runoff (U.S. Congress, 1995).
Conservation tillage has been shown to be profitable
for a number of crops in many areas (Fox and others,
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Table 7-2—Incentives from different instrument bases for investment in water- 
quality-improving innovations
Instrument base                    Factor-augmenting            Pollution-reducing                                 New inputs
Performance-based Good Good Good
Design-based
Expected runoff Good Good Good
Input- and technology-    Fair-Good         Poor       Fair-Good for inputs that enhance 
based production; poor for inputs that
do not enhance production 
(i.e., pollution-control inputs)  
Note: These rankings are subjective, based only on theoretical properties as opposed to empirical evidence.  A more reliable table would be
based on empirical results that compare each type of policy according to a consistent modeling framework that is representative of the nonpoint
problem.1991).  As a result, its use has steadily grown in recent
years (USDA, ERS, 1997).
Another technological innovation that improves water
quality is improved soil nitrogen testing.  This enables
more accurate nitrogen applications, resulting in fewer
over-applications and consequently less runoff and
subsurface leaching.  This technology is most appro-
priate where there has been a history of manure appli-
cations (Fuglie and Bosch, 1995; Musser and others,
1995).  A related technology, subsurface micro-irriga-
tion, reduces water use and can place nutrients more
precisely in the root zone compared with center-pivot
irrigation.  It is more profitable than conventional cen-
ter pivot irrigation on small fields, but not on large
fields (Bosch, Powell, and Wright, 1992) and also
results in reduced runoff and leaching.5
Other new technologies that may result in improved
water quality are not yet profitable and will require a
subsidy or regulation to become widely used.  For
example, microbial phytase as a feed additive can
reduce phosphorus in swine and poultry excretions by
50 percent or more (Simons and others, 1990; Coelho
and Kornegay, 1996).  Similarly, USDA’s Water
Quality Program discovered several new or improved
methods of applying pesticides and fertilizers for corn-
soybean agriculture in the Midwest.  These application
methods, which include pesticide banding, fertilizer
banding, and ridge tillage, could reduce polluted
runoff.  However, without any regulatory or economic
incentives, these practices were not adopted by pro-
ducers because they did not increase net returns (Iowa
MSEA, 1995; Missouri MSEA, 1995).
Private research has been found to be responsive to
regulations.  Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo (1995)
examined the effect of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act on innovation in the
agricultural chemical industry.  They found the regula-
tions resulted in the development of pesticides that
were often less toxic and shorter lived than traditional
pesticides (Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo, 1995).
Summary
Research and development is an important part of a
policy for reducing agricultural nonpoint-source pollu-
tion because it provides producers and society more
efficient ways of meeting environmental goals.  It may
also, if directed toward monitoring technology, facili-
tate the eventual use of more efficient standards-based
approaches to even nonpoint-source water quality
improvement.  Given the length of time it takes to
develop and introduce new technology, R&D may
require patience and a willingness to invest substantial
private or public funds.  However, since producers and
private firms will necessarily underinvest in R&D for
water quality improvements, the public sector will
have to either carry out this research or provide pro-
ducers and the private sector with incentives (through
economic incentives or regulations) that result in effi-
cient research investments.  Price and regulatory sig-
nals that correctly reflect society’s valuation of envi-
ronmental problems can ensure that research is consis-
tent with environmental goals.
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Table 7-3—Incentives from different instrument bases for adoption of water quality-improving-innovations
Instrument base                      Factor-augmenting          Pollution-reducing                 New inputs 
Performance-based Good  Good  Good 
Design-based
Expected runoff  Good  Good  Good
Input- and technology- Good with subsidies  Good with subsidies  Good with subsidies or standards.
based  or standards.  Otherwise,  or standards.    Otherwise, fair-good for inputs
fair-good   Otherwise, poor that enhance production; poor for 
inputs that do not enhance production
(i.e., pollution control inputs)
Note: These rankings are subjective, based only on theoretical properties as opposed to empirical evidence.  A more reliable table would be
based on empirical results that compare each type of policy according to a consistent modeling framework that is representative of the nonpoint
problem.
5 The research described above was not initiated specifically for
the purpose of improving water quality.Finally, it is important to recognize that while research
is often viewed as one of the tools available for
addressing water quality and other environmental
problems (e.g., Clean Water Action Plan, USDA Water
Quality Program), it cannot stand on its own as a tool
to control water pollution.  Instead, it is an extremely
valuable component of other approaches that include
performance or design incentives and standards.  R&D
cannot independently provide a solution to water 
quality problems because technology is only one com-
ponent of water quality improvement.  Even with the
most efficient, environmentally friendly technology,
producers have incentives to over- (under-) apply
inputs that contribute to (inhibit) nonpoint-source pol-
lution.  Economically sound water quality policies will
consider all aspects of the nonpoint problem to deter-
mine cost-effective solutions.
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President Clinton’s charge to chart a new course for
nonpoint-source pollution policy recognizes that eco-
nomic incentives, regulations (standards), education,
and research all have a role to play in meeting clean
water goals (EPA, USDA, 1998).  To date, however,
only some of these tools have actually been incorpo-
rated into State and Federal water quality programs.
Programs designed to address agricultural nonpoint-
source pollution have relied primarily on education,
technical assistance, and short-term financial assis-
tance.  More recently, design standards have been
incorporated into some State water quality programs. 
This report has systematically presented an extensive
range of policy instruments that can be applied to agri-
cultural sources of nonpoint pollution.  Unlike the
existing economic literature on nonpoint policy tools
in which a single study may consider only one or a
limited set of nonpoint policy instruments, with vary-
ing assumptions across studies, this report has
reviewed each policy tool using a unified framework.
Consequently, a comparison of each instrument’s
strengths and weaknesses, with regard to economic
efficiency and ease of administration, helps to identify
which tools might best underpin a national agricultural
water quality policy.  In this chapter, we consider the
full range of nonpoint instruments presented in this
report and, taking the economic characteristics of each
into account, we attempt to answer the following ques-
tions regarding implementation: 
• Which instruments are most likely to achieve water
quality goals at least cost, given the information
that is likely to be available?  
• Under what situations should each instrument be
used?  
• What information could a resource management
agency obtain to improve the performance of the
tools?
None of these questions implies that a single instru-
ment or combination of instruments is best.   Instead,
the most appropriate instrument(s) is best determined
case by case due to the heterogeneous nature of non-
point pollution.  At present, a comprehensive empirical
assessment of different policy options does not exist.
However, the limited economic literature providing
empirical comparisons of some instruments is
addressed in this chapter.  Before assessing policy
tools, however, we first review why policies for cost-
effective nonpoint-source pollution control are so diffi-
cult to design.
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Chapter 8
Implications for Policy 
and Future Directions
The previous chapters presented an extensive range of policy instruments that can
be applied to agricultural sources of nonpoint-source pollution.  Performance-
based measures are generally infeasible at present because of the difficulty in
observing nonpoint-source emissions and the information requirements placed on
producers. The characteristics of nonpoint-source pollution (i.e., heterogeneous
nature, variability, etc.) and the attractiveness of second-best policies (due to
administrative costs, etc.) rule against a single policy tool.  The most appropriate
tool(s) for a particular problem is an empirical issue based on policy goals, local
conditions, and costs of acquiring information.  Research in areas such as offsite
damages, implementation costs, and simulation models could enhance the per-
formance of nonpoint pollution control policies.Complexities of Policy Design
Designing comprehensive policies for controlling non-
point pollution consists of defining appropriate policy
goals, choosing appropriate instruments, and setting
these instruments at levels that will achieve the goals
at least cost.  Difficulties with each of these steps
derive from the complex physical nature of nonpoint
pollution.
Nonpoint emissions (runoff) cannot be measured at
reasonable cost with current technologies because they
are diffuse (i.e., they move off the fields in a great
number of places) and are affected by random events
such as weather, as is the process by which runoff is
transported to a water body.  This randomness narrows
the way that policy goals with good economic proper-
ties are defined, and limits the types of policy tools
that can be used to attain a cost-effective outcome.
Finally, runoff depends on many site-specific factors.
The more policies and goals are able to address these
site-specific factors, the more efficient nonpoint poli-
cies will be.
Assessment of Policy Goals
An economically efficient outcome is generally unat-
tainable because policymakers seldom have informa-
tion about economic damages.  Instead, a cost-effec-
tive approach to nonpoint pollution control is typically
preferred.  A cost-effective outcome is an outcome in
which policy goals are achieved at least cost.  A vari-
ety of policy goals exist; however, the physical nature
of nonpoint pollution limits the way in which the goals
may be defined and also the economic properties of
the goals.   Apart from the economist’s ideal outcome
of economic efficiency, there are in general two types
of policy goals: (1) physically based goals (water qual-
ity, runoff), and (2) input- and technology-based goals.
Physically based goals are limited in a number of
ways.  First, the random nature of the nonpoint process
requires that these goals be set to attain a probability
of occurrence of an outcome as opposed to a specific
outcome (i.e., that a mean ambient pollution level be
achieved, or that a particular ambient pollution level
be achieved 95 percent of the time).  
Second, the use of more stringent goals may not result
in an expected reduction in damages.  If not, then the
adoption of more stringent goals (i.e., a 25-percent
reduction in pollution levels as opposed to a 20-per-
cent reduction) may actually make society worse off in
its attempt to reduce pollution.  Some techniques can
be used to verify that physically based goals will
reduce economic damages; however, the results may
not always be conclusive.  
Finally, the method of pollution control that achieves a
physically based goal with greatest expected social net
benefits (the sum of private pollution control costs
plus the expected benefits of pollution reduction),
known as the economically preferred method, will
generally differ from the cost-effective method of
achieving the same goal.  The differences are due to
risk effects that arise because the impact of each input
on expected damages is not accounted for in the cost-
effective outcome.  For example, suppose the least-
cost method of achieving a particular policy goal
(method A) costs $50 and reduces expected damages
by $100, for an expected net social gain of $50.
Suppose method B also achieves the same goal, but at
a cost of $60 and a reduction in expected damages by
$120, for an expected net social gain of $60.  In this
case, method B is socially preferred to method A, even
though method A achieves the goal at least cost.
However, since damages often remain unknown and
the economically preferred and cost-effective methods
do not generally coincide, it will not be possible to
identify the economically preferred method before-
hand.  Thus, the notion of cost-effectiveness is limited
when policy goals are defined in terms of physical
measures.
Input- and technology-based goals offer a practical
alternative to physically based goals.  For example,
instead of designing policies to reduce mean nitrogen
loadings, the goal may be a specified reduction in
nitrogen fertilizer application rates.  Such goals give
policymakers more direct control over the factors that
determine the distribution of outcomes, and can be
chosen to ensure both a reduction in expected damages
and an expected improvement in water quality.  In
addition, these goals can be set such that the cost-
effective outcome is preferred to outcomes that
achieve the goals at higher cost (i.e., the cost-effective
and economically preferred outcomes may coincide).
Finally, these goals can be set deterministically, mak-
ing it easier to verify whether or not the goals are met.
In contrast, it may take years to obtain a large enough
sample to determine if probabilistic ambient water
quality goals are achieved.




Performance-based instruments include those instru-
ments based on the environmental outcomes of pro-
ducer actions, such as runoff and ambient pollution
levels.  However, runoff-based instruments are not fea-
sible since runoff cannot be accurately monitored with
current technology.
Ambient-based instruments are (seemingly) advanta-
geous because ambient pollution can be monitored
(although at potentially high costs) without the resource
management agency having to observe the actions of
each producer.  However, there are several difficulties
associated with using ambient-based instruments.  For
example, ambient-based instruments can be designed to
achieve an efficient or cost-effective outcome only
under highly restrictive conditions, such as when pro-
ducers are risk-neutral and producers and the resource
management agency share the same expectations about
the nonpoint process.  This limitation is due to the
complex, random nature of the nonpoint pollution
process.  Other limitations arise because ambient-based
instruments depend on group performance.  For these
instruments to be effective, producers must be able to
evaluate how their actions and the actions of others
affect ambient pollution levels.  Given the large num-
bers of nonpoint polluters that may exist within a
region, and without concerted public sector R&D to
resolve monitoring and forecasting technical problems,
such instruments are likely to be too complex and
information-intensive for producers to obtain all the
required information and make accurate evaluations.
In that case, producers will receive incorrect incentives
from ambient-based instruments.  
The resource management agency also has significant
informational requirements in setting ambient-based
instruments at appropriate levels because to do so
requires that the agency understand how producers
evaluate the impacts of their decisions on water quali-
ty.  In other words, the agency must understand each
producer’s belief structure about the nonpoint process.
This information is either not likely to be available, or
is likely to be difficult and expensive to obtain.
Feasible Policies Are Based on
Observable Components of Production
If performance-based instruments are not viable instru-
ments for controlling nonpoint-source pollution,
design-based instruments are the only potential
recourse.  Design-based instruments are based on
observable aspects of production such as input use or
technology choice.  In addition, ex ante performance
measures such as expected runoff (defined as the level
of runoff expected to result from specific production
choices and calculated with the use of a runoff model)
are included in the set of design bases.
Choice of base
As pointed out in chapters 3 and 4, efficiency requires
that design-based instruments be site-specific and
applied to each variable input and technology choice.
However, efficiency is not likely to be attainable, nor
may it be desirable with high administrative (i.e., mon-
itoring and enforcement) costs.  Instead, second-best
policies, based on a limited set of inputs or on expect-
ed runoff and applied uniformly across producers
operating in a particular region, may be preferred.
First, consider expected runoff as an instrument base.
This base is closer to the externality (pollution) than
individual production decisions, allowing producers to
remain somewhat flexible in how they control runoff.
Producers are able to benefit from their specialized
knowledge, to the extent that this knowledge can be
captured by a model used to calculate expected runoff
levels.  In addition, expected runoff-based instruments
have an “incentive effect,” inducing producers to seek
or to demand better technologies.  
Expected runoff-based instruments also have a number
of important drawbacks.  First, the random nature of
the nonpoint pollution process limits the types of out-
comes that can be attained using expected runoff-
based instruments.  For example, the only cost-effec-
tive outcome that can be achieved with such an instru-
ment is one designed to achieve a mean runoff goal.
In addition, the use of each input and each technology
choice must be monitored in order to apply the model
to determine expected runoff levels.  The administra-
tion costs are therefore not likely to be significantly
reduced relative to other second-best instruments.
Finally, producers are forced to use the resource man-
agement agency’s expectations, as defined by the
model, even though their own expectations may actu-
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only model that might currently be accepted as a tool
for predicting the runoff of a pollutant (Wischmeier
and Smith, 1978).  It has been used to assess eligibility
for USDA programs, and for enforcing conservation
compliance. 
Alternatively, second-best, design-based instruments
could be applied to a limited (truncated) set of inputs
and/or technologies, and the instruments could be
applied uniformly within a region.  Second-best,
design-based instruments could also be designed with
limited information on the part of the resource man-
agement agency to help control administration costs.
Such instruments may be effective in controlling non-
point pollution if the inputs/technologies chosen as
bases are highly correlated with water quality.
Design-based incentives vs. standards
For a given instrument base, economic incentives or
standards can be used to achieve identical policy goals.
However, use of each instrument type will likely have
different consequences for farm profitability by loca-
tion.  Distributional disparities will be greater the
greater the heterogeneity of land, the more uniformly
instruments are applied across a region, and the more
uncertainty the resource management agency has about
site-specific information when designing policies.  In
general, incentives provide more flexibility than stan-
dards because producers are free to adjust their produc-
tion practices to take advantage of personal knowledge
and to react to changing market conditions.
Incentives and standards will also have different
administrative aspects.  The information required by
the resource management agency in setting design-
based standards and incentives is very similar.
However, monitoring may be easier for incentives that
can be applied through existing markets.  For example,
a uniform fertilizer tax can be implemented as a sales
tax whereas a fertilizer standard requires that each pro-
duction site be monitored for fertilizer use.  Design
taxes have the additional advantage of generating rev-
enue.  This revenue could be used to support the
administration of the water quality policy, to fund sup-
porting programs such as education and research, or to
retire marginal land.  For example, a sales tax on fer-
tilizer in Iowa was used to support nutrient manage-
ment programs in that State (Mosher, 1987).  While
the tax rate is currently too low to affect behavior,
research and education efforts may be increasing the
efficiency of fertilizer use. That the nitrogen fertilizer
application rate on corn is much lower in Iowa than
for the other Corn Belt States is circumstantial evi-
dence that research and education are having an effect
(USDA, NASS-ERS, 1996). 
Shortle and Dunn (1986) compared input standards,
input incentives, expected runoff standards, and
expected runoff incentives designed to achieve an effi-
cient solution when asymmetric information exists.
Ignoring transaction costs, they found that appropriate-
ly specified input incentives generally outperform
input standards and expected runoff incentives and
standards, given the characteristics of nonpoint source
pollution and the information typically available to a
resource management agency.  These results, however,
do not necessarily carry over to the case of multiple
farms and/or second-best policies, where administra-
tive costs are considered.
It is not possible to make a general statement about the
relative performance of incentives and standards in a
world with asymmetric information and second-best
policies.  Instead, there are situations in which each is
preferred.1 Similar conclusions can be made about the
application of uniform policies across heterogeneous
land.  In general, each situation must be assessed indi-
vidually.
Miltz, Braden, and Johnson (1988) compared uniform
expected runoff standards and uniform expected runoff
taxes.  These instruments were compared in the con-
text of soil erosion, where the Universal Soil Loss
Equation and sediment delivery coefficients were used
to estimate sediment discharge to waterways.  They
found that uniform discharge standards were superior
to the uniform tax in achieving least-cost control if
there were a strong correlation between the delivery
coefficient and abatement cost.  Otherwise, the tax is
superior.  For example, fields along a river on flat land
would have higher delivery coefficients and lower ero-
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1Weitzman (1974) examined price and quantity policies under
asymmetric information and showed that, in cases where the mar-
ginal cost curve is nearly flat, an error in setting a tax could result
in large deviations from the desired result, making standards the
preferred instrument.  Alternatively, when the benefit function is
closer to being linear, price-based policies are superior.  However,
Malcomson (1978) showed that reliance on such simplistic criteria
might result in the choice of incorrect policy tools.  Similarly,
Stavins (1996) showed the choice to be more complex when the
uncertainty associated with the benefits and costs of pollution con-
trol are correlated.sion rates than fields on hilly, upland areas away from
the river.  The marginal costs of reducing erosion are
lower on the upland fields.  A uniform tax would pro-
vide a greater incentive to reduce erosion on upland
fields that may be contributing little to sediment in the
river.  A uniform standard would provide greater ero-
sion control at least cost.  Russell (1982) came to a
similar conclusion when comparing similar instru-
ments.  Which tool is superior depends on the charac-
teristics of the region, the size of the pollutant source,
and the marginal cost of abatement.  
Helfand and House (1995) found uniform input taxes
to result in lower welfare costs than input standards to
meet a desired water quality goal.  These results held
for taxes and standards applied to all inputs contribut-
ing to pollution, and also for the case in which only a
single input was targeted.
Lichtenberg (1992) found that standards may be prefer-
able to incentives when a specific input reduction goal
is desired.  For example, a standard would be preferred
in a situation where a particular chemical is clearly
detrimental to water quality and application rates need
to be limited or the chemical banned from use. Setting
a tax to optimally meet an input reduction goal requires
knowledge of the farm-specific demand for that input.
Such information is not likely to be available to a
resource management agency.  Design standards, or
limits on input use, would be much easier to implement
in this case, even though the distributive properties
might be poor.  Other examples where design standards
might be preferred include chemigation (using irriga-
tion equipment to apply chemicals along with water),
chemical use on sandy soils, the use of vegetative
buffers, and animal waste storage and use.
Other Instruments Provide 
A Supportive Role
Education
As shown in chapter 6, education by itself cannot
achieve cost-effective water quality control, although
it has proven valuable in support of other approaches.
For example, Bosch, Cook, and Fuglie (1995) found
that education enhanced the performance of a regula-
tion requiring nitrogen testing in Nebraska.  The regu-
lation was more effective than education and cost-
sharing in promoting adoption.  However, producers
did not use the information provided by the testing
properly unless they received some educational assis-
tance.  Education and short-term cost-sharing acceler-
ate the adoption process by providing producers with
the means to acquire management skills and overcome
short-term risks of new practices.  Standards and eco-
nomic incentives set the stage for producers to change
management practices, but adoption and continued use
is a multi-stage process that can fail at any of a num-
ber of points.  Education can help overcome many of
these constraints. 
Education can also be an inexpensive way of improv-
ing the efficiency of input use under current technolo-
gies.  To the extent that inefficient use of inputs is a
source of water quality degradation, improving the
management skills of producers enhances both net
returns and environmental quality.
Research and development
As with education, research is best suited in a support
role for all pollution control policies.  Research can
provide producers and society with more efficient
ways of meeting environmental goals.  New inputs and
technologies can help producers respond to water qual-
ity policies at least cost, while better information,
monitoring technology, and models can help resource
management agencies design more efficient policies.   
Heterogeneous Nature of Nonpoint
Pollution Suggests a Mixed Policy
The wide variety of water pollution problems from agri-
culture (nitrates in surface- and groundwater, soil ero-
sion, pesticides in groundwater, animal waste) and dif-
ferences in agriculture and hydrology across regions
probably argure against the use of a single policy tool.
Multiple instruments have a role when a single instru-
ment is inefficient because of the characteristics of non-
point source pollution (Braden and Segerson, 1993).  In
his study of price and quantity-based policies, Weitzman
(1974) concluded that mixed policies may give the best
results in some situations, depending on the characteris-
tics of the polluters and receiving waters. In a review of
pollution policy tools, Baumol and Oates conclude that
“...effective policy requires a wide array of tools and a
willingness to use each of them as it is required”
(Baumol and Oates, 1979, pp. 230-231).
Abler and Shortle (1991) reviewed the merits of a
variety of tools (including education, design standards,
performance standards, input taxes, input subsidies,
performance taxes, and research and development) for
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evaluation criteria based on both economic and admin-
istrative attributes, they could not identify a single
dominant tool.  Each had its strengths and weaknesses.
Which tools are actually preferred in a particular set-
ting depends on the weights applied to the various
attributes.  
Shortle and Abler (1994) evaluated a mixed scheme
consisting of marketable permits for polluting inputs
combined with a tax on excess input use and a subsidy
for returned permits.  Such a scheme can be imple-
mented without information on farm profits or offsite
damage costs.  This approach was generally shown to
be superior to policies based solely on design incen-
tives.  Optimal implementation could still entail large
administrative costs, but the mixed structure should
offer opportunities for increased efficiency over input-
based tax and license schemes that have been suggest-
ed as policies.
Conant, Duffy, and Holub (1993) studied how public
policy can be fashioned to better address the perceived
conflict between farm profitability and water quality
practices.  They examined how four different policies
performed in achieving three different policy objec-
tives in Iowa.  The policies were (1) design standards
for nutrient and pesticide management, (2) input taxes
on nitrogen and pesticides, (3) technical assistance and
cost-sharing for integrated crop management, and (4)
research and education.  The three policy objectives
were to achieve maximum water quality improvement,
to achieve greatest improvement in water quality con-
sistent with maintaining farm profitability, and to
achieve best overall improvement in both water quality
and profitability.  Each of the policies was examined,
using models of representative farms in six Iowa coun-
ties, for impacts on farm profitability, nitrogen runoff,
pesticide runoff, nitrate leaching, and pesticide leach-
ing over a range of implementation levels. The major
findings of the study, in terms of meeting policy objec-
tives, are as follows:
• Taxation produced the greatest water quality bene-
fit, but proved to be costly to producers. 
• Water quality can be significantly improved with-
out losses to farm profitability because of the prof-
itability of alternative practices.  Improvements to
both can be achieved simultaneously, and in some
cases, without high implementation and administra-
tive costs.    
• Changes in farming practices that might occur in
response to a new policy are highly uncertain.
However, this uncertainty affected the magnitude of
the changes in water quality and farm profitability,
not the direction.
• The impacts on water quality and profitability var-
ied greatly across the State.  This result implies that
targeting different policies to different areas could
improve efficiency.
Institutional Issues
Coordination of water pollution control programs at
the watershed level would promote economic efficien-
cy.  This suggests that policy tools should be tailored
to the individual watershed wherever possible by State
and local authorities.  A watershed approach facilitates
the identification of pollutants (and their source) that
limit desired uses.  Using best estimates of contribu-
tions from different sources, policy administrators can
then select abatement goals and the instruments best
suited to achieving those goals.  Sunding (1996) shows
how welfare losses from second-best policies can be
reduced by making use of information that is relatively
accessible at the regional level, including data on
prices, crop yields, and production costs. These data
can be used to tailor regulations on a regional basis to
minimize losses in private welfare while achieving a
particular environmental goal.
The Clean Water Act establishes a national goal for
water quality, and this is reaffirmed by the recent
Clean Water Action Plan (EPA, USDA, 1998).  The
Clean Water Action Plan also stresses the utility of a
locally led watershed-based approach to water quality
protection.  A potential conflict arises because such an
approach might not achieve national water quality
goals, at least not efficiently.  The Federal Government
can mitigate this conflict by coordinating with the
States to address transboundary problems.  Without
such intervention, the incentives for local jurisdictions
to consider the transboundary implications of their
own policies is lacking, and States may fail to meet
their own water quality goals because of pollution
from upstream activities.  The Clean Water Act estab-
lished a set of procedures for addressing such prob-
lems. 
The Federal Government may be in a better position
than local jurisdictions to support research on non-
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States trying to implement their own programs.
Examples would be the development of nonpoint-
source pollution models and the development of new
management practices.  Similarly, by acting as a clear-
inghouse for scientific information on nonpoint pollu-
tion, the Federal Government can lower information
costs to local jurisdictions.
In trying to balance Federal water quality goals with
local ones, it might be necessary to establish minimum
guidelines for water quality or for industry design
standards.  There might be some economies for a “lev-
eling of the playing field” between jurisdictions.  For
instance, an industry may benefit if it does not have to
meet 50 different sets of standards (Esty, 1996).  Even
though the guidelines may result in a higher cost to a
local watershed for achieving its own water quality
goals, the benefits to the economy as a whole out-
weigh these costs.
Minimum standards may also reduce the movement of
more mobile industries to States with weaker environ-
mental laws (Esty, 1996).   There is some evidence
that the location of large swine operations is at least
partly due to differences in environmental regulations
(Bacon, 1993; Hurt and Zering, 1993).  The recently
proposed Unified National Strategy for Animal
Feeding Operations establishes national minimum
standards for animal waste control for large animal
feeding operations.  One consequence is that States
enacting more stringent laws to protect their water
quality from animal waste are not hurt by the loss of
business to States with less stringent laws.  Minimum
standards also protect States that might otherwise be
slow to respond to environmental problems associated
with polluting industries seeking a more favorable reg-
ulatory environment.  
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